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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation research is to examine the process of community 
participation and community members’ perceptions of and preferences for the participatory 
approaches in Aceh post-tsunami redevelopment. The research questions are: (1) How has the 
process of community participation been implemented in the redevelopment of Aceh Province 
after the tsunami disaster? (2) What are community members’ perceptions of community 
participation in the redevelopment efforts after the Aceh tsunami? (3) What are community 
members’ preferences for the community participation approaches in the redevelopment efforts 
after the Aceh tsunami? 
I employed qualitative and quantitative methods in this study. The four case study 
villages were selected based on categories of level of develepment and tsunami-affected: Lam 
Teungoh, Lam Hasan, Lambung, and Merduati. Interviews were conducted with the 
representatives of government officials, key aid organizations/agencies, and residents involved in 
the relief efforts of the four case study villages. As many as 200 residents were selected 
randomly, where each case study village was represented by 50 residents.   
 In terms of the implementation of community participation, the research findings show 
that the occurence of “ad hoc” participation (participatory activities mainly mobilized by 
community members) was related to community members’ urgent needs right after the tsunami 
as well as their creativity and networking. With regard to aid organization/agency-promoted 
participation (participation mobilized by NGOs, international agencies, and the Indonesian 
Government), the findings indicates this kind of participation was associated with the willingness 
and capacity of aid organizations/agencies, nature of recovery projects, readiness of residents to 
participate, adequate time in exercising participation, and community facilitators’ approaches.  
 
 
 
 
With respect to perceptions of community participation in Aceh post-tsunami 
redevelopment, most respondents agreed that community participation in the relief efforts has 
benefited communities, in terms of meeting needs, capacity building, reducing traumatic 
feelings, and giving hope for a better future for communities. Meanwhile, factor analysis 
indicates that the biggest constraints of participation were the demand for quick decisions and 
actions, issue complexity caused by the tsunami, and the impact of Aceh’s military conflict and 
Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on citizens’ awareness and capability of getting involved in the 
participatory process.  
With regard to preferences for community participation approaches, most respondents 
agreed with provision of education and training as to participatory approaches for stakeholders 
and the formulation of specific guidelines for participation. The majority of respondents were 
also in favor of the implementation of both direct and representative participation in decision 
making. In terms of level of community participation in the government and NGO’s recovery 
projects, more than half of respondents chose the “partnership” category of Arnstein’s level of 
participation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On December 26, 2004, an extremely strong earthquake with a magnitude of 9.1 on the 
Richter scale and the resulting tsunamis devastated the South Asia region. Of 12 nations hit by 
the tsunami, Indonesia suffered the greatest. The overall fatalities were estimated at 127,000 
people, 93,285 people missing, and about 500,000 people displaced (BRR, 2009a). In Indonesia, 
the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam was affected the worst, while Nias Island in the 
Province of North Sumatra was affected to a much lesser extent.  
The earthquake and tsunami wave damaged most of Aceh's coastal areas, infrastructure, 
settlements, and public facilities such as schools, health centers, market places, and government 
buildings. This disaster also affected the social and economic life of the people as well as their 
psychological condition (Republic of Indonesia, 2005). It was estimated that to rebuild the areas 
affected by the disaster in Aceh and Nias, the government of Indonesia needed approximately 
USD 4.9 billion. Pledges made by aid agencies surpassed the minimum required to rebuild to 
pre-tsunami level by 2.3  billion. Eventually 93% of the pledges were converted into real 
funding. Funds (in total USD 6.7 billion) came from three main sources: NGOs (USD 2.4 
billion), donor agencies (USD 2.2 billion), and the Government of Indonesia (USD 2.1 billion) 
(BRR, 2009c).  
The government of Indonesia anticipated the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase after 
the disaster by initiating a master plan and establishing a special agency to coordinate the 
mitigation of the disaster, i.e. the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency of Aceh and Nias 
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(in Indonesian is known as Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh dan Nias or called BRR 
for short). 
The government of Indonesia views community participation after the tsunami as an 
important component in the decision making process starting from the planning and 
implementation phases through to the monitoring and evaluation phases (The Republic of 
Indonesia, 2005; BRR, 2006). The government wants the survivors of the disaster to play an 
important role in the post-tsunami development activities along with the governments (central, 
regional, and local), the private sector, universities, professional associations, the mass media, 
and the community at large. In this regard, BRR is expected to lead the Aceh rehabilitation and 
reconstruction process. The process will be based on a participatory approach as the 
manifestation of good governance principles. 
The implementation of community participation after the tsunami in Aceh Province is 
important to analyze due to the scale of the disaster and the socio-political situation in this 
province and at the national level.  With respect to the scale of the disaster, the Aceh tsunami 
disaster is considered one of the worst natural disasters in modern times. Questions arising here, 
which are also addressed in this study, are what roles do Acehnese community members play in 
redevelopment efforts, and what is the extent of and how effective is their involvement?  
From the socio-political standpoint, it is worth exploring how military conflicts taking 
place in Aceh prior to the tsunami affect today’s Acehnese community. In many ways, the Darul 
Islam Movement/Islamic Army of Indonesia (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia or DI/TII) 
and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) struggles for independence 
(during 1953-1962 and 1976-2005, respectively) have influenced all aspects of Acehnese 
community’s life. 
 
 
3 
 
In the national context, community participation issues are also interesting to examine 
because emergent democracy in Indonesian shows great promise. After the collapse of 
Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia started entering a more democratic era. In this 
era, the high demand for increasing roles of citizens in social life has become one of the main 
concerns across the country (Poppe, et. al, 2001; Satriyo, et. al., 2003; Suselo & Sundungdolok, 
2000). Law No. 22/1999 on Government Regional Autonomy (later revised by Law No. 
32/2004) and Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning are pro-community 
participation laws resulting from this era. Besides enabling district governments to be fully 
responsible for development in their areas (in terms of planning, implementation, and 
evaluation), Law No. 22/1999 gives latitude to the district governments to engage all community 
elements in decision making and other development activities, even though the law does not 
specify the implementation of the involvement (The Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 22/1999). 
Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning emphasizes the need to accommodate a 
participatory approach to regional planning. It states that citizens can get involved in local 
governance through their participation in the deliberative multi-stakeholder forum for 
development planning (Musrenbang) which take place in stages from the village level through to 
sub-district and district levels. Musrenbang provides communities with opportunities to propose 
development programs (The Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 25/2004).  
The following sections of this chapter will include research questions, the significance of 
the research for the public policy literature and for participants who deal with post-disaster 
community participation policies, and the conceptual framework of the participatory approach in 
post tsunami recovery efforts. Chapter 2 examines at theories that deal with community 
participation and disasters, including community participation in redevelopment after disasters, 
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public involvement in democratic systems, the definition and extent of community participation, 
the challenges of community participation, disasters as public policy issues, and collaboration in 
emergency management. Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology, including the design of 
the study, data collection and methods, sample selection, and data analysis. Chapter 4 examines 
the socio-economic profile of Aceh Province and the case study villages prior to and after the 
tsunami. Chapter 5 explains a conceptual framework of the participatory approach adopted in 
post-tsunami recovery efforts. Chapter 6 reviews the findings of the study and Chapter 7 
concludes with summary of findings, limitations of the study, future research, and some 
recommendations for supporting participatory approaches in post-disaster redevelopment in 
Aceh and Indonesia in the future.     
 
Research Questions 
In this study, I investigate the process of community participation, including community 
members’ perceptions of and preferences about the participatory approach in the recovery efforts 
after the 2004 Aceh tsunami. My research questions are: 
1. How has the process of community participation been implemented in the redevelopment of 
Aceh Province after the tsunami disaster?  
2. What are community members’ perceptions of community participation in the redevelopment 
efforts after the Aceh tsunami?  
3. What are community members’ preferences for the community participation approaches in 
the redevelopment efforts after the Aceh tsunami? 
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Research Significance 
Although there is some general guidance provided for community participation in post-
disaster redevelopment (The Republic of Indonesia, Laws No. 25/2004, No. 32/2004, and No. 
24/2007), to date, Aceh Province and other regions in Indonesia have not had any specific 
guidance on this matter. This situation needs to be seriously addressed in light of the appreciation 
of people’s rights in determining their future in the disaster recovery process as well as 
supporting comprehensive participatory redevelopment efforts.  
In post-disaster reconstruction, the involvement of the affected people and communities 
at large is instrumental to any long-term plans for sustainable recovery. The affected people and 
communities at large’s involvement in reconstruction efforts is a crucial component in terms of 
building the capacity of communities, meeting the needs of the community, and maintaining the 
continuum of development. In terms of maintaining the continuum of development, their 
involvement in post-disaster reconstruction helps preserve the continuity of development 
(Newport & Jawahar, 2003; Pardasani, 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006).   
Given the above, the analysis of community participation after the Aceh tsunami is 
important for both Aceh Province and any other regions across the country as one of valuable 
bases for the preparation of more effective post-disaster participatory policies in the future.  
This research will also add to the growing body of community participation literature on 
disaster mitigation efforts. It will provide alternative strategies and conceptual models for 
community participation after the disaster as well as enhance the basis for further study in 
community participation as part of disaster relief in global communities. The attention to 
community members’ perceptions and preferences towards the participatory approach in post-
disaster redevelopment is important. Their perceptions and preferences can affect their 
 
 
6 
 
involvement in post-disaster redevelopment, which in turn, contributes to the success of the 
recovery process (Buckle & Marsh, 2002; Coghlan, 1998; McCamish, 1998; McDowell, 2002; in 
Pardasani, 2006). In addition, by taking into account all stakeholders’ views, including 
community members’ preferences, policy makers can produce a more comprehensive and 
broadly supported strategy for the participatory approach in post-disaster redevelopment. 
This research can benefit a number of parties. It will provide agencies and institutions at 
the local, national, and international levels with strategies and methodologies for developing 
community participation in the post-disaster period. This research will also help researchers in 
understanding community participation in the post-disaster term in developing countries, with a 
specific reference to Indonesia. 
 
The Conceptual Framework of the Participatory Approach in Post Tsunami Recovery 
Efforts 
 
 The participatory principles embeded in the Master Plan for Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction for Aceh Province and Nias Islands were the main guidance for community 
participation in post-disaster redevelopment in Aceh . Some other references included related 
laws or regulations, namely Laws No. 25/2004, No. 32/2004, and No. 24/2007.  Law No. 
24/2007, specifically designed for the purpose of disaster management, was stipulated during the 
reconstruction process. Like the Master Plan, it also incorporates community-based disaster risk 
management. Laws No. 25/2004 and No. 32/2004 are the main laws that address the 
community’s role in Indonesian general development processes. The central government in 2004 
approved these laws which include the fundamental principles on which to build a more 
democratic system. 
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The master plan for rehabilitation and reconstruction for Aceh Province pays 
considerable attention to community participation issues. The master plan states that all 
community elements are expected to be involved in the decision making process from the 
planning and implementation phases through the monitoring and evaluation phases. The 
survivors of the disaster along with the community, the governments, private sector, and NGOs 
should cooperate in post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction to achieve greater 
development results (The Republic of Indonesia, 2005). 
Under the oversight of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), the central 
and regional governments function to facilitate the participation of all components in the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction process. The Master Plan emphasizes the importance of the 
establishment of the Development Councils from the village to provincial levels with 
representatives from the public, government, and the private sector in order to coordinate the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction process. The Development Councils are expected to conduct 
planning exercises (identification of issues, strengths, threats and opportunities), develop action 
plans, and monitor and evaluate their implementation. The Development Council is a generic 
name. Its form depends on an already existing community institution. 
In many ways, the master plan only provides general principles of community 
participation and does not set specific criteria, such as to what extent community members’ roles 
and views in each stage of redevelopment process should be accommodated. It is no wonder then 
if in practice, participatory approaches used by NGOs vary. Vebry et al., (2007) state that certain 
NGOs involved in rebuilding houses used participatory approaches in the lowest form by only 
inviting their beneficiaries in the consultation process, while the rebuilding and funding process 
were still fully managed by the NGOs themselves. Other NGOs allowed wide latitude to their 
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beneficiaries by giving them a chance to design their houses (facilitated by their technical staff) 
and manage the needed funds. 
Law No. 32/2004 on Government Regional Autonomy enables district governments to be 
fully responsible for planning, implementation, and evaluation of development in their respective 
areas. As a consequence of the enactment of this law, the central government is now responsible 
only for the following functions:  defense and security, foreign affairs, monetary affairs, justice 
and religion. District development is solely within the authority of the district government (The 
Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 32/2004). This law also recommends that local governments 
engage community members in development of their areas. However, it does not give any 
explanation regarding the meaning and forms of the participation and what steps should be taken 
to put the participation in place.  
Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning is more specific in supporting 
community participation in policymaking. This law emphasizes the need to accommodate a 
participatory approach to regional planning. Here, citizens can get involved in local governance 
through their participation in the deliberative multi-stakeholder forum for development planning 
(Musrenbang).  Musrenbang takes place in stages from the village level through to sub-district 
and district levels to develop annual development programs and budgets. At the village level, 
Musrenbang provides community members with opportunities to voice their aspirations and 
participate in producing development programs that suit their needs (The Republic of Indonesia, 
Law No. 25/2004). However, instituting wide representation and participation is still a big 
challenge for local governments at this level.  
Law No. 24/2007 on Disaster Management, so far the only specific law on disaster 
managment in Indonesia, has now been an umbrella of Indonesia’s disaster management 
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implementation that incorporates community-based disaster risk management. According to this 
law, disaster management is also part of the public domain, knowledge, and effort, and is 
integrated with government’s role in planning and coordinating the efforts. Disaster management 
covers a series of actions in which stakeholders  control, prevent, response or completely 
eliminate certain identified hazards. This law explicitly states each individual’s rights in disaster 
management. The rights include gaining education, training and skills in the operation of disaster 
management; accessing written and/or verbal information in disaster management policies, 
participating in planning,operating, and maintaining the health service assistance delivery 
program including psychosocial support; participating in decision making on disaster 
management activities, especially those related to his/her self interest and his/her community 
interest; and conducting monitoring in accordance with mechanisms arranged in the 
implementation of disaster management (Partnerships for Disaster Reduction-South East Asia, 
2008).  Although this law enables community members to get involved in a wide scope of the 
disaster management process including in decision making and monitoring, like the Master Plan, 
it does not clearly state the extent to which community involvement will be accomodated nor 
how they should participate in each stage of the disaster management process including in the 
post-disaster term. The absence of these technical issues in the law is not supplemented in the 
operational guidance either. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 This chapter will describe theories related to community participation in order to provide 
a theoretical framework and tools with which to examine community participation in post-
disaster redevelopment in Aceh. The purpose of this literature review is to establish a knowledge 
base for the study. This chapter will be informed by theories about community participation in 
post-disaster redevelopment, public involvement in democratic systems, the nature of community 
participation (definition, extent, and challenges of community participation), disasters as public 
policy issues, and collaboration in emergency management.  
Theories of community participation in post-disaster redevelopment will be described to 
examine the exercise of community participation in recovery efforts. Public involvement in 
democratic systems will be discussed to identify how citizens participate in development in a 
democratic arena. The nature of community participation will be reviewed in order to examine 
the essence, level and constraints of community participation. A review of disasters from the 
perspective of the field of public policy study will be conducted to identify the relationship 
between disasters and public policy. Finally, theories of collaboration in emergency management 
will be discussed to highlight the importance of collaboration among stakeholders in emergency 
management.          
 
Community Participation in Redevelopment after Disasters 
Community participation has been widely accepted as a tool for analyzing and addressing 
social problems in a sustainable way (Osti, 2004). However, the exercise of community 
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participation is surely contingent upon the settings in which it is implemented. Community 
participation in an emergency situation poses different challenges and constraints from those in a 
normal situation. The demand for quick decisions and actions in a context of complicated issues 
presents impediments for the implementation of community participation in post-disaster 
reconstruction (Moe & Pathranarakul, 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006). 
Research shows that community participation plays an important role in the recovery 
process after disasters. In post-disaster reconstruction taking place in Maldives, India, and Nepal, 
for instance, the involvement of the affected communities is vital to meeting the need of 
communities, improving capacity building of communities and maintaining the continuum of 
development. In terms of maintaining the continuum of development, their involvement in post-
disaster reconstruction helps preserve the continuity of development (Newport & Jawahar, 2003; 
Pardasani, 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006).  
Although there have been different opinions on the degree of community involvement 
needed in redevelopment efforts, research shows that participation of affected individuals and 
communities is a determining factor leading to overall success (Buckle & Marsh, 2002; Coghlan, 
1998; McCamish, 1998; McDowell, 2002; Pardasani, 2006). Buckle and Marsh (2002) argue that 
despite the significant role of experts in assessment of planning and implementation efforts, local 
knowledge, strengths, and priorities affect the redevelopment success. According to Buckle and 
Marsh (2002), the involvement of communities in needs assessment may be fraught with risk; 
however, this contributes to reducing disaster vulnerability and increasing resilience.     
 The involvement of communities can encompass the stages of need assessment, design, 
and implementation of the rebuilding efforts. This involvement promotes the recognition, 
acquisition, maturation and connection of community assets and produces self-reliant, self-
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sustaining and empowered communities (Delgado, 2000; Homan, 2005, Kramer & Specht, 
1983). To support participatory approaches, education, training, and awareness building within 
communities, related departments, and other concerned parties are an inevitable need (Newport 
& Jawahar, 2003). 
  Based on his research on community participation in post-tsunami reconstruction and 
redevelopment in the Maldives, Pardasani (2006) proposes a participatory model to implement a 
comprehensive disaster management and rehabilitation program. This model suggests the 
establishment of councils at two main levels: a National Advisory Council and Community 
Councils. The National Advisory Council functions to coordinate all redevelopment efforts 
involving all agencies, organizations, representatives from international development programs, 
financial experts, construction company executives, reconstruction experts, and community 
councils that are involved in the process of redevelopment. It also assists in creating a blue print 
for reconstruction and prepares reports and briefings for the public. Community Councils are 
based in villages and towns and consist of representatives of the local community from various 
backgrounds and professions, including at-risk groups. These councils have the right to review 
funding proposals and redevelopment efforts and propose modifications. These councils have 
representatives to the national advisory council elected by each community council (Pardasani, 
2006). 
Pardasani (2006) accentuates the important role of NGOs in the model. According to him 
NGOs should be advocates for the affected communities and help empower communities in 
terms of supporting their rights and needs, educating and informing them, helping community 
councils function, and guiding them in complex negotiating processes with bureaucracy and 
other institutions. Furthermore, he recommends that the whole process of reconstruction should 
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be undertaken in an open, accessible, accountable, and transparent manner to build trust among 
all components involved. Considering its general and applicable principles, it seems that 
Pardasani’s participatory model for post-disaster reconstruction can be adopted in different 
settings with some modifications and adjustments.  
 Although community participation in post-disaster reconstruction in other countries has 
been intensively studied, there is only limited research paying attention to such work in Aceh’s 
reconstruction after the 2004 tsunami. Vebry, Manu, and Berman (2007) examine community-
based housing reconstruction programs implemented by three organizations, United Nations 
Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), Canadian Red Cross (CRC) and Urban 
Poverty Linkage (UPLINK). The research findings show that these three organizations used 
various levels of community participation: the consultation level of CRC (top-down approaches, 
the beneficiaries gave feedback, the benefactor made a decision), the collaboration level of UN-
HABITAT (the beneficiaries and the benefactor make a joint decision), and the empowerment 
level of UPLINK (bottom-up approaches, the beneficiaries make a final decision). Interestingly, 
the highest level of participation (empowerment) resulted in the highest score in terms of 
beneficiary’s satisfaction, accountability and construction quality. Conversely, the lowest level 
(consultation) resulted in the lowest score in those three aspects. Vebry et al. (2007) claim that 
the experience of UN-HABITAT, UPLINK and other organizations shows that homeowner’s 
participation has speeded up reconstruction as a result of the increased sense of belonging. This 
research demonstrates that community participation in post-disaster reconstruction can be 
realistic, satisfying, fast, and can produce high quality outcomes. According to Vebry et al. 
(2007), the success of these community approaches rests on adequate time for the process and 
the availability of well-trained facilitators.        
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 Previous studies have investigated the impacts, constraints, levels, scope, and strategies 
of community participation in post-disaster redevelopment (Buckle & Marsh, 2002; Coghlan, 
1998; Delgado, 2000; Homan, 2005, Kramer and Specht, 1983; McCamish, 1998; McDowell, 
2002; Moe & Pathranarakul, 2006; Newport & Jawahar, 2003; Pardasani, 2006; Vebry, Manu, & 
Berman, 2007; Waugh & Streib, 2006), but there is no particular study which examines the 
perceptions and preferences of community members toward this participatory approach itself. 
The attention to community members is important because their involvement in post-disaster 
redevelopment contributes to the success of the recovery process (Buckle & Marsh, 2002; 
Coghlan, 1998; McCamish, 1998; McDowell, 2002; in Pardasani, 2006). Also by properly 
considering and accommodating their views, in addition to government officials and other 
individuals or parties’ views, policy makers can set a more comprehensive and broadly supported 
strategy for the participatory approach in post-disaster redevelopment in the future.          
 
Public Involvement in Democratic Systems 
In democratic systems, it is widely accepted that citizens have determinant power in 
dealing with many aspects of their lives. Democracy, in general, requires that the government be 
in some way selected by, guided by, and accountable to the public. In the contenxt of the U.S. 
federal system, what exists, are various forms of representative democracy, a factor which is 
complicated for the ordinary citizens, by the fact that there are multiple layers of general purpose 
governments, plus many forms of “special districts,” all of which are supposed, in democratic 
systems, to at least be guided by and accountable to the public. Some democratic theorists view 
the democratic system as a mechanism for representing citizen interests as well as developing an 
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informed citizenry consistent with the educative functions of democracy (Pateman, 1970). This 
so-called “participatory democracy” is considered pivotal to development of citizens.  
Added to the complications of representation and multiple levels and forms of 
government is the fact that, even in representative systems, the control individual citizens can, or 
should, have over government is limited by factors of numbers and widely varying levels of 
attentiveness and even knowledge (Dahl, 1990). Hence, typically “pluralism,” as discussed in 
theories of American democracy in the 1950s and 1960s, exists (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1951). 
Pluralism is a system in which there is a whole plethora of groups and organizations –now often 
referred to as “interest groups”—intervening between the grassroots of individual citizens and 
their various “governments” (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1951). This plethora of intervening groups 
and organizations is a large portion of what is now commonly referred to as “civil society,” 
something that is being promoted aggressively by U.S, European, United Nations, etc. 
organizations in their approach to the currently “emerging nations” in their efforts to promote 
their vision of democracy. 
In fact, the “franchise,” the right to participate in government by voting, also varies and 
has changed over time in the U.S. Mostly, various mechanisms have emerged to extend the 
franchise to a broader range of citizens. One very significant, and somewhat unique, mechanism 
for expanding the franchise is “administrative participation.” This is the engagement of the 
public via “public involvement” by administrative agencies, often on a program-by-program 
basis, and very frequently directly engaging grassroots citizens. This is done in the form of such 
things as hearings, public meetings, organization of advisory committees, each focusing upon 
specific public agencies and/or programs (May, 1971; Voth & Bonner, 1978). 
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One of the things that is evident from this is that, in democratic systems, there is a wide 
range of flexibility in the manner in which citizens may participate, which allows for a 
considerable amount of what can best be called “ad hoc” participation (Dodge, 1974). Ad hoc 
participation may take a number of forms: committees, ombudsmen, citizen research and 
information offices, volunteer programs, and fund-raising efforts. 
Starting with David Lilienthal’s writings (1944), Philip Selznick’s “TVA and the Grass 
Roots,” (1966) and the voluminous literature on the “Maximum Feasible Participation” feature 
of the U.S. war on poverty of the 1960s, and even the literature on community development, 
there is a very large literature on administrative participation, or what is often simply referred to 
“public involvement.” In the U.S., there are, for instance, detailed guidelines and manuals for 
“public involvement” in agency decision-making produced by various government agencies, like 
the Department of Transportation (United States Department of Transportation, 1976). Voth and 
Bonner (1978) have summarized some of the major features, functions, and dilemmas of 
administrative participation. 
 
Definition and Extent of Community Participation 
To define community participation precisely is not an easy task. Various social, 
economic, educational, and other conditions within communities affect community participation. 
The varying degrees and types of involvement in development activities also contribute to the 
difficulty of defining “community participation.” In participatory development literatures, 
“community involvement,” “popular participation,” ”self-help,” and “self reliance” are often 
considered to have the same meaning as community participation (Whyte, 1986).   
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In simple terms, Whyte (1986) defines community participation as “the involvement of 
the community members in development project” (p. 7). The involvement here includes a series 
of activities: assessment of the situation, definition of the problems, setting of priorities, making 
decisions, planning of action programs to overcome the problems, sharing responsibility in 
project implementation, and evaluating and modifying the project.  Whyte examines the 
involvement of the community members; however he does not measure the degree of the 
involvement. It means that as long as the community is involved in the development project, 
though at the minimum level, it still can be categorized as community participation.   
Unlike Whyte, Voth and Bonner (1978) contend citizen participation connotes active 
involvement in which the citizen engages. They focus on the effect of citizens on public 
decisions. According to Voth and Bonner, in simple terms, citizen participation may be defined 
as “voluntary activities undertaken by persons in their roles as ordinary citizens, or amateurs, to 
influence public decisions or the acts of public officials” (p. 4).  Here, the citizens hope that, 
through their involvement, their interests will be considered and accommodated by those in 
charge.    
Arnstein’s “ladder of citizen participation” (1969) offers an analytic framework for 
categorizing community involvement in development. She argues that citizen participation has 
hierarchical levels. The highest level of participation is the so-called citizen power which is 
defined as “the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded 
from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future” (p. 2). The 
lowest level is non participation in which citizens have no chance to get involved in planning or 
conducting programs. Arnstein’s “ladder of citizen participation” can be applied to various 
development activities and settings due to its flexibility and practicality. Arnstein does not 
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consider techniques and mediums of participation as the parameters in determining the level of 
participation. The main concern is to examine how much power citizens exercise regardless of 
how and in what arenas they gain the power.  
Arnstein (1969) classifies community participation into three categories: non 
participation, tokenism, and citizen power -- based on the degree of power which citizens enjoy 
in decision making process. These categories are formulated as “eight rungs on a ladder of 
citizen participation.” The classification is based on the American context and its experiences. 
According to Arnstein (1969), in a hierarchal form, community participation categories from the 
lowest (the least meaningful) to the highest (the most meaningful) are as follows: 
1. Nonparticipation 
In this category, community members are not allowed to participate in planning or 
conducting programs. Power holders ignore the involvement of community in the 
development process. This category has two levels (from the lowest to the highest): 
a. Manipulation 
The social elite are placed in the advisory boards of development programs aimed at 
engineering the community’s support. At meetings, the officials persuade and advise the 
citizens, and not the reverse. 
b. Therapy 
The authority tries to be the savior by “curing” the “diseases” suffered by the community. 
For example, tenants of public housing are used for the sake of the authority’s interest, 
such as through promoting cleanup campaigns. On the other side, they do not have a 
chance to deal with their urgent problems, such as arbitrary eviction or poor maintenance. 
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The fact is that it actually does not solve their real problems because it doesn’t touch on 
the basic underlying factors causing the problems.  
2. Tokenism 
This category introduces the initial steps toward legitimate citizen participation through the 
involvement of the community in decision-making. Unfortunately, this involvement doesn’t 
guarantee their concerns will truly be taken into account. The levels of community 
participation in this category (from the lowest to highest) are as follows: 
a. Informing 
Citizens are informed of their rights, responsibilities, and options. Unfortunately the 
information is usually provided at a late stage and using a one-way flow of information 
(from officials to citizens), so citizens can’t influence the decision significantly. 
b. Consultation 
The community is invited to contribute ideas or considerations for the programs through 
surveys, neighborhood meetings, or public hearings.  Participation is gauged by 
questionnaire responses, number of meetings/public hearings, or number of people 
attending the meetings/public hearings. The drawback is that there is no guarantee that 
their input will be really considered by the officials. 
c. Placation 
The officials invite the community to provide input for programs and accommodate the 
involvement of community through the existence of their representatives in related 
planning boards. However, the right to accept or reject the advice still depends a lot on 
them. 
3. Citizen power 
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In this category, citizens have a determinant power to force and influence the decision-
making. A degree of citizen power can be achieved if the citizens have mechanisms in place 
which will hold their leaders accountable. This category has three levels. From the lowest to 
highest levels are as follows: 
a. Partnership 
The power of citizens is gained through negotiation. The officials share planning and 
decision-making responsibilities through joint policy boards, planning committees, or 
other mechanisms of problem resolution. 
b. Delegated power 
Citizens can have dominant decision-making authority with regards to a certain program 
or plan as a result of negotiation with public officials. One of the models at this level is 
the implementation of the rights of citizens to veto decisions.  
c. Citizen Control  
This highest level of community participation enables citizens to govern a program, to 
handle managerial aspects, and to negotiate to change the conditions. In practice, in the 
American context, many people consider that no model city can meet the criteria of 
citizen control because the final power and accountability are held by the city council. 
 
Like Arnstein, another scholar, Johnson (1984), also analyzes citizen participation in light 
of the degree of involvement and power that citizens have in the decision making process. In 
terms of local planning, Johnson classifies community participation levels into five categories (in 
reality, they often blend with each other).  
1. Constituent participation 
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This form appears when the planning choices made by the elected officials reflect their 
constituents’ aspirations and needs. This form is possible to be implemented if citizens have 
an opportunity to choose their officials or leaders. 
2. Consultative participation 
This second form acknowledges the citizens’ right to get information as well as to deliver 
comments, options and recommendation on planning. To realize the right, the planning 
authorities need to implement meetings or hearings. 
3. Definitive participation 
This is a distinct form of citizen participation. Here, citizens have legal authority to impose 
requirements, grant permission, and commit resources. The three top levels (degree of citizen 
power) of Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation regarding partnership, delegated power, 
and citizen control levels strongly reflect this form. 
4. Implementative participation 
In implementing planning decisions, the involvement of citizens becomes significant. In this 
case, the citizens’ choices can be various: cooperate with, abstain from, or oppose the 
implementation.  
5. Evaluative participation 
This form is implemented after the planned project has been completed. The citizens who 
are interested in and beneficiaries of the project decide whether the outcomes meet their 
needs and interests. This form of participation is worthwhile in order to give feedback for 
the implementation of constituent participation. For instance, the failure of a particular 
project can result in the rejection of similar projects. 
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Given the above explanation, it can be concluded that community participation refers to a 
situation in which community members take part in decision making, planning, implementation, 
and evaluation processes in the affairs they are interested in. The levels of participation vary 
from the “no power” to “superficial power” and “real power” levels. In terms of how 
communities get involved in participatory process, it can take place through representative and 
direct participation. In the former participation, community members represented by bureaucrats 
or community leaders formulate decisions to fulfill community aspirations and needs. The latter 
is implemented by enabling community members to directly voice their concerns.   
 
The Challenges of Community Participation 
Community participation in development can benefit both communities and the 
government (Rukmana et. al, 1993; Voth & Bonner, 1978). First, community participation 
mobilizes the resources of citizenry (money, material, knowledge, skills, and leadership) which 
contributes to complementing the lack of government resources. Second, community 
participation creates a possibility for decisions to be based on the community’s needs and 
priorities. Third, community participation ensures community’s knowledge, creativity, and skills 
are recognized and used that in turn results in the enhancement of community’s capacity 
building. Fourth, community participation builds up the self enabling and cooperative spirit of 
the community. Fifth, community participation ensures a greater acceptance and appreciation of 
development programs. This may result in better care and maintenance. Sixth, community 
participation can function to reduce conflict by airing conflictual issues openly and attempting to 
resolve them. 
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  According to Hoff and Steinberg (1992), the willingness and readiness of both the 
government and communities affect community participation in policymaking process. On the 
one hand, government bureaucrats and agencies should have the political will and skills to 
stimulate and broaden participatory process. On the other hand, community members should 
have the will and ability to participate in the process or learn over time the benefits of such 
participation. Referring to Cobb and Ross (1997), “low cost strategies” are used by government 
to make sure that an issue is never considered in the agenda.  This unwillingness of government 
relates to an attempt to preserve its power and promoted its own self-interest. The use of these 
strategies limits government’s use of resources, such as funds, time, and people.  
Despite its potential benefits, public participation in development poses challenges for 
community decision makers. According to Cogan, Sharpe, and Hertzberg (1986), citizen 
participation in development will vary for different activities and governmental levels. In terms 
of activities, due to technical capability issues, citizen participation is most effective in the stages 
of goal formulation and policy definition and tends to be limited in other stages. In this case, the 
planners’ roles in those other stages will be much more dominant. Cogan et al. (1986) consider 
that citizen participation in development covers a broad scope (i.e. goal setting, policy 
identification and analysis, policy making, administrative rulemaking, program operations, and 
evaluation). With regard to governmental levels, citizens tend to get involved in local level 
decisions because they are most relevant to their daily lives. On the other hand, issues at the state 
and regional levels tend to be more abstract and removed from their daily routine.  
Moreover, Cogan et al. (1986) argue that the constraints of community participation 
should also be considered in light of the nature of community participation itself. On one hand, 
public involvement is often a requirement for government. On the other, it is optional for 
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citizens. However, Cogan et al. (1986) contend, even though community members tend to be 
reluctant to participate in the development process, it does not mean that they have no motivation 
to be involved. As a matter of fact, they have various motivations. They choose to participate 
probably because they expect a satisfying experience and hope to be able to make a difference. 
With regard to a well-planned program, the expectations of community members and the 
government are similar. 
Meanwhile, Snel (1999) contends that there are three primary constraints on community 
participation. First, it is likely that community participation is considered an unfair distribution 
of work among members of community. Some community members probably feel that they are 
asked to take on extra work tasks that do not provide them with appropriate financial, social, or 
other incentives. Second, the usual positions of people tend to be individualistic. Dealing with 
this, it is difficult to involve people with affairs that are not directly related to their lives and 
interests. Third, community members perhaps consider that the development project is 
government’s responsibility, therefore government’s efforts to involve them in the project is a 
form of exploitation. 
Based on this review of the literature, it can be concluded that constraints on community 
participation in policymaking come from both the government and the community. The roles of 
these groups and their cooperation determine the success of community participation in 
policymaking process. More successful community participation requires the political will and 
the skills of government bureaucrats and government agencies to stimulate the participatory 
process, as well as the awareness and abilities of community members to participate in the 
process.    
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Specifically, to overcome the technical capability constraints that, in the worst case, lead 
communities not to be able to get involved in policymaking, the constituent participation model 
formulated by Johnson (1984) can be adopted. Through the constituent participation model, 
community members can be represented by officials or leaders who are familiar with the issues 
with wich the community is dealing. This model requires elected community representatives so 
that community’s aspirations and needs can be properly channeled in the policymaking process.     
     
Disasters as Public Policy Issues 
In his book After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events, Birkland 
(1997) considers disasters as part of focusing events that are important in policy making. He 
defines a focusing event as “an event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as 
harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or suggests 
potential harms that are or could be concentrated on a definable geographical area or community 
of interest, and that is known to policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously.” (p. 22). 
In response to disasters, government needs to make decisions about “official disaster declarations 
or resource allocations connected with mitigation, preparedness, response or recovery” (Perry, 
2007, p. 4). 
In the field of public policy study, disasters are often analyzed from the perspective of the 
surface features of an agent, that is, natural and man-made (catastrophic) disasters. Birkland 
(1997), for instance, discusses how four types of man-made and natural disasters (oil spills, 
nuclear power plant accident, earthquakes, and hurricane) affect agenda setting and the policy 
making process. When discussing natural disasters as focusing events, Birkland examines the 
physical, economic, and human features. These disasters are among humanity’s most damaging, 
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expensive, deadliest and feared events. Besides killing a large number of people, they also 
destroy infrastructure and affect the social and economic life of the people. 
As disasters, focusing events provide a reasonable push to get the attention of people in 
and around government (Kingdon, 1995). Although they are not the sole triggers of attention to a 
problem, focusing events have potential to motivate the process of change when they occur in the 
course of an already ongoing debate on a particular issue, or when there is a stalemate in a policy 
debate. 
Birkland (1997) contends that a potential focusing event has several criteria. First, the 
event happens suddenly. A sudden event can be used to attract greater attention to the problem 
revealed by the event. Second, a potential focusing event is rare, unpredictable and unplanned. 
The event is not a daily occurrence, strikes with little or no warning, and is unexpected. Third, a 
potential focusing event affects a lot of people. In the case of natural disasters, for instance, those 
people can be in the same area. Fourth, the event is learnt by members of the policy community 
virtually simultaneously.  
According to Birkland (1997), the agenda setting power of the event --the process by 
which issues gain greater mass and elite attention, depends on five factors. The first is the 
magnitude of harm caused. Certain problems are so injurious, large and salient that they almost 
automatically attract public attention.  The second factor is the scope and rarity of the issue. A 
widespread and infrequent issue has more chance to gain public attention. The third factor is the 
role of policy communities and policy entrepreneurs in the policy domain. Policy communities 
refer to active and informed individuals or groups that form advocacy coalitions. Policy 
entrepreneurs are those who get involved in the issue because of their material interests or 
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technical expertise in the field and lead advocacy coalitions in advancing issues on the agenda 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999).  
The fourth factor is the social construction of the problem. Problems are socially 
constructed through the use of symbols, beliefs, and facts. And the fifth factor is the symbolic 
power of the event to extend the issue to a broader community of citizens.  Symbols are the idea 
of how complex issues are transmitted into easy ones. These symbols are framed by participants 
in policy making and propagated by the mass communications media (Birkland, 1997).  
 
Collaboration in Emergency Management 
In the disaster literature, terms such as emergency preparedness, disaster planning or 
disaster management, are used interchangeably in the context of efforts to manage and control 
disasters (Pearce, 2000). Emergency management can be defined as “the discipline and 
profession of applying science, technology, planning, and management to deal with extreme 
events that can injure or kill large numbers of people, do extensive damage to property, and 
disrupt community life” (Hoetmer, 1991, p. xviii). In this regard, emergency managers (those 
who are in charge of coping with disasters) should employ knowledge, techniques, strategies, 
tools, organization networks, and other community and external resources to reduce the 
occurrence of disasters and successfully deal with their impacts in order to protect people, 
property, and the environment.  
According to Choi (2008), emergency management is basically a comprehensive 
management program covering hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and 
disaster recovery. He argues that hazard mitigation deals with prevention and lessening the 
impact of a disaster. According to Choi (2008), disaster preparedness is related to preparation to 
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mitigate against, respond to, and recover from any disaster, such as emergency operations plans, 
resource management plans, and training and exercises. Disaster response includes emergency 
operations to save lives and property through evacuating and providing supplies/logistics for 
victims and restoring damaged public services (Choi, 2008). Disaster recovery takes actions to 
return the system to normal to cope with disaster impacts, such as debris clearance, 
unemployment, temporary housing, and facility development (Choi, 2008). 
Emergency management relates to many actors (i.e. the vulnerable communities, 
government institutions, non government organizations (NGOs), private sectors, and the general 
public). Therefore, emergency management should be supported by effective management 
strategies. Collaborative management is one of strategies necessary for coping with disasters 
(Montjoy & Kiefer, 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006).    
Collaborative management can be defined as “a concept that describes the process of 
facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be 
solved, or solved easily, by single organizations” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 4). Due to 
complicated problems and negative impacts resulted from disasters, it is important to set up 
plans, structures, and arrangements to engage the efforts of governments, voluntary and private 
agencies and other related parties in a comprehensive and coordinated manner (Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006).   
Promoting collaboration in complex organizations is extremely challenging because 
people (or parties) in the organizations are expected to work together to share resources, power, 
and authority, so that they can embrace common goals that could not be achieved by only relying 
on a single individual or party (Kagan in Daka Mulwanda et al., 1995). 
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Summary 
Several theories presented in this literature review were applied to analyze community 
participation in Aceh post-tsunami redevelopment. Theories of public involvement in democratic 
systems were employed to investigate the forms of participation in the recovery efforts. How 
community members participate in the relief efforts in relation to the three forms of participation 
indicated in these theories, i.e. “ad hoc,” “interest group,” and “administrative” participation 
(Dahl, 1961; Dodge, 1974; May, 1971; Truman, 1951; Voth & Bonner, 1978) was investigated 
in the context of Aceh post-tsunami redevelopment.   
In examining community members’ perceptions of the importance, constraints, extent of 
community participation in post-tsunami reconstruction, I also adopted a number of concepts 
provided in this literature review. The importance of community participation refers to the work 
of Newport and Jawahar (2003), Pardasani (2006), Waugh & Streib (2006). Constraints of 
participation adopt the work of Moe and Pathranarakul (2006), Waugh and Streib (2006), and 
Hoff and Steinberg (1992). Meanwhile, Arnstein’s level of participation (1969) was used to 
examine the extent to which community members have participated in Aceh post-tsunami 
redevelopment.   
In terms of determining community members’ preferences for the participatory 
approaches in post-tsunami redevelopment, I referred to the work of Vebry et al. (2007) on the 
need of education and training on participatory approaches for stakeholders as well as the need 
of the formulation of specific guidelines for participation. Direct and representative participation 
discussed in Arnstein (1969) and Johson (1984) were also adopted to examine the extent to 
which community members support the implemententation of these two types of participation.   
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 As stated in Chapter I, my research questions are: (1) How has the process of community 
participation been implemented in the redevelopment of Aceh Province after the tsunami 
disaster?; (2) What are community members’ perceptions of community participation in the 
redevelopment efforts after the Aceh tsunami?; and (3) What are community members’ 
preferences for the community participation approaches in the redevelopment efforts after the 
Aceh tsunami? 
This chapter explains the methodology employed in this study to answer the research 
questions. This chapter includes, design of the study, data collection, sample selection, and data 
analysis. 
  
Research Design 
The methodological approach used in this study included case studies of Acehnese 
communities in the tsunami-affected areas. The case study areas included the following villages: 
Lam Teungoh, Lam Hasan, Lambung, and Merduati. In this study, I employed qualitative and 
quantitative methods consisting of document analysis, in-depth interviews, and surveys. The use 
of mixed-methods aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the research 
questions. Mixed methods can neutralize the disadvantages of using either qualitative or 
quantitative method and complement the strengths of the two methods. This strategy is 
commonly used in public policy research. Policy research employs a number of methods, 
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techniques, and tools in analyzing public policy issues as well as promoting better policy (Haas 
& Springer, 1998).  
 The first research question “How has the process of community participation been 
implemented in the redevelopment of Aceh Province after the tsunami disaster?” was answered 
by the qualitative method which employed the following instruments: document analysis and in-
depth interviews. The two latter research questions “What are community members’perceptions 
of community participation in the redevelopment efforts after the Aceh tsunami?” and “What are 
community members’ preferences for the community participation approaches in the 
redevelopment efforts after the Aceh tsunami?” were addressed by the quantitative method by 
using the survey (questionnaire) instrument.     
 
Data Collection 
 Data were collected from fall 2009 through early fall 2010. The primary sources of data 
concerning the profiles of Aceh Province and case study villages prior to and following the 
tsunami and other relevant preliminary data were collected from fall 2009 until mid-spring 2010. 
During this period, I also chose four case study villages based on certain criteria (presented in the 
sample selection section) as well as carrying out the questionnaire pretests. Beginning in March 
until early fall 2010, the remainder of the research work, such as conducting interviews and 
surveys, was completed.     
    
Documentary Sources 
I analyzed documents from various sources pertinent to community participation in 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh Province after the tsunami at the provincial and case 
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study village levels. The documents included laws and regulations (Law No. 25/2004 on 
National Development Planning, Law No. 22/1999 on Government Regional Autonomy, Law 
No. 32/2004 on Government Regional Autonomy (the revision of Law No. 22/1999), Law No. 
11/2006 on the Aceh Government, and Law No. 24/2007 on Disaster Management), Attachment 
1 Regulation of the President of Republic of Indonesia number 30 year 2005 on Master Plan for 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for the Regions and people of the Province of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam and Nias Islands of the Province of North Sumatera, Main book of Rehabilitation 
and Reconstruction (Republic of Indonesia, 2005), reports from the government, village 
administrations, BRR, NGOs, international agencies, BPS - Statistics (provincial and district 
levels) on post-tsunami redevelopment, socio-economic profiles of Aceh and the four case study 
villages prior to and following the tsunami. 
 
Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with three groups: government officials (BRR) and Ministry 
of Public Works officials), NGO and International Agency workers, and community leaders 
(heads of villages and informal leaders). Selection of participants for the interviews was based on 
the relevance of their contribution to the understanding of the research problem. The interviews 
were mainly intended to gather information about the community participation process and 
benefits, supporting factors and constraints of partcipation. The interview questions are presented 
in Appendix C.   
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Surveys 
Surveys were carried out by involving community members in four tsunami-affected 
villages. Questionnaires were used to obtain community members’ perceptions and preferences 
about community participation in post-tsunami reconstruction. As many as 200 people from 4 
villages got involved in the survey, where each village was represented by 50 people. A 
questionnaire was selected as an instrument because of a relatively large number of respondents 
involved and much information needed to be obtained from them. The questionnaire is presented 
in Appendix D.     
 
The Questionnaire Pretests 
 The questionnaire pretests were mainly aimed at checking the contents, format, and order 
of the questions. The respondents of the pretest were 5 residents of Lam Teungoh Village. Based 
on the results of the pretests, I then revised the questionnaire questions. Due to the difficulty in 
expressing thoughts in writing among community members, the all questions, except for some 
personal data questions, were drafted in multiple choice form. This was also in line with 
suggestions from the head of Lam Teungoh Village and the Lam Teungoh community leader. 
Another important revision was specifying the occupation option (fisherman, farmer, merchant, 
government employee, house wife, unemployed, etc) to prevent respondents from answering 
“general occupation.” 
  
Sample Selection 
Sample selection included villages, community members within each village and aid 
organizations/agencies.  
 
 
34 
 
Villages  
The four case study villages were selected based on two categories of level of 
develepment (more developed and less developed) and two categories of tsunami-affected (very 
severely affected, and moderately-to-severely affected). Two less developed villages included 
Lam Teungoh (very severely affected) and Lam Hasan (moderately-to-severely affected), both in 
Peukan Bada Subdistrict, Aceh Besar District. Meanwhile, two more developed villages included 
Lambung (very severely affected) and Merduati (moderately-to-severely affected), located in 
Meuraxa Subdistrict and Kuta Raja Subdistrict respectively. 
 The village level of development here is associated with socio-economic conditions and 
land use systems. More developed areas were mainly indicated by service-based economic 
activities as well as high level of residents’ incomes and education. In contrast, less developed 
areas were mainly reflected by agricultural or fishery-based economic activities as well as low 
level of residents’ incomes and education.  
In terms of village income/capita level, Aceh Province income/capita was employed as a 
benchmark to decide the extent of village income/capita. In this study, Aceh’s annual 
income/capita refers to that in 2009 which is Rp. 16.9 million or about Rp 1.4 million/month 
(BPS – Statistics Indonesia, 2010). Due to the absence of published data about income/capita at 
the village level (a common case in Indonesia), these kinds of data were obtained from the head 
of the village.  
The tsunami-affected level is related to casualties and damage caused by the tsunami to 
the village’s environment, housing, and public facilities (covering transportation, health 
facilities, religious facilities, educational facilities, government building, energy and electricity, 
postal and telecommunications service, drinking water and sanitation, and water resources). 
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Community Members 
Community members were selected randomly. The fifty respondents selected in each 
village were chosen based on the following steps: the list of village members was collected from 
the village office, village members who were under 15 years old were left out, and fifty village 
members were then chosen randomly using a random number table. When the list in the village 
office was incomplete, I collected the information from the neighborhood units (Rukun Tetangga 
or RT) officials.   
 
Aid Organizations and Agencies 
Key aid organizations and agencies involved in post-tsunami redevelopment were chosen 
in the four case study villages. Each village was represented by two aid organizations or 
agencies. Their approaches in recovery efforts were examined to identify the general picture of 
the participatory process following the tsunami. For this purpose, representatives of the aid 
organizations and agencies, particularly those who dealt with participatory issues like community 
organizers or community facilitators, were interviewed.  The aid organizations and agencies 
included NGOs, international agencies, and government agencies. Specifically, NGOs included 
Mercy Corps (in Lam Teungoh), UPLINK and AIPRD (in Lam Hasan) and World Vision (in 
Lambung). International agencies included USAID/DAI (in Lam Teungoh) and UN-HABITAT  
(in Merduati), while government agencies included BRR (in four case study villages) and 
Ministry of Public Works (in Lambung and Merduati).  
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Data Analysis 
Data analysis was explained based on methods used (qualitative and quantitative 
methods) to answer each research question. 
   
The Qualitative Method 
To answer research question # 1, “How has the process of community participation been 
implemented in the redevelopment of Aceh Province after the tsunami disaster?” document 
analysis and interviews were undertaken. In terms of document analysis, I collected data about 
the implementation of community participation in the four case study villages by analyzing 
relevant documents (as explained in the documentary sources section) and interviewing 
community leaders (heads of villages and informal leaders), government officials, and aid 
organization/agency workers of the four case study villages.  
The data relate to the implementation of community participation in the case study 
villages based on the three categories of participation: “ad hoc,” “interest groups/civil society-
promoted” and “administrative” participation suggested in theory. The second type of 
participation was modified a little bit to be “aid organization/agency-promoted participation,” 
because this type also includes the international agencies’ roles. As discussed in the literature 
review chapter, “ad hoc” participation relates to voluntary actions mainly mobilized by 
community members themselves. “Administrative” participation is a participation mechanism in 
which administrative agencies take the initiative in reaching out the citizens and involving them. 
Aid organization/agency-promoted participation is a participation mechanism in which aid 
organizations/agencies help empower communities.  
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In terms of examining the extent to which residents have participated in post-tsunami 
redevelopment, particularly for the categories of “aid organization/agency-promoted” and 
“administrative” participation, the Arnstein’s level of participation was employed. In addition, 
constraints, supporting factors and benefits of the implementation of community participation in 
the redevelopment of Aceh Province after the tsunami disaster, from the perspectives of the 
interviewees, were also investigated.  
      Meanwhile, the analysis of interviews and documents followed qualitative research 
methodologies, in particular Miles and Huberman’s (1994) techniques for data reduction and 
display. The techniques I adopted could be divided into the following steps: 
1. Noting and Coding of primary information (interviewee’s identity and their answers to the 
questions). 
2. Breaking down the content of each interview into short summarizing sentences. 
3. Summaries were sorted based on the sets of interview questions with regard to community 
participation in post-disaster reconstruction (implementation, constraints, supporting factors, 
and benefits). 
4. For over all comparison, findings were displayed on a matrix system. 
 
The Quantitative Method 
To answer research questions # 2 and 3, “What are community members’perceptions of 
community participation in the redevelopment efforts after the Aceh tsunami?” and “What are 
community members’ preferences for the community participation approaches in the 
redevelopment efforts after the Aceh tsunami?” the survey (questionnaire) instrument was 
employed.  
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 After data collection which used the questionnaire instrument was completed, data were 
processed and analyzed by using the statistical package (SPSS). Data were coded and 
categorized, and then divided into three groups: profiles of the respondents, respondents’ 
perceptions of community participation in the redevelopment efforts after the Aceh tsunami, and 
respondents’ preferences for the community participation approaches in the redevelopment 
efforts after the Aceh tsunami. Profiles of the respondents included personal data and data about 
respondents’ involvement in post-tsunami redevelopment (such as redevelopment activities they 
got involved, reasons why they got involved in the activities and level of their satisfaction on the 
involvement in the tsunami relief efforts). Respondents’ perceptions include perceptions of the 
importance of community participation and the constraints of community participation in post-
tsunami redevelopment. Respondents’ preferences include preferences for the following 
approaches: provision of education and training as to participatory approaches, the formulation 
of specific guidelines for community participation in the rebuilding process, the way community 
members participate (direct and representative) in the relief efforts, and participatory approaches 
promoted by the government and NGOs based on Arstein’s level of participation. 
 Respondents’ perceptions of the importance of community participation were examined 
by cluster analysis. To know the profiles of those who “tend to agree” and “tend to disagree” 
with the importance of participation, cross tabulation were used with variables of sex, age, 
education, and income. To find out respondents’ perceptions of the most dominant factors which 
impeded the implementation of community participation in Aceh post-tsunami redevelopment, 
factor analysis was used.  Finally, to find out respondents’ preferences for the community 
participation approaches in the redevelopment efforts after the Aceh tsunami, descriptive 
statistical analysis was used. In this respect, the extent to which respondents preferred a number 
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of participatory approaches in the redevelopment efforts was presented.   Table 3.1 below 
presents the summary of research questions, methodology, instruments, samples, and data 
analysis of the dissertation research. 
Table 3.1.: Summary of research questions, methodology, instrument, documents/samples, 
and data analysis of the dissertation research 
Research Questions Metho-dology 
Instru-
ment Document/Sample Data Analysis 
(1) How has the process of 
community participation 
been implemented in the 
redevelopment of Aceh 
Province after the tsunami 
disaster?  
 
Qualita-
tive 
method 
Document 
analysis 
 
Relevant laws and 
regulations, Master Plan 
for Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Aceh, 
Main Book of 
Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Aceh, 
reports from the 
government, BRR, NGOs, 
international agencies, four 
case study villages, BPS – 
Statistics 
-Three categories of 
participation (“ad-hoc,” aid 
organization/agency-
promoted, and 
administrative) were 
adopted to analyze the 
implementation of 
participation in the Aceh 
post-tsunami redevelopment 
- Arnstein’s level of 
participation was used to 
examine the extent to which 
residents have participated 
in post-tsunami 
redevelopment 
- Constraints, supporting 
factors, and benefits of the 
implementation of 
community participation 
from the perspectives of the 
interviewees were examined 
- Miles and Huberman’s 
(1994) techniques for data 
reduction and display was 
used to analyze interviews 
and documents 
Interview 
 
Government officials of 
BRR and Ministry of 
Public Works, workers of 
organizations/ agencies 
(Mercy Corps, UPLINK, 
AIPRD, World Vision, 
USAID/DAI, 
UNHABITAT), and 
community leaders (heads 
of the villages and informal 
leaders of the four case 
study villages) 
(2) What are community 
members’perceptions of 
community participation in 
the redevelopment efforts 
after the Aceh tsunami?  
 
 
Quantita-
tive 
method 
Survey 
(question-
naire) 
- Residents of the four case 
study villages (200 
residents) were selected 
randomly. Each village 
was represented by 50 
villagers.  
- Four case study villages 
(Lam Teungoh, Lam 
Hasan, Lambung, and 
Merduati) were selected by 
considering of level of 
development and tsunami 
affected.  
- Cluster analysis and cross 
tabulation were used to 
examine respondents’ 
perceptions of the 
importance of participation.  
- Factor analysis was used 
to find out respondents’ 
perceptions of the most 
dominant factors which 
impeded the implementation 
of participation. 
(3) What are community 
members’ preferences for 
the community 
participation approaches in 
the redevelopment efforts 
after the Aceh tsunami? 
Descriptive statistical 
analysis was used to find 
out respondents’ preferences 
for the community 
participation approaches 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PROFILE OF ACEH PROVINCE AND FOUR CASE STUDY VILLAGES PRIOR 
TO AND FOLLOWING THE TSUNAMI  
 
 
 This chapter includes a portrait of the Aceh Province and four case study villages (Lam 
Teungoh, Lam Hasan, Lambung, and Merduati) prior to and following the tsunami. This chapter 
is intended to give a general description of the Aceh Province and the four case study villages 
prior to and following the tsunami and to show the extent to which the tsunami has influenced 
the province and the villages.    
 
The Profile of Aceh Province 
The Aceh Province, the westernmost area of Indonesian Archipelago, has an area of 
57.366 square kilometers, spreading over 23 districts and cities, from the Aceh Besar District to 
the South Aceh District. Aceh has undergone significant changes during the post-military 
conflict (2005-present) and post-tsunami reconstruction era (2009-present). The reconstruction 
effort and the peace treaty between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM) on August 15, 2005, have led to a lot of challenges and a number of opportunities for 
Aceh. Below is the overview of Aceh’s socio-cultural, political, economic, infrastructure, 
agricultural and environmental conditions prior to and following the tsunami   
 
Socio-Cultural and Political Conditions 
Based on population census in 2010, BPS – Statistics Aceh reports that Aceh has a 
population of 4,486,570, consisting of 2,243,578 male and 2,242,992 female (Waspada, 2010). 
Prior to the tsunami in 2004, BPS - Statistics Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (2008) reports 
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the population stood at 4,218,486, while BRR’s version (2009a) states the number is greater, i.e. 
4,297,485. After the tsunami and earthquake, BPS – Statistics Indonesia reports that, based on a 
2005 census, the population decreased to 4,031,589 (Savitridina, et. al, 2006). Of these three 
sources, only BRR provides detailed data about the number of tsunami victims. According to this 
agency, the total number of casualties caused by the disaster was about 127,000, with an 
additional 93,285 declared missing. About 500,000 survivors lost their homes, while 750,000 
people lost their livelihoods (BRR, 2009a). Table 4.1 reports data on the number of Aceh’s 
population by district/city prior to and following the tsunami based on BPSs – Statistics Aceh 
and Indonesia’s sources.   
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Table 4.1.: Number of population by district/city in Aceh Province prior to and following 
the tsunami  
 
No District/City 2004 2005 
1 Simelue 71,517 78,389
2 Aceh Singkil 144,684 148,277
3 Aceh Selatan 185,704 191,539
4 Aceh Tenggara 168,229 169,053
5 Aceh Timur 312,014 304,643
6 Aceh Tengah 285,619 160,549
7 Aceh Barat 160,545 150,450
8 Aceh Besar 301,575 296,541
9 Pidie 469,888 474,359
10 Bireun 348,057 351,835
11 Aceh Utara 487,526 493,670
12 Aceh Barat Daya 111,100 115,676
13 Gayo Lues 68,312 72,045
14 Tamiang 229,520 235,314
15 Nagan Raya 110,486 123,743
16 Aceh Jaya 79,155 60,660
17 Bener Meriah** - 106,148
18 Pidie Jaya** - -
19 Banda Aceh 239,146 177,881
20 Sabang 28,692 28,597
21 Langsa 135,167 137,586
22 Lhokseumawe 138,663 154,634
23 Subulussalam** - -
Total 4,218,486 4,031,589
Sources: BPS – Statitistics Aceh (2008) and BPS – Statistics Indonesia (2006) 
*Bener Meriah was established in 2004, while Pidie Jaya and Subulussalam in 2007 
 
Aceh has a number of ethnic and language groups. The dominant ethnic group is 
Acehnese which occupies areas throughout Aceh. Many of this ethnic group’s people live in 
Aceh Jaya District, Nagan Raya District, the city of Lhokseumawe, and Langsa District, which 
are located in the coastal areas. Alas people made up of the Gayo ethnic group mainly inhabit the 
central, eastern and southeastern part of Aceh, spreading over 4 districts (i.e. Central Aceh, 
Bener Meriah, Gayo Lues, and parts of Aceh Tamiang). Tamiang mostly live in Aceh Tamiang, 
Aneuk Jamee in southern and southwestern, Kluet in South Aceh, and Simeulue in Simeulue 
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Island. The people of Aceh communicate in several languages, but the Acehnese language is 
widely spoken in the province. This language is a member of the Aceh-Chamic group of 
languages. This group of languages is mostly found in Vietnam and Cambodia and is closely 
connected to the Malay group of languages. Other main languages cover among others Gayo, 
Sigulai, and Haloban (Hasjmy, 1992). 
The majority of people in Aceh embrace Islam. It is reported that in 2004, the number of 
Muslims reached 4,248,804 people, or 98.87 percent of the total population of Aceh (BPS- 
Statistics Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2005). Islam and custom cannot be separated in 
the Aceh people’s lives. One of the hadih maja (traditional proverbs) of Aceh says “Hukom ngon 
adat lagee zat ngon sifeut” which means “the Islamic law and traditional custom are like fabric 
and its characteristics.” Hence, all the teachings and public system in Aceh could not be in 
opposition to Islam” (Hasjmy, 1992). 
Administratively, as other provinces in Indonesia, under Law No. 32/2004, Aceh 
Province consists of the following government structure (from the highest to the lowest levels): 
districts (kabupaten)/cities (kota), sub-districts (kecamatan), and villages (desa or kelurahan). 
Later, the peace treaty between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM) in 2005, led the central government to stipulate a new law, namely, Law No. 11/2006 on 
the Aceh government which changed the province structure and election process. 
Law No. 11/ 2006 acknowledges mukim and gampong as lawful units of a community 
(Republic of Indonesia, 2006). Mukim is a government level under the sub-district, and 
comprises several gampongs, and led by an imeum mukim. Gampong, the same level as a village, 
is under a mukim, with the right to conduct its own internal affairs, and is led by a geuchik. Since 
2009, all villages in Aceh have officially been transformed to gampongs in accordance with the 
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enactment of the new Aceh local law. Geuchik is elected by gampong’s inhabitants, while head 
of village (kepala desa or lurah) is appointed by head of sub-district (camat). Law No. 11/ 2006 
also regulates direct elections for heads of regions, the governor, which previously was 
appointed by the central government. 
The earthquake and tsunami wave striking on December 26, 2004 devastated most of 
Aceh’s coastal areas and also affected socio-cultural and political conditions. From the physical 
damage standpoint, 15 kabupatens/kotas were devastated, namely: Kabupaten Aceh Barat, 
Kabupaten Aceh Barat Daya, Kabupaten Aceh Besar, Kabupaten Aceh Jaya, Kabupaten Aceh 
Selatan, Kabupaten Aceh Timur, Kabupaten Aceh Utara, Kota Banda Aceh, Kabupaten Bireun, 
Kota Lhokseumawe, Kabupaten Nagan Raya, Kabupaten Pidie, Kota Sabang, Kabupaten 
Simeuleu, and Kabupaten Singkil. Kota Banda Aceh, Kabupaten Aceh Jaya, Kabupaten Aceh 
Barat, and Kabupaten Aceh Besar are the kabupatens or kotas severely affected by the tsunami 
disaster in light of death tolls and damage to infrastructure (BRR, 2009k). 
The major socio-cultural issues arising from the earthquake and tsunami were associated 
with the great number of victims, damages to socio-cultural facilities, lack of food and shelters 
for victims, invalid demographic information, vulnerable situations mostly among women and 
children, and traumatic feelings among the victims. The responses to these issues included 
development of temporary housing for refugees, nurturing orphans, development of food 
supplies for victims, restoration of socio-cultural lives, the data collection on population, sex, 
and age structure, improvement of socio-economic conditions of victims, overcoming threat of 
sexual harassment and trafficking among refugees, and services and counseling for traumatic 
victims (The Republic of Indonesia, 2005; BRR, 2009i). 
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Aside from its devastating impact, the Aceh tsunami turned out to be a blessing in 
disguise. The horrifying disaster pushed the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) to sit together to end the prolonged military conflict. The disire to help 
victims of the disaster and to rebuild the province arose which in turn resulted in the strong wish 
for ending the conflict (BRR, 2009b). Hence, a series of negotiations took place which 
eventually concludeed in a peace accord signed by both parties facilitated by the Finnish 
organization Crisis Management Initiative in Helsinki on August 15, 2005 (BRR, 2009b). 
Looking back to the former time, the centralized and authoritarian system during Soeharto’s New 
Order regime was viewed as the cause for injustice in Aceh which led to the emergence of GAM 
(in 1976) and other separatist movements in various regions of Indonesia. In the context of Aceh, 
the situation was then triggered more and more by the increase in dissatisfaction of several 
communities’ elements over the distribution of profits from new natural gas and oil production in 
the eastern coastal area of this province and the intensification of the transmigration program in 
Aceh (BRR, 2009b). 
As a matter of fact, Aceh province’s fight against the Indonesian government had also 
happened before GAM emerged. In 1953, Daud Beureueh led the Darul Islam Movement/Islamic 
Army of Indonesia (DI/TII) in Aceh fight for an autonomous Aceh within a wider Islamic state 
of Indonesia. Therefore, Aceh’s DI/TII was, by its nature, different from GAM which aimed for 
independence (Aspinall, 2005). This movement which ended in 1962 was also a form of protest 
toward the government of Indonesia for making Aceh part of the North Sumatera Province 
judicial area which distinctly ignored Aceh’s huge contribution in supporting the existence of the 
still young Republic in 1945 (BRR, 2009b).  
. 
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Economy  
Aceh’s economy will be examined by relying upon many indicators of Gross Regional 
Domestic Product (GRDP), economic structure, economic growth, and employment and 
inflation. The depiction of Aceh’s economy below is based on data processed from various 
sources including BPS – Statistics Aceh, World Bank, Bank Indonesia, Multi Donor Fund, BRR, 
and Bappeda Aceh.    
 
Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP)  
In the past, Aceh’s main income earners were in the oil and gas sector including 
industries linked to oil and gas production. Up until 2004, before the tsunami struck Aceh on 
December 26, 2004, this source accounted for about 40% of the province’s GRDP. In line with 
rapidly depleting oil and gas production in the past few years, Aceh’s GRDP resulting from oil 
and gas sector has been declining steeply. In 2009, the oil and gas sector only contributed about 
20% to GRDP (Badan Pusat Statistik Aceh & Bappeda Aceh, 2009; Badan Pusat Statistik 
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam & Bappeda Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2006).  
This was one of factors causing Aceh’s GRDP to fall down in 2009 and put Aceh with annual 
income/capita of Rp. 16.9 million (Rp 20.3 million on average in Indonesia) as the 6th poorest 
province among 33 provinces in Indonesia. From the standpoint of poverty level, it was also 
reported that in that year, 21.8% of 4.3 million Aceh’s people was categorized poor (BPS – 
Statistics Indonesia, 2010). Overall gas production in Aceh from 2002 through mid 2009 is 
presented below. 
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Figure 4.1.: Gas production in Aceh, 2002 – mid 2009 
 
*Mscf : Million Square Cubic Feet 
 
Sources: Aceh Economic Update February 2010, Bank Indonesia and Bappeda Aceh, 2010 
 
In the long run, the revenue from petroleum and natural gas will continue decreasing. 
Based on the projection, it is indicated that in the years to come this resource will steadily have 
little contribution to this province’s revenues. Given that, Aceh’s economy will have little future, 
unless non-oil sectors are developed. In the past few years, Aceh’s economy has also been 
mainly supported by the reconstruction effort and the availability of reconstruction funds. As the 
reconstruction effort came to end, Aceh’s economy then slowed down (The World Bank, et al., 
2009; Bank Indonesia & Bappeda Aceh, 2010). Aceh’s GRDP by industrial origin at current 
market prices and at 2000 constant prices during the period of 2000-2009 can be seen in the 
following table. 
 
 
*
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Table 4.2.: GRDP of Aceh Province by industrial origin at current market prices and at 
2000 constant market prices (trillion Rupiahs), 2000-20009 
 
                   
Industrial        
             Origin 
 
 
Year 
Agri-
culture
, live-
stock, 
fores-
try, & 
fishery 
Mi-
ning 
& 
quar-
rying 
Ma-
nu-
fac-
tu-
ring 
indus-
try 
Elec
-tri-
city 
& 
wa-
ter 
sup-
ply 
Con-
struc
-tion 
Tra-
de 
hotel 
& 
res-
tau-
rant 
Trans
-por-
ta-
tion 
& 
com-
muni-
cation 
Ban-
king 
& 
finan-
cial 
servi-
ces 
Servi-
ces 
          
GRDP 
GRDP 
non oil 
& gas 
2000 Current 
price 
6.98 12.23 
 
9.76 0.04 1.75 4.29 1.27 0.23 2.95 39.50 19.63 
Constant 
price 
6.98 12.23 9.76 0.04 1.75 4.29 1.27 0.23 2.95 39.50 19.63 
2001 Current 
price 
8.21 8.37 9.67 0.05 1.46 4.97 1.42 0.27 3.24 37.65 21.23 
Constant 
price 
7.24 8.81 8.40 0.04 1.31 4.77 1.35 0.25 3.10 35.26 19.54 
2002 Current 
price 
9.12 12.71 9.10 0.07 1.75 5.20 1.67 0.39 3.70 43.71 27.01 
Constant 
price 
7.37 14.70 8.86 0.04 1.49 4.88 1.41 0.31 3.28 42.34 21.10 
2003 Current 
price 
10.19 14.60 9.69 0.10 1.87 5.39 1.86 0.49 4.43 48.62 27.01 
Constant 
price 
7.61 16.15 9.01 0.05 1.50 5.00 1.46 0.41 3.49 44.68 21.88 
2004 Current 
price 
12.47 12.23 9.80 0.12 2.10 5.65 2.16 0.58 5.25 50.36 30.15 
Constant 
price 
8.07 12.26 7.41 0.06 1.51 4.86 1.52 0.49 4.19 40.37 22.26 
2005 Current 
price 
15.20 13.17 10.26 0.12 1.84 7.08 2.93 0.84 5.52 56.95 35.45 
Constant 
price 
7.75 9.49 5.76 0.06 1.27 5.19 1.73 0.44 4.60 36.29 22.53 
2006 Current 
price 
16.76 19.62 8.53 0.13 4.20 8.10 4.43 1.36 6.21 69.35 43.47 
Constant 
price 
7.87 9.24 5.00 0.07 1.88 5.57 1.93 0.49 4.80 36.85 24.27 
2007 Current 
price 
18.14 15.98 7.94 0.17 5.42 9.23 5.75 1.35 7.12 71.09 49.72 
Constant 
price 
8.16 7.29 4.49 0.08 2.15 5.67 2.14 0.52 5.48 35.98 26.02 
2008
* 
Current 
price 
19.26 13.88 8.19 0.20 6.26 10.2
6 
6.54 1.49 7.46 73.53 54.19 
Constant 
price 
8.22 5.30 4.14 0.09 2.13 5.93 2.17 0.55 5.55 34.09 26.51 
2009
** 
Current 
price 
19.39 8.20 7.93 0.29 6.84 10.4
2 
7.55 1.79 8.35 70.76 57.55 
Constant 
price 
8.48 2.69 3.89 0.12 2.20 6.12 2.28 060 5.44 32.18 27.55 
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Sources:  
- Gross Regional Domestic Product of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2000 – 2005, BPS – 
Statistics Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Regional Development Planning of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam, 2006 
- Gross Regional Domestic Product of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2005 – 2008, BPS – 
Statistics Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Regional Development Planning of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam, 2009 
- The Selected Socio-Economic Indicator of Aceh, BPS – Statistics Aceh Province, 2009 
- Statistic Official News of Aceh Province No. 05/02/11/Th.V, 10 February 2010, 2010 
 
*  Preliminary figures 
**Very preliminary figures 
 
 
In terms of Aceh’s economic structure, during the period of 2000-2004, the share of 
primary activity consisting of the sectors of agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishery, mining, and 
quarrying to Aceh’s Gross Regional Domestic Product (GDRP) reached 44% to 51%. The share 
of secondary activity consisting of the sectors of manufacturing, construction, and utilities (water 
supply and electricity) ranged between 23% and 30%. While the tertiary activity (trade, hotel, 
and restaurant sector, transportation and communication sector, banking and financial services 
sector, and services sector), during that period ranged between 22% and 32%. The share of 
mining sector in the year 2000 was the highest in Aceh’s GDRP (31%) followed by the 
manufacturing sector (25%) and the agriculture sector (18%). 
The share of mining sector, during the period of 2000-2003 was the highest in GRDP. In 
2001, the production level of petroleum and natural gas reached the lowest point (22.2%) 
because of the culmination of military conflict (BPS – Statistics Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and 
Regional Develoment Planning of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2006). Subsequently, in 2004, 
the economic structure changed significantly, agriculture contributed the highest (22.83%) to 
GRDP. 
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  . After the tsunami, Aceh’s GDRP at current market prices still went up from year to year. 
In 2005, Aceh’s GDRP was 56.95 trillion Rupiahs, while in 2009 it increased to 70.76 trillion 
Rupiahs. During the period of 2005-2009, the primary sector still provided the biggest 
contribution to GDRP. This sector accounted for between 45 – 52% of the province’s GDRP. 
However, the mining sector share went down steadily due to the decline in revenue from 
petroleum and natural gas as mentioned earlier. In this period, starting from 2005 until 2009, the 
share of the agriculture sector in Aceh’s GRDP became the largest, except in 2006 when the 
mining and quarrying sector was the largest (28.30%).    
The share of secondary activity significantly declined during the period from 2005-2009, 
contributing only 18-21% to GRDP. The share of the manufacturing sector (its biggest share 
linked to oil and gas production), which in the previous time always be the biggest contribution 
in this activity, declined from 18.01% in 2005 to 11.20% in 2009. This happened as a 
consequence of the decreased production of petroleum and natural gas overtime. While the share 
of tertiary sector to GRDP in this period was around 28%-35%, showing the positive trend 
compared to the period of 2000-2004.  
The rehabilitation and reconstruction process following the tsunami shifted the structure 
of Aceh’s economy. From 2007 until 2008, the trade, hotel, and restaurant sector became the 
third largest sector contributing to GRDP (2007: 12.98%, 2008: 13.95) behind the agriculture 
and mining and quarrying sectors. The trade, hotel, and restaurant sector replaced the 
manufacturing sector which had hold the position for long period of time. In 2009, the trade, 
hotel, and restaurant sector went up to the second biggest contributor (14.73%).  In the same 
year, the agriculture sector accounted for 27.40% of GRDP, while the mining and quarrying 
sector accounted for 11.59%.  
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In 2009, other sectors which had significantly contributed to GRDP besides the 
aforementioned sectors were the services sector (11.80%), the manufacturing sector (11.20), the 
transportation and communication sector (10.67%) and the construction sector (9.67%).  The 
increased share of all of these sectors was also a logical consequence of the recovery and 
development activities taking place in the post-tsunami reconstruction process. The entire 
structure of Aceh’s economy during the period of 2000-2009 can be seen in the following table.  
 
Table 4.3.: The economic structure of Aceh Province, 2000-2009 (percent) 
No Industrial 
Origin 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009** 
1 Agriculture, 
livestock, 
forestry, & 
fishery 
17.68 21.80 20.86 20.95 24.76 26.69 24.16 25.51 26.19 27.40 
2 Mining and 
quarrying 
30.95 22.20 29.08 30.03 24.28 23.12 28.30 22.48 18.88 11.59 
3 Manufacturing 
industry 
24.70 25.68 20.82 19.93 19.46 18.01 12.30 11.16 11.14 11.20 
4 Electricity and 
water supply 
0.11 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.41 
5 Construction 4.43 3.88 4.01 3.85 4.16 3.22 6.06 7.62 8.52 9.67 
6 Trade, hotel 
and restaurant 
10.86 13.20 11.89 11.08 11.22 12.44 11.69 12.98 13.95 14.73 
7 Transportation 
and 
communication 
3.21 3.77 3.82 3.83 4.30 5.15 6.39 8.08 8.89 10.67 
8 Banking and 
financial 
services 
0.59 0.71 0.88 1.01 1.15 1.47 1.96 1.90 2.03 2.53 
9 Services 7.48 8.61 8.47 9.12 10.43 9.69 8.95 10.02 10.14 11.80 
Gross Regional 
Domestic Bruto 
(GRDP) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
GRDP non oil and 
gas 
49.69 56.38 56.03 55.56 59.87 62.24 62.67 69.93 73.70 81.33 
Sources: 
- Gross Regional Domestic Product of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2000 – 2005, BPS – 
Statistics Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Regional Development Planning of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam, 2006 
- Gross Regional Domestic Product of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2005 – 2008, BPS – 
Statistics Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Regional Development Planning of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam, 2009 
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- The Selected Socio-Economic Indicator of Aceh, BPS – Statistics Aceh Province, 2009 
- Statistic Official News of Aceh Province No. 05/02/11/Th.V, 10 February 2010, 2010 
 
*  Preliminary figures 
**Very preliminary figures 
 
 
Economic Growth  
Previously, the economic growth of Aceh Province depended highly on the oil and gas 
sector. Due to declining oil and gas reserves in this area, in 2004, oil and gas mining decreased 
by 24% while oil and gas manufacturing decreased by 12%. This led the growth rate of Aceh’s 
GRDP to decline by 10% in 2004. In 2005, Aceh’s economic growth totally fell down. 
Following the tsunami, the growth of many sectors decreased. The agriculture sector decreased 
by 3.89%, the mining and quarrying sector 22.62%, the manufacturing industry sector 22.30%, 
the electricity and water supply sector 1.95%, the construction sector 16.14, and the banking and 
financial services 9.53%. Only three sectors showed positive growth, i.e. the trade, hotel and 
restaurant sector (6.64%), the transportation and communication sector (14.39%), and the 
services sector (9.65%). Due to the tsunami, Aceh’s economic growth in 2005 declined by 
10.12%. 
In 2006, overall Aceh’s economy grew. Although the decline of the oil and gas sector 
continued, the positive growth occurred in other sectors. Consequently, economic growth 
reached 1.56%. Unfortunately, in 2007, 2008, and 2009, economic growth contracted again by 
2.36%, 5.27%, and 5.58%, respectively. The decline in economic activities of the oil and gas 
sector and the manufacturing sector in these years was the main factor. In 2008, the construction 
sector also contracted by 0.85 %, while other sectors grew. In 2009, all sectors excluding oil and 
gas sector and manufacturing sector (which contracted by 49.24% and 6.06% respectively), 
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grew. However, Aceh’s economic growth contracted by 5.58%. In this year, the electricity and 
water supply sector grew 27.07%, banking and financial services 9.61%, transportation and 
communication 4.86%, services 4.68%, trade, hotel, and restaurant 3.28%, construction 3.16%, 
and agriculture 3.09%.  
Although Aceh’s economy contracted for the last couple of years (due largely to the 
decrease in Aceh’s oil and gas reserves), prospects for Aceh’s economy are still promising. The 
non oil and gas sectors have been growing from 2002 until 2009. The growth of these sectors 
peaked in 2006 and 2007 at 7.70% and 7.23% respectively because during these years, massive 
reconstruction programs took place and the Aceh’s political atmosphere had been more 
conducive after the peaceful agreement between the Free Aceh Movement and the government 
of Indonesia. However, after the post-tsunami reconstruction was over in 2009 and given the 
decline of oil and gas production, it will be difficult for the Aceh government and policy makers 
to boost the non-oil and gas sectors.  The economic growth of Aceh Province during the period 
of 2001-2009 can be seen in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4.: The economic growth of Aceh Province, 2001-2009 (percent) 
No Industrial 
Origin 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009** 
1 Agriculture, 
livestock, 
forestry, and 
fishery 
3.31 2.13 3.27 6.04 -3.89 1.52 3.62 0.81 3.09 
2 Mining and 
quarrying 
-27.91 66.79 9.86 -24.06 -22.62 -2.58 -21.10 -27.31 -49.24 
3 Manufacturing 
industry 
-13.88 5.45 1.68 -17.80 -22.30 -13.16 -10.10 -7.73 -6.06 
4 Electricity and 
water supply 
2.18 -3.16 16.98 19.53 -1.95 12.06 23.70 12.73 27.07 
5 Construction -24.95 13.28 0.95 0.92 -16.14 48.41 13.93 -0.85 3.16 
6 Trade, hotel 
and restaurant 
11.33 2.18 2.46 -2.68 6.64 7.41 1.70 4.59 3.28 
7 Transportation 
and 
communication 
6.58 4.17 3.87 3.67 14.39 10.99 10.95 1.38 4.86 
8 Banking and 
financial 
services 
8.48 23.95 30.99 19.45 -9.53 11.77 6.02 5.16 9.61 
9 Services 4.86 5.95 6.31 20.14 9.65 4.41 14.30 1.21 4.68 
Gross Regional 
Domestic Bruto 
(GRDP) 
-10.73 20.07 5.52 -9.63 -10.12 1.56 -2.36 -5.27 -5.58 
GRDP non oil and 
gas 
-0.44 7.96 3.70 1.76 1.22 7.70 7.23 1.88 3.92 
Sources:  
- Gross Regional Domestic Product of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2000 – 2005, BPS – 
Statistics Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Regional Development Planning of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam, 2006 
- Gross Regional Domestic Product of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2005 – 2008, BPS – 
Statistics Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Regional Development Planning of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam, 2009 
- The Selected Socio-Economic Indicator of Aceh, BPS – Statistics Aceh Province 2009, 2010    
- Statistic Official News of Aceh Province, No. 05/02/11/Th.V, 10 February 2010, 2010 
*  Preliminary figures 
**Very preliminary figures 
 
Employment and Inflation 
In spite of its huge contribution to the province’s GRDP, before the tsunami, the oil and 
gas sector employed less than 5% of the workforce. The agriculture, forestry, hunting & fishery 
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sector employed about 60% of the workforce. However, the latter sector has been continuing to 
decline from year to year. In 2009, it attracted 51% of the workforce, remained far higher than at 
the national level which reached 41%. Other sectors which employed large workforce in this 
year included services (18%) and trade (15%) (Bank Indonesia & Bappeda Aceh, 2010).  
In general, in the context of Aceh, the shift from the agriculture to other sectors like 
services, trade, and industry is partly because of the reconstruction effort after the tsunami. It is 
also a result of improved security conditions in remote areas, as well as assistance to small to 
medium-sized enterprises provided by NGOs and government during the reconstruction effort 
(The World Bank et. al, 2009). Aceh’s employment structure from 2003 through 2009 is 
presented in the graphics below. 
With regard to Aceh’s unemployment rate, Bank Indonesia and Bappeda Aceh (2010) 
report that prospects are uncertain. With unemployment at 9.3% in 2009, job creation remains a 
major challenge in the province. At the national level, unemployment declined to 8.1%. The fact 
that Aceh has high minimum wages in Indonesia (Rp 1 million/month compared with Rp 
800.000 on average in Indonesia), the second highest after Papua Province in 2009, is one of the 
biggest constraints for investment in the region (Bank Indonesia & Bappeda Aceh, 2010). In 
addition, the limited electricity supply has also hindered investment and job creation in Aceh. 
Aceh’s unemployment rate from 2004 through 2009 is reported in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3.: Unemployment in Aceh, 2004-2009 
 
Sources: Aceh Economic Update February 2010, Bank Indonesia & Bappeda Aceh, 2010 
 
The inflation rate in Aceh had been far higher than the national rate for several years 
during the peak of reconstruction effort (2005-2007).  Inflation reached the highest rate, more 
than 40% in 2005. In 2008, in line with the slowdown of the reconstruction effort, restored 
supply networks, and Aceh’s economy, inflation became relatively low. Despite this condition, 
the trend could change in the future due to Aceh’s insufficient infrastructure along the west 
coast, rising commodity prices at the global level, and the Rupiah’s stronger currency (Bank 
Indonesia & Bappeda Aceh, 2010). In February 2009, Year onYear inflation (inflation in 
February 2009 compared to that in February 2008) increased by 5.9%, lower than the national 
level of 8.6% as well the neighboring province Medan of 7.7%. Inflation in Aceh during the 
period of 2005- early 2009 can be seen in Figure 4.4.   
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Figure 4.4.: Inflation in Aceh 2005 – early 2009 
 
Sources: Aceh Economic Update May 2009, Bank Indonesia & Bappeda Aceh, 2010 
 
Infrastructure, Agriculture, and Environment 
In the infrastructure sector, the impact of the tsunami included damage to the sectors of 
housing, transportation, health facilities, religious facilities, educational facilities, government 
buildings, energy and electricity, postal and telecommunications service, drinking water and 
sanitation, water resources, and other facilities. Existing infrastructure was severely damaged or 
unusable including, among others, up to 139,195 homes, 119 bridges (a quarter of all bridges in 
the province) totaling 150 kilometers, around 2,618 km of the roads, 22 ports and 8 airports, 
more than 3,415 schools, 200 local clinics and hospitals, and 669 government buildings. With 
regard to agriculture, 73,869 ha of agricultural land with varying degrees of productivity were 
destroyed, 13,828 fishing boats vanished and up to 27,593 ha of brackish fish ponds disappeared. 
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The loss to the environment included 16,775 ha of coastal forests and mangroves, and 29,175 ha 
of reefs (BRR, 2009g). 
  In response to the damage and the loss mentioned above, local agencies, NGO, and donor 
agencies, coordinated by BRR (the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency of Aceh and 
Nias), implemented rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. The results of the reconstruction 
effort include, among others, 140,304 permanent houses built, 3,696 kilometers of road and 363 
bridges constructed, 23 ports and 13 airports constructed, 1,759 schools built, 3,781 religious 
facilities built or repaired, 1,115 health facilities and 996 government buildings constructed, 
69,979 hectares of agricultural land reclaimed, and 7,109 fishing boats built or provided (BRR, 
2009g). In general, the programs and achievement of the reconstruction effort in the 
infrastructure sector are presented in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5.: Infrastructure reconstruction following the tsunami 
No Program/Activities Unit 
Target as 
Presidential 
Regulation 
47/2008 
Achievement % Achievement
1 Sea Port Unit 16 15 94%
2 Ferry Port Unit 8 8 100%
3 Airport Unit 9 9 100%
4 Airstrip Unit 3 3 100%
5 Helipad Unit 1 1 100%
6 National Road Km 933 694.80 74%
7 Provincial Road Km 782 584.32 74%
8 District Road of Aceh and Nias Km 3,511 2,417.25 69%
9 Bus Terminal and Damri Public 
Bus 
Unit 16 15 94%
10 Supporting Bus Unit 56 68 121%
11 Meteorology and Geophysics Unit 8 9 113%
12 Post Office Unit 23 22 96%
13 EWS-Early Warning System Package 1 1 100%
14 Diesel Power Generator Package 13 12 92%
15 State Electricity Company Office Package 1 1 100%
16 Peusangan Water Power Plant Unit 84 84 100%
17 Micro Hydro Power Plant Unit 8 8 100%
18 Solar Power Plant Unit 4,084 4,127 101%
19 Transmission Line Km 930 935 101%
20 Distribution Line Km 1,271 1,392 109%
21 Household Electricity Line Unit 122,000 122,000 100%
22 Electricity Distribution Point Unit 597 669 112%
23 Central Electricity Plant Unit 1 1 100%
24 Gas Station Unit 1 1 100%
25 Irrigation Ha 121,884 124,590 102%
26 Flood Control m’ 98,765 152,902 155%
27 Coastal Protection m’ 72,454 108,694 150%
28 Water Lt/s 1,430 2,843 199%
29 Waste Management Unit 6 6 100%
30 Waste Dump Area Unit 7 13 186%
31 Drainage m’ 200,000 600,467 300%
32 Disaster Mitigation Center Unit 1 1 100%
33 Escape Building Unit 5 8 160%
34 Tsunami Museum Unit 1 1 100%
Source: Infrastructure: Stimulating the triggering sector, BRR, 2009 
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The Profile of Case Study Villages 
Below is the profile of four case study villages affected by the 2004 Aceh tsunami. 
Several aspects covering geography, socio-demography, economy, and infrastructure of the 
villages will be described. Data come from reports of each village, interviews, and aid 
organizations’ reports. 
 
Lam Teungoh 
Geography 
Lam Teungoh, about 20 minutes drive from Banda Aceh the capital city of Aceh 
Province , is bordered on the north by the Indian Ocean, on the south by the Village of Lam 
Tutui, on the east by the Village of Meunasah Tuha and on the west by the Village of Lam 
Guron. The area of Lam Teungoh is approximately 40 hectares; 20 hectares of fish and shrimp 
pond areas, 10 hectares of settlements and public facilities, and 10 hectares of agricultural and 
plantation areas (AIPRD – LOGICA, 2006, & Husaini, personal communication, March 8, 
2010). 
This fishing village which is one of 26 villages in the Peukan Bada Subdistrict, the Aceh 
Besar District, has 3 hamlets, namely Lam Raya, Teungoh, and Meunasah. The elevation of the 
village is very low and the topography is flat due to its proximity to the water. The 2004 Aceh 
tsunami completely damaged this seaside village, destroying all public facilities, settlements, 
infrastructure, and environment.   
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Socio – demography  
Before the tsunami, the population of Lam Teungoh was approximately 1294. The 
tsunami killed about 80% (1045) of the village residents (Yayasan Pugar, 2007). Survivors from 
Lam Teungoh then lived in tents around the National Television Station (Televisi Republik 
Indonesia, TVRI), Jalan Sudirman, Mata Ie, southeast of Banda Aceh, one of the biggest IDP 
(internally displaced person) camps in Aceh. One week after the disaster, they moved to 
temporary living centers in Lampeuneurut village and after one month they moved again to 
Lamseudaya village in the area of the civil servant estate. Other survivors sought refuge in their 
relatives’ homes or host communities in Banda Aceh, Sibreh and surrounding areas. Later on, 
once some villagers had built several temporary shelters in Lam Teungoh, many villagers 
returned to their home village to live there (Husaini, personal communication, March 8, 2010).  
As in other tsunami-affected villages, many women, girls, and children in the village of 
Lam Teungoh were killed by the tsunami. Many men in this coastal area were fishermen who 
survived at sea or were farming in the hills when the tsunami struck. But their wives and children 
were killed by the waves not far from the beach. Most of them were hit by the tsunami as they 
were on their way to the hills near its neighboring villages of Tutui and Lambaro Neujid. 
Unsurprisingly, so much of population of these neighboring villages survived since their villages 
were situated at the foot of hilly areas (Husaini, personal communciation, March 8, 2010).  
Since the massive reconstruction effort was over (2007),  the number of Lam Teungoh 
population has decreased year by year due to migration of its residents to other areas. By 2008, 
the population of Lam Teungoh was around 189 people; 115 male (60.85%) and 74 female 
(39.15%) (BPS – Statistics the Aceh Besar District, 2006).   
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Table 4.6.: Demography of Lam Teungoh before and after the tsunami 
Variable  2003 
Pre-
Tsunami 
2004 
Post-
Tsunami 
2005 
2006 2008 
Population 918 1294 249 189 189 
Household number 150 n/a n/a 109 92 
Family Size 6 n/a n/a 2 2.05 
Male 512 
(55.77%) 
n/a n/a 117 
(61.90%) 
115 
(60.85%) 
Female 406 
(44.33%) 
n/a n/a 72 
(38.10%) 
74 
(39.15%) 
< 5 years  n/a n/a n/a n/a 16 
≥ 5 –  < 17 years  n/a n/a n/a n/a 36 
≥ 17 – < 50 years  n/a n/a n/a n/a 117 
≥ 50 years n/a n/a n/a n/a 20 
Sources:  Processed based on data from:   
- Peukan Bada Sub-District in Figures, 2003 – BPS – Statistics of the Aceh Besar District 
- Peukan Bada Sub-District in Figures, 2006 – BPS – Statistics of the Aceh Besar District  
- The Five Year Development Plan (2008-2012) of the Village of Lam Teungoh, and interview 
with Husaini, community leader of the Village of Lam Teungoh on March 8, 2010 
- Yayasan Pugar, 2007 
 
 
With regard to education, Lam Teungoh’s condition is serious. Referring to Lam 
Teungoh village data in 2008 (Gampong Lam Teungoh, 2008), quite a lot of villagers had no 
education (39.88%). Only 22.09% had a senior high school level of education and 1.23% had an 
undergraduate education. The remaining villagers were in the level of education of junior high 
school (30.67%) and elementary school (6.13%).    
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Table 4.7.: Level of education of Lam Teungoh residents in 2008  
Education Number Percentage 
No education 65 39.88 
Elementary 10 6.13 
Junior High 50 30.67 
Senior High 36 22.09 
University (undergraduate) 2 1.23 
Total 163 100.00 
Sources: Processed based on data from:  
The Five Year Development Plan (2008-2012) of the Village of Lam Teungoh, and interview 
with Husaini, community leader of the Village of Lam Teungoh on March 8, 2010 
 
Economy 
According to Husaini, community leader of the Village of Lam Teungoh (personal 
communication, March 8, 2010), the fishery sector has been a source of income for many 
villagers before and after the tsunami. This sector suffered severe damage because of the 
tsunami. Most of fisherman’s boats were carried away by the waves. In the same vein, the fish 
and shrimp ponds were all destroyed and covered with sludge and sand carried by the tsunami 
from the sea. Unfortunately, for many fishermen in the village fishing was the only skill they 
had.  
Serious damage was also experienced in the agricultural sector. The damage to 
farmland encompassing hectares of rice fields and plantations. Rice fields could not be sowed 
anymore since they contained too much mud and sand. They were also filled with debris from 
collapsed houses. Meanwhile, hundreds of cows, water buffalos, sheep, goats, and fowl were 
dead or missing. 
Given the damage to village’s economy above, in the months following the tsunami, as in 
other tsunami-hit areas, villagers relied heavily on handouts given by the government, NGOs and 
other aid organizations. Later, when the reconstruction process took place, villagers could earn a 
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living again by doing their previous jobs (particularly for fishermen) and getting involved in the 
reconstruction effort (e.g. cash-for-work projects, building village’s infrastructure, etc). 
Besides working in the fishery and agricultural sectors, a number of Lam Teungoh 
residents make a living as  poultry and cattle breeders, unorganized day laborers, construction 
related professionals, merchants, drivers, and government employees. Based on information from 
Husaini, (personal communication, March 8, 2010),  monthly income/capita in the village is now 
about Rp 800,000 – 1 million. This income places this village as a poor village in the province. 
By 2009, the provincial minimum wage was Rp 1.2 million per month (Bank Indonesia & 
Bappeda Aceh, 2010), while the provincial income/capita calculated per month was Rp. 1.4 
million.  
 
Table 4.8.: The livelihood of Lam Teungoh residents in 2008 
Occupation Number Percentage 
Fisherman and fish and shrimp pond farmer 30 26.79 
Farmer   25 22.32 
Poultry and cattle breeder 17 15.18 
Unorganized day laborer 10 8.93 
Construction- related professional 6 5.36 
Merchant 3 2.68 
Driver 2 1.79 
Government employee 1 0.89 
Unemployed  18 16.07 
Total 112 100.00 
Sources: Processed based on data from: 
The Five Year Development Plan (2008-2012) of the Village of Lam Teungoh, and interview 
with Husaini, community leader of the Village of Lam Teungoh on March 8, 2010 
 
 
Infrastructure 
All buildings and public facilities in Lam Teungoh were destroyed by the tsunami. The 
tsunami swept away houses, the village office, the village clinic, the elementary school, the 
 
 
65 
 
prayer house, sport facilities and asphalt roads. In line with the arrival of many parties from 
within the country and all around the globe in assisting the rescue and relief operations, Lam 
Teungoh began to rebuild (Husaini, personal communication, March 8, 2010).  
UPLINK, a consortium of Indonesian and international development groups, gave 
materials for the 40 temporary homes. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) provided a canoe and 
material for a small, temporary mosque. The US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) paid villagers to clean their fields through the cash-for-work project (later, this project 
was also carried out by an Indonesian relief group Pugar and a NGO Mercy Coprs). USAID also 
built a community center, volleyball court and garden. Pugar and Al Amin, a Muslim aid group, 
provided fishing boats. The French group Secours Populaire Francais constructed an ice factory 
to keep the fish fresh for market, while CARE supplied rice, toiletries, cooking oil and other 
goods. Permanent homes were built by a German organization, GTZ. Later, the homes were also 
constructed by UPLINK and BRR (Husaini, personal communcation, March, 8, 2010).  
Presently, the condition of the village infrastructure is back to normal. In a way, the 
quality of many community houses, roads, and other public facilities is better than that of 
previous facilities. The following table summarizes major infrastructure built by numerous aid 
organizations in Lam Teungoh during the reconsctruction process. 
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Table 4.9.: Infrastructure built in Lam Teungoh during the reconstruction period 
Project, Name Source of Funds Remarks 
House construction GTZ*, UPLINK, & BRR** 110, 12, 26 units 
Road construction Government of Japan 
(through Department of 
Public Works) and BRR 
 
Village Office construction USAID/DAI***  
Volleyball court construction USAID/DAI  
Village Meeting Hall construction AIPRD ****  
Well construction PLAN  
Water Supply PLAN, WASALMA*****  
Ritual ablution place construction MERCY CORPS  
Women’s Group building construction MERCY CORPS  
Public cemetery fence construction MERCY CORPS  
Drainage construction MERCY CORPS  
Floodgate construction AIPRD   
Pathway construction AIPRD  
State-Owned Islamic Elementary 
School construction 
Islamic Relief 
 
 
Mosque construction WAMY******  
Prayer-house construction AIPRD   
Public toilet construction World Vision, Care, PPK, 
Yayasan Dian 
 
Sources: Processed based on data from: 
The Five Year Development Plan (2008-2012) of the Village of Lam Teungoh, and interview 
with Husaini, community leader of the Village of Lam Teungoh on March 8, 2010 
 
*           Gesselschaft for Technische Zusammenarbeit (The German Technical Cooperation) 
**         Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh dan Nias (the Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation Agency of Aceh and Nias)  
***       The US Agency for International Development/ Development Alternatives, Inc. 
****     Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development  
*****   Wahana Amal Sesama Makhluk Allah 
****** World Assembly of Moslem Youth 
 
 
Lam Hasan  
Geography 
 
The Village of Lam Hasan, 5 kms from Banda Aceh, is bordered on the north by the 
Vilage of Payatieng, on the south by the Village of Rima Keuneruem, on the east by the Village 
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of Ajuen and the Village of Lampoh Daya, and on the west by the Village of Payatieng and the 
Village of Lam Geu-eu. Located in the Peukan Bada Subdistrict, the Aceh Besar District, this 
village has 7 hamlets: Paya Loe, Lampoh Raya, Lamdan, Komplek Perumahan BTN, Lampoh 
Sukon, Pola Permai, and Darma Sakinah.  
Lam Hasan has a spacious area of 90 hectares, consisting of 70 hectares of settlements 
and public facilities and 17 hectares of agricultural and plantation areas (Gampong Lam Hasan, 
2009a). Like its neighboring village of Lam Teungoh, Lam Hasan’s elevation is also very low 
with a flat topography.  
According to head of the Village of Lam Hasan, Bukhari MY (personal communication, 
May 9, 2010), out of 7 hamlets, 5 hamlets, namely Lamdan, Lampoh Raya, Lampoh Sukon, 
Darma Sakinah, and Paya Loe, were totally flattened to the ground by the tsunami. The 
remaining neigborhoods of Komplek Perumahan BTN and Pola Permai were partially destroyed. 
   
Socio – demography  
Around 600 Lam Hasan residents were dead from the December 26, 2004 tsunami. 
Immediately after the tsunami, the remaining population was about 1700 (Bukhari MY, personal 
communication, May 9, 2010). Although located fewer than 2 killometers inland, the death toll 
was relatively low (approximately 26%). The location of some of its hamlets which are 200-500 
meters from Gle Genteng (Genteng Hill) provided enough time for a lot of Lam Hasan residents 
to climb the hill and runaway from the tsunami. 
The survivors from Lam Hasan scattered in several areas in Aceh. Most of them stayed in 
the MPI building in Ajun. The rest mostly lived in their relatives’ homes or stayed in host 
communities in the unaffected areas around Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh and other areas. In early 
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March 2005,  after UPLINK’s 36 temporary tents were erected in Lam Hasan, a number of 
villagers initiated to return to their home village. Later, more and more villagers went back to the 
village once many permanent homes were built. 
As of 2009, data show that Lam Hasan had a population of 2316, far higher than that in 
the aftermath of the tsunami (Gampong Lam Hasan, 2009). The increase in the number of 
population resulted from influx of new inhabitants and new births.   
 
Table 4.10.: Demography of Lam Hasan before and after the tsunami 
Variable  2003 
Pre-
Tsunami 
2004 
Post-
Tsunami 
2005 
2006 2009 
Population 1901 2300 1700 1576 2316 
Household number 397 n/a n/a 432 555 
Family Size 5 n/a n/a 4 3.86 
Male 874 
(45.98%) 
n/a n/a 831 
(52.73%) 
1189 
(51.34%) 
Female 1027 
(54.02%) 
n/a n/a 745 
(47.27%) 
1127 
(48.66%) 
0 – 12 months n/a n/a n/a n/a 146 
> 1 year – < 5 years  n/a n/a n/a n/a 244 
≥ 5 – < 7 years  n/a n/a n/a n/a 151 
≥ 7 – ≤ 15 years n/a n/a n/a n/a 655 
>15 – < 57 years  n/a n/a n/a n/a 969 
≥57 years n/a n/a n/a n/a 151 
Sources: Processed based on data from:   
- Peukan Bada Sub-District in Figures, 2003 – BPS – Statistics of Aceh Besar District 
- Peukan Bada Sub-District in Figures, 2006 – BPS – Statistics of Aceh Besar District  
- The Profile of the Village of Lam Hasan, 2009 
- Interview with Bukhari MY, head of Lam Hasan Village on May 9, 2010  
 
In terms of education, data (Gampong Lam Hasan, 2009) show that in 2009 the majority 
of Lam Hasan residents had a senior high school education (57.53%), whilst 5.64% had an 
undergraduate education. Interestingly, 1.58% had master or doctoral degrees, reflecting that the 
village had a few number of residents with high levels of education. Those well-educated 
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residents worked as lecturers or educators. However, education levels in the village are disparate, 
reflected by the high number of residents with no-education (12.28%).   
 
Table 4.11.: Level of education of Lam Hasan residents in 2009 
Education Number Percentage 
No education 257 12.28 
Elementary 116 5.54 
Junior High 365 17.44 
Senior High 1204 57.53 
Undergraduate 118 5.64 
Master degree 31 1.48 
Doctoral degree 2 0.10 
Total 2093 100 
Sources: The Profile of the Village of Lam Hasan, 2009, and interview with head of Lam Hasan 
village, Bukhari MY on May 9, 2010 
 
 
Economy 
According to data in 2009 (Gampong Lam Hasan, 2009), 21.81% of Lam Hasan residents 
were  state or private workers, 13.14% were farmers, 21.51%  were government employees, the 
remainder being poultry and cattle breeders (6.08%), bakers (4.83%), retired goverment 
employees (4.38%), unorganized day laborers (3.57%), police and military (3.40%), tailors 
(2.23%), construction related professionals (1.79%), merchants (1.61%), midwives (1.52%), 
mechanics (1.34%), carpenters (1.07%), fishermen (0.71%), medical doctors (0.45%), and 
miscellaneous (0.80%). This occupation portrait is basically the same as that prior to the tsunami. 
Monthly income/capita in Lam Hasan is around Rp 1 - 1.2 million (categorized as a poor 
village).  This is because a large number of residents are unemployed, while others still have low 
monthly income jobs (bricklayers, bakers, tailors, mechanics, carpenters, and fishermen) 
(Bukhari MY, personal communication, May 9, 2010).   
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Table 4.12.: The livelihood of Lam Hasan residents in 2009 
Occupation Number Percentage 
Private or state company worker 244 21.81 
Farmer 147 13.14 
Government employee  140 12.51 
Poultry and cattle breeder 68 6.08 
Baker 54 4.83 
Retired ( government employee and police & military) 49 4.38 
Unorganized day laborer 40 3.57 
Police and Military 38 3.40 
Tailor 25 2.23 
Construction related professional   20 1.79  
Merchant 18 1.61 
Midwife 17 1.52 
Mechanic 15 1.34 
Carpenter 12 1.07 
Fisherman 8 0.71 
Medical doctor 5 0.45 
Miscellaneous (police officer, lawyer,  etc) 9 0.80 
Unemployed  210 18.76 
Total 1119 100.00 
Source: The Profile of the Village of Lam Hasan, 2009 
 
 
Infrastructure 
Based on the head of the village Bukhari’s information (personal communication, May 9, 
2010), 60-70% buildings in Lam Hasan were wiped out by the tsunami. Although a number of 
residents’ houses and other infrastructure (prayer house, drainage, schools) were not completely 
destroyed, they did require reconstruction. Immediately after the tsunami, relief agencies, and 
local and foreign governments came to the village to provide emergency assistance.  
In the beginning, UPLINK dominated the reconstruction effort in the village. This 
organization provided materials for temporary shelters and subsequently built and renovated 
houses. UPLINK also rehabilitated drainage (later continued by Mercy Corps) and made route 
evacuation. Mercy Corps carried out the cash-for-work project, creating a source of income for 
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the villagers. BRR, Muslim Aid and British Red Cross constructed new homes. AIPRD  built a 
village office. Water was delivered by  Care and Oxfam, whilst food was provided by Care, 
WFP, and Save the Children. In the next period of relief efforts, other parties such as Plan, Luis 
Fernandez Fund, and Turkey Red Cross also took an active part (Bukhari MY, personal 
communication, May 9, 2010).  
 
Table 4.13.: Infrastructure built in Lam Hasan during the reconstruction period 
Project Name Source of Funds Remarks 
House construction UPLINK, BRR, Muslim Aid, & British 
Red Cross 
236 (rehab 40), 96,13, & 16 
units respectively 
Road construction BRR (through the Dep’t of Public 
Works), ILO*, & UPLINK  
Total +/- 5 km 
 
Village Office construction AIPRD   
Water supply Care, Oxfam  
Public bathing place renovation MERCY CORPS  
Construction of Local Government 
Supporting Medical Clinic 
(Puskesmas Pembantu) 
PLAN  
Construction of Women’s Group 
building 
PPK** 
 
 
Construction of prayer house’s 
fence and gate 
PPK  
Construction of Women’s Group’s 
Warehouse building 
MERCY CORPS 
 
 
Tsunami victims’ cemetery fence 
construction 
AIPRD   
Drainage rehabilitation MERCY CORPS, BRR (through the 
Dep’t of Public Works), & UPLINK 
1600 m, 300 m,& 300m 
State Elementary School 
construction 
Luis Fernandez Fund 
 
 
State Senior High School 
construction 
Turkey Red Cross  
Evacuation route development UPLINK  
Street and pathway naming and 
housing numbering 
MERCY CORPS  
Volleyball and table tennis courts 
construction 
AIPRD  
Supply of street lights MERCY CORPS  
Prayer-house rehabilitation 
 
Bureau of welfare, specialty and culture, 
Aceh Province  
 
Public toilet construction MERCY CORPS   
Sources: Processed based on data from: 
The Five Year Development Plan (2008-2012) of the Village of Lam Hasan, 2009 
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Village Profile of Lam Hasan, 2009 and  interview with Buchari MY, Head of Lam Hasan 
Village 
 
*   The International Labour Organization 
** Program Pengembangan Kecamatan (Subdistrict Developmen Program) under the 
Department of Home Affairs 
 
 
Lambung  
Geography 
 
Lambung is situated in the Meuraxa Subdistrict, one of 9 subdistricts in the city of Banda 
Aceh. During the 2004 tsunami, Lambung along with 15 other villages in the Meuraxa 
subdistrict experienced severe damage. Lambung is close to the Indian Ocean, bordered on the 
north by the Vilage of Deah Glumpang, on the south by Jalan (Street of) Sultan Iskandar Muda, 
on the east by the Village of Ulee Lheue, and on the west by the Village of Blang Oi. Four 
hamlets are part of the village:  Seulanga, Mawar, Dahlia, and Melatika. As a whole, Lambung’s 
area covers 52 hectares; 29 hectares of settelements and public facilities, 15 hectares of 
mangrove areas, and 8 hectares of fish and shrimp pond areas (Gampong Lambung, 2009).  
 
Socio – demography  
“The Profile of Lambung Village, the Meuraxa Subdistrict, the city of Banda Aceh” 
(2009) describes that Lambung lost 1037 out of 1368 or around ¾ of its population when the 
earthquake and tsunami struck. According to head of Lambung village, Zaidi M. Adan  (personal 
communication, July 2, 2010), aside from fishermen who were going fishing on the boat during 
the disaster (15 people including himself) and those who survived from the tsunami waves in the 
village, survivors were also those who were travelling around the city of Banda Aceh after the 
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earthquake (before the tsunami). In addition, some residents were also safe because of being out 
of the village for the purpose of studying, running a business and doing other activities in the 
provinces like Medan and Jakarta.  
  According to Zaidi M. Adan (personal communication, July 2, 2010), as many as 50 
survivors sought refuge in their relatives’ houses concentrating around Cot Gu, Mata Ie, near the 
National Television Station (Televisi Republik Indonesia, TVRI). One month later, a number of 
male survivors started building temporary shelters in the village. The shelters accomodated more 
than one hundred villagers for more than 2 years due to the long village mapping and land 
consolidation process among villagers for replanning and rebuilding permanent houses. The rest 
of the survivors not living in the shelters scattered in other cities in the province (Langsa and 
Sigli) or in other provinces (Medan, Jakarta).  
In 2009, five years after the disaster, Lambung residents lived in their village comfortably 
and safely. The number of Lambung residents increased to 420. New residents (resulted from 
marriage, birth, the presence of more house renters, etc) contributed to the increased population. 
Renters were attracted by a more orderly and beautiful Lambung village.  
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Table 4.14.: Demography of Lambung before and after the tsunami 
Variable  Pre-Tsunami 2004 
Post-Tsunami 
2005 2009 
Population 1368 331 420 
Household number 295 154 146 
Family Size 4.64 2.15 2.88 
Male 753 (55.04%) 215 (64.95%) 222 (52.90%) 
Female 615 (44.06%) 116 (35.05%) 198 (47.10%) 
0 – 12 months n/a n/a 13 
>1 - < 5 years  n/a n/a 50 
≥ 5 –  < 18 years  n/a n/a 98 
≥ 18 – < 56 years  n/a n/a 219 
≥ 56 years n/a n/a 40 
Sources:  Processed based on data from:   
The Profile of Lambung Village, the Meuraxa Subdistrict, the city of Banda Aceh, 2009, and 
interview with Zaidi M. Adan, head of Lambung Villageon July 2, 2010 
 
In the education sector, as a whole, the 2009 data (Gampong Lambung, 2009) show that 
Lambung residents had a relatively better portrait than two previous villages. The number of 
residents who had no education was very small (2.28%). The majority of residents (61.82%) had 
a senior high school education and 21.08% had a college education. The rest of the residents 
were in the education levels of junior high school (13.11%), and elementary  school (1.71%). 
   
Table 4.15.: Level of education of Lambung residents in 2009 
Education Number Percentage 
No education 8 2.28 
Elementary 6 1.71 
Junior High 46 13.11 
Senior High 217 61.82 
University (undergraduate) 74 21.08 
Total 351 100.00 
Sources: The Profile of Lambung Village, the Meuraxa Subdistrict, the city of Banda Aceh, 
2009, and interview with Zaidi M. Adan, head of Lambung Village on July 2, 2010 
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Economy 
Data in 2009 show that the majority of people in Lambung village were employed as 
workers in the private companies, government employess, construction-related professionals, and 
merchants. A number of inhabitants, especially male groups, produced Acehnese unique cakes 
which were quite famous all over Aceh (Gampong Lambung, 2009).  
  According to the head of Lambung Village, Zaidi M. Adan (personal communication, 
July 2, 2010), due to economic reasons as well as the awareness to rebuild their village, a certain 
number of residents participated in the income-generated cash-for-work (cleaning up the village) 
project sponsored by several relief agencies (International Relief and Development, Inc., etc) 
after the tsunami. The project was really helpful in providing community members with a regular 
income during the months after the disaster. As in other tsunami affected areas, most residents in 
Lambung could not practice their occupation for quite a long time after the tsunami. Later, as the 
project was over and the situation was getting normal, residents returned to their previous jobs.  
Based on information from the head of the village (personal communication, July 2, 
2010), monthly income of each villager is currently about Rp 1.5- 1.75 million, relatively high 
compared to residents in other villages in Aceh.  
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Table 4.16.: The livelihood of Lambung residents in 2009 
Occupation Number Percentage 
Private company worker 68 27.83 
Government employee 28 11.67 
Construction-related professionals   27 11.25 
Merchant 18 7.50 
Fisherman 7 2.92 
Retired government employee and police and 
military 
7 2.92 
Police and Military 3 1.25 
Farmer 2 0.83 
Miscellaneous (medical doctor, lawyer, etc)  16 6.67 
Having irregular jobs 30 12.50 
Unemployed  34 14.17 
Total 240 100.00 
Sources: The Profile of Lambung Village, the Meuraxa Subdistrict, the city of Banda Aceh, 
2009, and interview with head of Lambung village, Zaidi M. Adan on July 2, 2010 
 
 
Infrastructure 
Like Lam Hasan village, Lambung village was also completely destroyed by the tsunami. 
In contrast to the surrounding villages which were built at high speed by NGOs immediately 
after the tsunami, the initial redevelopment progrees in Lambung was slow. A common 
agreement on rearranging the village mapping among community members took a long time 
(Zaidi M. Adan, personal communication, July 2, 2010). This village had to wait until 2006 to 
start building permanent homes for its residents. The old Lambung village, which was not 
properly planned like most villages in Indonesia, finally turned into the block system village with 
wide roads. The village used to have a narrow road and small alley leading Lambung villagers to 
be trapped inside the village and unable to escape from the tsunami. Lambung has now often 
been considered a model village for spatial mapping and for the successful participative post-
disaster redevelopment, particularly in Aceh (BRR, 2009b).  
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Reconstruction in Lambung was supported by the government and various aid 
organizations. Through the Re-Kompak program (Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Masyarakat dan 
Permukiman or The Community-Based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project), 
the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) through the Community-Based Settlement Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction Project (Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Masyarakat dan Permukiman or 
ReKompak) provided funding to build 309 houses. Japan International Cooperation System 
(JICS) built a three story community escape building with a helicopter pad on its roof as a safe 
place for communities during a tsunami or other disasters. RCTI, a private television station 
based in Jakarta the capital city of Indonesia, donated funds for the construction of one school 
complex which has the level of education of kindergarten, elementary, junior high and senior 
high. From its own funding, Lambung gave a contribution to build a volleyball court, Pos 
Kamling (Law and order of the neigborhood post) and  a village office (Zaidi M. Adan, personal 
communication, July 2, 2010). Many other development projects have been succesfully 
implemented in Lambung.  
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Table 4.17.: Infrastructure built in Lambung during the reconstruction period  
Project Name Source of Funds Remarks 
Temporary shelter construction AIPRD  
Knock down buildings construction 
(for temporary clinic, temporary 
kindergarten building, and 
warehouse) 
AIPRD  
Artesian wells construction AIPRD  
House construction MDF/ReKompak* 309 units  
Road and drainage construction BRR  
Mukim Office construction BRR  
Prayer House (Meunasah) BRR  
Village Meeting Hall construction BRR  
Construction of building for 
producing Acehnese traditional cake 
BRR  
Afternoon Religious School for 
children (TPA) construction 
BRR  
Village Office construction BRR and Lambung 
residents-owned funds 
 
Volleyball court construction Lambung residents-owned 
funds 
 
Youth Hall construction JICS**   
Community escape building 
construction 
JICS  
Law and order of the neigborhood 
post (Pos Kamling) construction 
Lambung residents-owned 
funds 
 
Community health center 
(Puskesmas) construction 
Saudi Arabian Red Cross  
Construction of chool complex 
(kindergarten, elementary, junior 
high & senior high school buildings 
RCTI ***  
Sources: The Profile of Lambung Village, the Meuraxa Subdistrict, the city of Banda Aceh, 2009 
and interview with head of Lambung village, Zaidi M. Adan on July 2, 2010 
 
*        The Multi Donor Fund/ Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Masyarakat dan Permukiman or 
The Community-Based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project 
**      Japan International Cooperation System  
***    Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia, an Indonesian private television 
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Merduati 
Geography 
 
Having an area of 30.71 hectares, Merduati  is surrounded by  Lampaseh Kota village on 
the west side, Kampung Baru on the east and south sides, and Peulanggahan village and Keudah 
village on the North side. Since 2009, this area (along with other areas which were formerly 
kelurahans), has legally turned into a village or gampong as a consequence of the enactment of 
Law No 11/2006 on the Aceh Government.  
The elevation of Merduati is about 0.5 meter above sea level, quite low compared to 
other villages in the Kuta Raja subdistrict which have the elevation ranging from 0.5 to 1 meter.  
Like other villages in the Meuraxa Subdistrict (Lampaseh Kota, Keudah, Peulanggahan, 
Gampong Jawa, and Gampong Pande), Merduati has flat topography (PNPM-Mandiri, 2008).  
According to the head of the village, Turmizi (personal communication, August 14, 2010), the 
tsunami destroyed 70-75 percent of the total 5 hamlets in the village, namely Seroja, Kemuning, 
Sedap Malam, Mawar, and Melatika.   
In terms of land use, Merduati is organized as follows:  19.4 hectares of settlements, 2.21 
hectares of public facilities, 8.17 hectares of trading and service areas, 0.81 hectares of office 
complex areas and 0.07 hectares of other areas. Its strategic location near the capital city, to 
some extent,  makes Merduati an influential trading and service area, both in the city of Banda 
Aceh and in the province.  The standing of  this area is also associated with its proximity to 3 
central markets in the province: Pasar Aceh, Kawasan Perdagangan, and Pasar Peunayong (GTZ-
SLGSR, 2006).   
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Socio – demography  
Merduati is the most populous area among other 5 villages in the Kuta Raja subdistrict. 
Like many villages in the Kuta Raja subdistrict, Merduati is also a densely populated area. 
Before tsunami, it had a population of  5365 (GTZ – SLGSR, 2006). Based on information from 
Khair, one of community Merduati leaders (personal communication, August 14, 2010), tsunami 
killed a large number of residents including the head of the village, Zakaria. It was predicted that 
only about 1500 (28%) residents survived (Turmuzi, personal communication, August 14, 2010) 
.  Like survivors in its neighboring villages, most survivors were safe because they were out of 
the village during the tsunami.  
  Like many survivors from Lam Teungoh and other areas, survivors from Merduati also 
sought refuge  around TVRI area on Jalan Sudirman, Mata Ie. Others scattered, living in their 
relatives’ homes and host communities or school and government buildings located around 
Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar areas like Lambaro, Ulee Kareng, Darussalam and Tungkop. One 
month later, a number of residents returned to their home village and lived in several spots like 
Arrahman Mosque and Taman Dianjung Mosque or even in the ruins of village buildings. After a 
base camp for Merduati residents equiped with the Indonesian soldier (TNI)-donated tents was 
established in Geuceu Iniem, some 100 Merduati residents then moved there (Turmuzi, personal 
communication, August 14, 2010).   
As of July 2010, most of survivors have returned home and many new residents have 
lived in Merduati. Data show that Merduati population currently reaches 2651 (Gampong 
Merduati, 2010). As a thriving business area, the population of Merduati is predicted to  increase 
over time (Gampong Merduati, 2010).  
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Table 4.18.: Demography of Merduati before and after the tsunami 
Variable  Pre-Tsunami 2004 
Post-Tsunami 
2006 2010 
Population 5365 1969 2651 
Household number 1064 1218 844 
Family Size 5.04 1.62 3.14 
Male 2998 (55.88%) 1141 (57.95%) 1421 (53.60%) 
Female 2367 (44.12%) 828 (42.05%) 1230 (46.40%) 
≤ 5 years  n/a n/a 302 
> 5 –  < 21 years  n/a n/a 655 
≥ 21 – < 56 years  n/a n/a 1572 
≥ 56  n/a n/a 122 
Sources:  Processed based on data from:   
- The Detailed Regional Spatial Planning of Kuta Raja Subdistrict, 2006 
- Data about the number of population of Merduati Village, Kutaraja subdistrict, 2010  
 
In terms of the education condition, based on the 2008 report, the majority residents had 
senior high school level of education (48.31%). Those who had an undergraduate or higher 
education level were 20.15%. Other residents had the level of education of junior high school 
(16.50%) and elementary school (6.15%). Meanwhile, 8.88% had no education.   
 
Table 4.19.: Level of education of Merduati residents in 2008 
Education Number Percentage 
No education 163 8.88 
Elementary 113 6.15 
Junior High 303 16.50 
Senior High 887 48.31 
University* 370 20.15 
Total 1836 100.00 
Source: PNPM-Mandiri, The participative review of the five year development plan for 
combating poverty 2008-2010 
*Including level of education above undergraduate, but the exact number of post graduate level 
is unavailable. 
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Economy 
Prior to the tsunami, the majority of people in Merduati village worked as private 
company workers, government employees, and merchants, while the remainder being national 
police and military, drivers, medical workers, fishermen, and fish and shrimp pond farmers. As 
an area close to the center of the province, Lambung had to deal with unemployement issues. 
Even though Merduati enjoys a relatively high income/capita compared to other case study 
villages (about Rp. 2.5 million per month), prosperity is not equally distributed. A large number 
of its resident are unemployed or still do not have regular jobs (Turmuzi, personal 
communication, August 14, 2010).    
As in other tsunami-hit villages, after the tsunami, Merduati residents also participated in 
the cash-for-work project. In their village, this was run by IRD (International Relief and 
Development, Inc.). However, many of them were not used to doing manual labor and did not 
want to continue getting involved in the project. Therefore, as the majority of cleanup had been 
accomplished and as the situation was getting more normal, most of them returned to their 
previous sources of employment.  
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Table 4.20.: The livelihood of Merduati residents in 2008 
Occupation Number Percentage 
Private company worker 169 17.70 
Government employee 124 12.98 
Trader 122 12.77 
Police and Military 33 3.46 
Driver 12 1.26 
Medical worker 10 1.05 
Fisherman 7 0.73 
Fish and shrimp pond farmer 3 0.31 
Having irregular jobs  431 45.13 
Unemployed  44 4.61 
Total 955 100.00 
Source: PNPM-Mandiri, The participative review of the five year development plan for 
combating poverty 2008-2010 
 
 
Infrastructure 
The tsunami devastated about ¾ of Merduati’s infrastructure including settlements, social 
and educational facilities, roads, medical facilities, sport facilities, and religious facilities. The 
village was paralyzed and road access was obstructed by thousands of tons of debris and 
hundreds of corpses. It took about 3 months for the city of Banda Aceh and other organizations 
to systematically clean this area. IRD (International Relief Development, Inc.) paid each resident 
involving in the cleanup as much as Rp 35,000/day (Turmuzi, personal communication, August 
14, 2010).   
The government of Indonesia (through BRR and several projects), various NGOs and aid 
agencies took part in the redevelopment process of Merduati. BRR and government-related 
projects of P2KP (Program Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Perkotaan or The Urban Poverty 
Project) and PNPM (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat or the National Community 
Empowerment Project) constructed infrastructure  like roads and drainage. In cooperation with a 
Christian Doctors' Association from Jakarta, Bayer supports a neighborhood health clinic. The 
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members of this Doctor’s association had previously gotten involved in providing medical aid 
right after the tsunami. The clinic was mainly directed to child and mother care (Turmuzi, 
personal communciation, August 14, 2010).  
Another organization, Unicef (the United Nations Children’s Fund) helped 
Muhammadiyah (the second largest Indonesian Islamic organization) rebuild schools in the 
village. The schools had several facilities such as a library, a multi purpose hall, a canteen,  
toilets, and a sport court. Unicef contracted the United Nations Office for Project Services 
(UNOPS) to build the schools. Meanwhile, UN-Habitat and UNDP (the United Nations 
Development Program) with their Aceh-Nias Settlements Support Program (ANSSP) funded by 
the Government of United Arabs Emirates, built and renovated 486 houses. Besides UN-
Habitat/UNDP, ADB (the Asian Development Bank), BRR, and Genesis also constructed houses 
as many as 300 units (Turmuzi, personal communication, August 14, 2010).  
Other organizations including Care, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Unicef and Bayer also 
supported relief efforts by constructing numerous public facilities which were urgently needed 
by Merduati residents.  
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Table 4.21.: Infrastructure built in Merduati during the reconstruction period  
Project Name Source of Funds Remarks 
House construction UN-Habitat/UNDP* 
ADB** 
BRR 
Genesis  
445 new units, 41 rehab 
213 units 
76 units  
11 units  
Road construction BRR 
P2KP*** 
PNPM-Mandiri**** 
 
Community warehouse 
construction 
P2KP  
Drainage construction P2KP 
Care 
Muslim Aid 
PNPM-Mandiri 
 
Mosque rehabilitation  (3 
units) 
BRR, City of Banda Aceh 
government 
 
Water supply BRR  
Village office renovation Provincial government  
Construction of public 
bathing, washing and toilet 
facilities 
Care  
Elementary school building 
construction 
Oxfam  
Muhammadiyah’s 
educational complex 
construction 
Unicef*****  
Health clinic construction Bayer in cooperation with 
Jakarta Christian Doctors’ 
Association 
 
Sources: Processed based on data from: 
PNPM-Mandiri, The participative review of the five year development plan for combating 
poverty 2008-2010,  and interview with head of Merduati villageTurmuzi on August 14, 2010. 
 
*          The United Nations Development Program 
**        The Asian Development Bank 
***      Program Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Perkotaan (The Urban Poverty Project)  
****    Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (The National Community Empowerment 
Project) 
*****  The United Nations Children’s Fund  
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Summary 
The tsunami that hit Aceh and the four case study villages on December 26, 2004, 
besides causing a large number of casualties, also affected Aceh and the villages’ socio-politics, 
economy, infrastructure, and environment. The scale of the damage triggered huge aid and 
assistance from various NGOs and donor agencies around the world. The redevelopment process 
involving NGOs, donor agencies, the Government Indonesia, and the community at large, 
resulted in better infrastructure. It also turned out to be a blessing in disguise where the 
Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) then agreed so sign a peace accord 
in 2005, after about thirty years of the military conflict. However, the relief efforts to overcome 
the damage to the environment need a relatively longer period of time to be evaluated 
thoroughly. On economy, we also still have to wait and see the extent to which reconstruction 
efforts after the tsunami has boosted Aceh’s economy. Specifically, the description of the four 
case study villages in this chapter is hoped to provide the villages’ socio, demographic and 
economic backgrounds which, can be seen later, affected the implementation of participation in 
the villages.   
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CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
The research findings will be presented and discussed according to each supporting 
research question: the implementation of community participation in post-tsunami 
redevelopment in Aceh Province and community members’ perceptions and preferences on 
community participation in the recovery efforts. The implementation of participation will be 
described in three categories of participation (“ad hoc,” aid organization/agency-promoted, and 
administrative) and supplemented by the benefits, constraints, and supporting factors of 
community participation following the tsunami. Community member’s perceptions and 
preferences on participation will refer to the survey (questionnaire) results. This chapter begins 
with the profile of survey respondents,  followed by perceptions on the importance and 
constraints of participation, and preferences on participation from the perspective of survey 
respondents.      
 
The Implementation of Community Participation in Post-Tsunami Redevelopment in Aceh 
Province 
 
Various types of participation took place in the reconstruction term following the tsunami 
in the  four case study villages of Lam Teungoh, Lam Hasan, Lambung, and Merduati. Referring 
to the participation theories discussed in the literature chapter, the types of participation can be 
asociated with the actors promoting or mobilizing the participation itself. They include “ad hoc” 
participation, administrative participation, and civil society participation.   
“Ad hoc” participation relates to voluntary actions mainly mobilized by community 
members themselves and plays a role in such forms as volunteer programs, information offices, 
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and fund-raising efforts. Administrative participation is a participation mechanism in which 
administrative agencies take the initiative in reaching out to the citizens and involving them. 
Civil society participation is promoted by “interest groups” and help empower affected 
communities through such activities as supporting their rights and needs, educating and 
informing them with relevant information, providing funds, building facilities, and others.  In the 
context of the relief efforts in Aceh following the tsunami, besides community members, 
administrative agencies, and interest groups, aid organizations like foreign government 
organizations were also involved in the participatory-based development programs.  
In many cases, the process of all participation types taking place on the ground mentioned 
above were not fully in line with the guideline of community participation embeded in the 
Master Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for Aceh Province. The hierarchycal 
participatory process through Development councils from the village to provincial levels could 
not be implemented in the beginning years following the tsunami, due to the demand for quick 
relief actions at the village level and the difficulty in reaching an agreement on land 
consolidation between residents related to land titling issues. What was happening was the 
reconstruction efforts managed by government agencies and aid organizations were mostly 
accentuated in the village scope (Nazarul Khairi, ex head of BRR for Aceh Besar District & 
Iqbal Barata, ex head of BRR for Banda Aceh District; personal communication, June 15, 2009 
& August 18, 2010). In Lam Teungoh and Lam Hasan, facilitated by Mercy Corps, the Five Year 
Village Development Plans (comprehensive village plans) with the participatory approaches 
were succesfully formulated in 2008. This document was a reference used by those villages in 
proposing their village development plan at the upper development structure (subdistrict).   was 
also one of  aid organizations which succeeded in facilitating the formulation a document on 
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short‐term community planning in Merduati right after the tsunami (in 2005).  The formulation 
was possible with strong support from village leaders and the community as a whole (UNDP & 
UN-HABITAT, 2006).  
It is important to note that the reconstruction effort promoted by aid organizations had 
some similar characteristics in terms of initial steps taken, implementation of existing 
community’s representatives structure, and the funding sources of their projects. In general, 
before starting the village reconstruction effort, aid organizations made consultations with the 
local authorities (pertinent government agencies, heads of subdistricts, heads of villages, etc). In 
the consultations, there had been socialization and instruction about the organizations’ mission, 
vissions and other relevant aspects. After preliminary agreement was achieved between those 
parties, aid organizations supported by village apparatus organized village meetings to determine 
the needs and priorities of communities. In the beginning, village meetings were usually held in 
barraks/temporary tents, later on in village halls, mosques or prayer houses after they were built.  
With respect to functionalization of existing community’s representive structure, The 
Activity Managing Team (Tim Pengelola Kegiatan or TPK) and the committee for Rehabilitation 
and Reconstruction (Komite Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi or KERAP which later became the 
Community Self-help Body or Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat/ BKM) models, for instance, 
were often adopted. The models had been used for already existing government development 
projects like the Sub-District Development Project (Program Pengembangan Kecamatan or 
PPK). Meanwhile, in terms of funding sources, aid organizations mainly funded their projects 
from their own sources, donor agencies or donor countries. 
Below is the implementation of community participation following the Aceh tsunami 
which is grouped based on the aforementioned types of participation. The second type of 
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participation, civil society participation, is extended to be “aid organization/agency-promoted 
participation” since it also describes the involvement of international agencies in the 
participatory approaches. Data were gathered from interviews with community leaders and heads 
of villages of the case study villages and community facilitators of associated aid organizations 
working on reconstruction efforts in those villages.   
 
“Ad hoc” Participation 
1. Lam Teungoh 
In the beginning days following the tsunami, survivors from Lam Teungoh who were 
scattered in Aceh Besar and Banda Aceh, individually returned to their village to find out if their 
family members were missing. On the next second week, survivors who mostly gathered in the 
evacuation area in Lamseudaya village and survivors from neighboring village of Lamtutui who 
sought refuge in the same area, organized themselves to continue the searching process led by 
the head of Lamtutui village, Baharuddin. Later Baharuddin also served as head of Lam Teungoh 
village at the same time, since the previous head of Lam Teungoh village, Masri, was killed by 
the tsunami. While searching for corpses, they started collecting rough data about death toll in 
the village (Husaini, personal communication, March 8, 2010).   
The paralized local governments and the absence of any relief agencies right after the 
tsunami, led the survivors to evacuate corpses of their family members, relatives, or friends by 
themselves. Those corpses were buried in any possible areas in their village.  Within the first 
week after the tsunami, the men began burying corpses. In total, some 500 corpses were buried 
by mid-February. Later, the Indonesian Red Cross and other parties assisted with evacuation and 
burial process. At that time, most dead bodies were buried in the largest tsunami mass grave in 
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Lambaro, Aceh Besar. In parallel with search for corspes, data collection on death tolls was also 
undertaken by the community.  
More than one month after the tsunami, community members of Lam Teungoh Village 
and Lamtutui Village, led by Baharuddin,  held a meeting to make a decision with regard to 
survivors’ lives. In the meeting, they decided to go back to Lam Teungoh and Lamtutui because 
they needed to work again in the villages (mostly as fishermen). They also agreed to rebuild a 
temporary prayer house and some temporary houses. 
With limited resources, tens of male survivors started initial redevelopment of the village. 
In February 2005, Lam Teungoh villagers finally finished the development of the temporary 
prayer house and 10 temporary houses. They used wood from remaining trees and debris for wall 
materials. Iron sheeting donated by the Welfare Justice Party (PKS) was used for roofing. The 
temporary prayer house then became a community center enabling residents to organize 
themselves and deal with many issues such as death toll dissemination and trauma counseling 
(Husaini, personal communication, March 8, 2010).      
The return of villagers to the villages was very much influenced by the high spirit of 
togetherness among them to redevelop their village. Of all tsunami-affected area inhabitants in 
Aceh, Lam Teungoh and Lamtutui villagers were the first groups who came back to redevelop 
their villages following the tsunami. This phenomenon is quite amazing given the high level of 
damage and loss of life suffered by the village. The quick decision to return to their home village 
helped accelerate the redevelopment efforts in the village, reduced survivors’ traumatic feelings 
and helped earn a livelihood particularly for most villagers who work as fishermen. The fact that 
most villagers were native inhabitants who were related to each other contributed to the strength 
of social ties among them (Husaini, personal communication, March 15, 2010).   
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That spirit impressed USAID which carried out the cash-for-work project, that is, payed 
residents to clean the land and build a community center and other public facilities. UPLINK, 
Mercy Corps and other aid organization then were also attracted to provide materials or give 
funding for the village reconstruction process.  
Besides the tight bond among residents, the strong leadership of Baharuddin also played 
an important role in the return and initial redevelopment process in the village of Lam Teungoh. 
Given the low level of education among many community members, leadership played an 
important role in the mobilization process. This low level of condition, in many cases, prevented 
residents from active participation in the rebuilding process.  Baharuddin succeeded in 
motivating villagers to return to the village and rebuild it (Husaini, personal communication, 
March 15, 2010). He was communicative, decisive, charismatic and close to the people – typical 
of Acehnese natural born leader. As a fisherman, he spent more than 30 years on the sea. Before 
the tsunami, he had been not only head of Lamtutui village, but also Sea Commander (Panglima 
Laot), leader of an association of fishermen in nine villages including Lam Teungoh village. 
 
2. Lam Hasan 
Like in Lam Teungoh village, the absence of local government and other aid 
organizations during the first days after the tsunami forced survivors from Lam Hasan to take 
urgent measures in initial relief efforts in their village. Two days after the tsunami, community 
members who escaped to Gle Genteng (Genteng Hill) returned to Lam Hasan and started looking 
for their dead family members and relatives. Their return was also to find food (bread, coconut, 
snacks, and drinking water) from houses and food shops leftover in the neighboring village of 
Lampasi Engking.  
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A couple of days later, they sought refuge in the MPI’s building in Ajun and emergency 
tents surrounding the building. Besides survivors from Lam Hasan, survivors from other villages 
around Aceh Besar and the City of Banda Aceh  gathered in this area. In the beginning, 
survivors built the tents by using wood and plastic coming from tsunami debris. Later, 
emergency tents were supplied by various local and international relief organizations (Bukhari 
MY, personal communication, May 9, 2010).  
During the third and fourth week, survivors began evacuating corpses and buried them in 
a collective manner as well as collecting data about death tolls. Most corpses were buried in front 
of the village’s prayer house (about 60 corpses), while the rest were buried in community’s or 
village land. When the reconstruction process started taking place, the evacuation and burial 
processes were supported by the Indonesian Red Cross and other parties (Bukhari MY, personal 
communication, May 9, 2010). Like in Lam Teungoh, most dead people were then buried in the 
tsunami mass grave in Lambaro.  
The strong wish to return to their own village motivated survivors to ask for any needed 
assistance from several aid organizations. Among others, led by the head of the village Bukhari 
MY, they approaced Mercycorps, UPLINK and the Welfare Justice Party (PKS). As a result, in 
February 2005, villagers cleaned tsunami debris in their village supported by Mercy Corps 
through the cash-for-work project. One month later, Lam Hasan villagers could stay in the 
village temporary tents. As many as 36 tents were provided by UPLINK. They utilized wood 
floors contributed by PKS. The function of the tents were significant. It also supported any other 
necessities in an emergency situation, that is to deal with trauma healing and the need for disaster 
information (Bukhari MY, personal communication, May 9, 2010).  
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3. Lambung  
Like other survivors in tsunami-affected areas in Aceh, right after the tsunami, survivors 
from Lambung village also returned to their village to find the corpses of their family members, 
other relatives, and friends. Due to the flat topography of this area and surrounding areas, only 
ten corpses were found amid the tsunami debris (Zaidi M. Adan, personal communication, July 
2, 2010). Many corspes were swept away by the tsunami waves to other areas. The corpses were 
then burried in the village cemetery. 
To reconsolidate his village inhabitants, the head of Lambung village coordinated male 
survivors from the village who sought refuge in their relatives’ houses concentrating around Cot 
Gu, Mata Ie, to start erecting temporary shelters in their home village one month after the 
tsunami. They used debris from the State Junior High School 11 (SMPN 11) building located 
200 meters west of the village office as well as materials donated by villagers’ relatives residing 
around Banda Aceh. Fortunately, many of the survivors’ relatives were building contractors who 
kept some building materials at their home areas. The shelters were finished within one month 
and immediately after that, 40 of the survivors lived in them. The number of residents living in 
the village temporary shelters increased, and in the fourth month, reached 120 people. Like in 
Lam Teungoh and Lam Hasan, the existence of these temporary shelters was really significant 
pertaining to access to disaster information and restrengthening social life (Zaidi M. Adan, 
personal communication, July 2, 2010). 
In supporting relief efforts of their village, Lambung residents were quite creative. Led 
by their head of the village, who is well educated, with a bachelor degree in social and political 
sciences, Lambung residents also opened a community bank account for receiving donations and 
announced it widely. Then they advertised village redevelopment meetings in local newspapers 
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or on local radio. The village bureacrats’ and community leaders’ relations with ex-Lambung 
inhabitants who had moved to other areas, including businesspersons, government officials, and 
other prominent figures,  made it easy for the village to  collect funds donated by those people 
and to network. This relation also enabled the village to have information access to any 
development projects managed by the government and various aid organizations (Zaidi M. Adan, 
personal communication, July 2, 2010). From its own funding, Lambung successfuly built a 
volleyball court, Pos Kamling (Law and order of the neigborhood post), and  a village office. 
Through village development meetings, which were usually attended by more than one 
hundred inhabitants, the proposal of a number of survivors to rebuild the village into better 
organized settlements was discussed. With the participation of most survivors, the village 
eventually arrived at a common agreement concerning a redrawing of boundaries and land-use 
patterns.  The new land-use plan was handled by professional rural spatial planners. Approved by 
villagers, all the land was properly consolidated and the village was replanned and built with an 
open green area and a minimal width of roads of four meters. This could be realized after 
villagers agreed to freely give at least 10-15% of their land for the construction of roads and 
public buildings. It is important to note that religious approaches made by the head of the village 
as well as cultural and religious leaders by linking the land contribution to  religious services 
were the key factors in this process (Zaidi M. Adan, personal communication, July 2, 2010). 
 
4. Merduati   
Unlike the three previous villages, Merduati’s proximity to the center of the capital city 
of Banda Aceh, made it a bit easy for several parties to immediately get involved in the village 
relief efforts. Along with volunteers from the Indonesian Red Cross and the Indonesian Mobile 
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Brigade troops, a number of survivors from Merduati evacuated corpses in the village a few days 
after the tsunami. Those corspes were taken to the area around the Lambaro intersection, before 
being buried in the next couple of days in the mass grave near that  area (Turmuzi, personal 
communication, August 14, 2010). 
One month after the tsunami, with tents donated by The Indonesian National Soldier 
(TNI), survivors established a base camp in Geuceu Iniem on land owned by a local inhabitant.  
In this base camp, some 100 survivors organized themselves to search for remaining corpses in 
their village, made a list of the death toll and served any emergent necesities of survivors 
(logistic, clothing, information, etc). It is important to note that close working relations between 
the head of the village and community leaders (particularly religious leaders) made it easier for 
survivors to tackle participation emergency activities. Later, religious leaders also took an active 
role in involving Merduati residents in the village recovery process (Turmuzi, personal 
communication, August 14, 2010).    
As a thriving business area, Merduati attracts many people from different ethnic 
backgrounds (Chinese, Indian, Javanese, Padangnese, etc) and occupations (private sector 
workers, government employees, traders, etc).  Many people also lease buildings and houses over 
time in this area to make a living as traders or to just stay at boarding houses (students, etc) 
because of its strategic location. This create a low sense of belonging for the newcomers to the 
village and weaken social ties among community members which in turn, influence participation 
among community members (Turmuzi, personal communication, August 14, 2010).  
Unlike previous villages, survivors from Merduati did not immediately return to their 
village and did not build barracks/temporary homes in the village. Most survivors stayed in the 
evacuation areas or lived in their relatives’ homes and host communities until permanent homes 
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were built in the village by some aid organizations. Its proximity to the capital city resulted in 
easy access to any relief assistance including barracks/temporary shelters. The death of the head 
of the village because of the tsunami also caused coordination among survivors to be difficult 
which, in turn,  inhibited survivors from wider participation in the reconstruction process. The 
new village head, Zakaria, was appointed 6 months later (Turmuzi, personal communication, 
August 14, 2010). The status of Merduati was still as a kelurahan until 2009 where its head was 
appointed by the government. 
 
Summary of Ad-hoc Participation in the Four Case Study Villages 
Given data about the participatory activities mainly mobilized by the community 
members above, it can be concluded that residents of the four case study villages participated in 
(1) corpse evacuation; (2) data collection on the death toll in their own village; and  (3) 
disseminating disaster-related information. The occurance of this kind of participation was 
basically related to communities’ urgent needs right after the tsunami. Communities had no 
choice except to participate in these activities because aid agencies were still not involved 
actively in the relief effort at that time. All case study villages, except for Merduati, also 
participated in barrack/temporary shelter development. The non-existence of temporary shelter 
development in Merduati resulted from the lack of coordination among its community members 
due to the death of its former head of village in the tsunami and its proximity to the capital city 
which resulted in easy access to relief assistance. 
Lambung village surpassed other villages in terms of the variety of participatory 
activities. Lambung made some breakthroughs through  their residents’ initiatives in village 
development planning, land contribution for public facilities, opening a bank account for public 
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donations, advertising village meetings, and public facility construction with village funds.  
Table 6.1. below summarizes the participatory activities of the four case study villages in post-
tsunami redevelopment. 
 
Table 5.1.:   Community participation mainly mobilized by residents following the tsunami 
in the case study villages of Lam Teungoh, Lam Hasan, Lambung and Merduati  
 
       Village 
 
Activity 
Lam Teungoh Lam Hasan Lambung Merduati 
Corpse evacuation  √ √ √ √ 
Initial data collection on 
death toll  
√ √ √ √ 
Barrack/temporary home 
development 
√ √ √  
Disseminating disaster 
related information (in 
barracks/tents/evacuation 
areas, community center 
building, etc) 
√ √ √ √ 
Village development 
planning 
  √  
Massed land contribution for 
public facilities 
  √  
Opening a bank account for 
public donations 
  √  
Advertisement of village 
meeting in media 
  √  
Public facility construction 
with village funds 
  √  
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Aid Organization/Agency-promoted Participation 
Mercy Corps (Lam Teungoh Case) 
1. Relief activities 
Mercy Corps, a global aid organization, started operating in Aceh province right after the 
tsunami hit this area. Mercy Corps focused its work on community development, economic 
development and local government initiatives (Mercy Corps, 2009). In Lam Teungoh, Mercy 
Corps operated from January 2005 through March  2010.  
A number of relief efforts have been conducted by Mercy Corps in the village. The cash-
for-work project, aimed at cleaning up the village to make it ready for reconstruction and 
enabling households to earn cash, was its first project in the village. This project was followed by 
several construction projects including construction of the ritual ablution place/bathing place, 
women’s group building, public cemetery fence, and drainage system. The economic 
development program included training on business and entrepreneurship, providing grants both 
for survivors to run businesses (as mechanics, cattle breeders, etc) and for the village (to 
establish a village shop and to provide rental wedding supplies and kichenware). The leadership 
and governance program consisted of village administration data base development and 
facilitating the formulation of Five Year Village Development Plan (2008-2012) of the Village 
of Lam Teungoh in cooperation with the Indonesian government. The program also included 
training on administration and leadership, bookkeeping, project management, and reporting, 
(Gampong Lam Teungoh, 2008).   
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2. Participatory Process 
 Facilitated by Mercy Corps and supported by village bureaucrats (the head of the village and 
his apparatus) and community leaders,  Lam Teungoh residents organized a series of 
community meetings begun in early 2005 to discuss urgent relief efforts in the village. 
Twenty to thirty villagers usually participated in the meetings.  
 Improvements, objectives and goals were determined based on agreement between Mercy 
Corps and the community by taking into account the conformity of the programs with Mercy 
Corps’ missions and focused work in Aceh Province.     
  Once projects were decided, committees were established. One committe consisted of three 
people (chair, secretary, and treasurer). Each project was associated with a different 
committee. The committee in the women group building construction project, for instance, 
was different from that of drainage construction. Committees were responsible for the 
overall implementation of their related projects. Their members were chosen by village 
meeting participants (the input of the head of the village was, however, considerably 
important).   
 Mercy Corps provided consultation and relevant training for committee members to support 
construction projects. Meanwhile, training on entrepeneurship, administratiion, leadership, 
etc, was conducted with participants who were selected by the head of the village and his 
apparatus by considering input from residents. 
 Construction designs (for ritual ablution place/bathing place, Women’s Group building, 
public cemetery fence, drainage) were prepared by the Mercy Corps technical staff by taking 
into account the community’s aspirations. 
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 Local community members were prioritized to be laborers in the construction projects. Non-
local laborers were employed as minimally as possible to enable local residents to improve 
their incomes. The use of manual labour without a contractor was enabled because of the 
small scale of the construction projects.  
 Committees managed project funds and dealt with builders and material suppliers 
(community contracting model). To control the use of funds, Mercy Corps disbursed the 
funds in several stages, based on the progress of the construction. This helped projects meet 
the contract timing and quality specifications. 
 Program monitoring and evaluation was formally done by village bureaucrats supported by 
tuha peut (an advisory council consisting of four people considered knowledgeable and 
resourceful within the community). Community members were also persuaded to participate 
in this process. Communities could direct their complaints, questions, or input to pertinent 
committees or Mercy Corps.  
 Committees made reports of program implementation and evaluation. The report of one 
program subsequently became a useful reference for other future programs. 
 In accordance with the comprehensive village plan, the Five Year Village Development Plan 
(2008-2012) was formulated in 2008. Its process was  entrusted to the Village Planning 
Team (Tim Perencana Gampong or TPG). TPG members were selected by the head of the 
village and started working on the project in 2008 (with Mercy Coprs’ facilitation). The 
planning process of the document consists of several steps. First, TPG members identified 
village assets, potential, and problems. They also analyzed Mercy Corps’ former projects 
that had been implemented in their village. Subsequently, TPG came up with detailed 
potential projects and activities and made a presentation. After receiving feedback, the 
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planning draft was approved by tuha peut and sent to the subdistrict. To carry out projects 
approved in the five year development plan, Mercy Corps gave the village $21,000 in 2008 
and $25,000 in 2009.  
 For the economic projects in the early phase of the emergency period (right after the 
tsunami), Mercy Corps provided individuals or groups of residents with low incomes with 
grants. Those people were to make proposals regarding economic activities they wanted to 
undertake (development of machine shops, food shops, etc).  The approval of the proposals 
was done through the Mercy Corps’ review process. Grants, rather than loans, were given 
since the majority of residents were poor and only ran small businesses. For economic 
projects outlined in the five year village development plan, there had been the establishment 
of the Village Owned Enterprise (Badan Usaha Milik Gampong). Mercy Corps proposed 
this project to minimize the dependence of the village on external sources of funding so that 
the village would be able to realize its future development projects.The enterprise was aimed 
at generating profit for the community. The establishment of a village shop, provision of 
rental wedding supplies and kichenware became the means for the village to generate 
funding for its economic development.           
(Tasir Muhammad Rizal Husein, Mercy Corps’ community facilitator, Jan 2008 – Dec 2009, 
personal communication, April 4, 2010; Mercy Corps, 2010). 
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Table 5.2.: The role of residents and other actors for each phase of Mercy Corps’ projects 
in Lam Teungoh*  
 
       Actor 
 
Activity 
Residents/ 
beneficiaries  
Committees/ 
community 
representa-
tives  
Mercy 
Corps 
Hired 
Contractor 
Arnstein’s level 
of community 
participation 
Program initiation 
for village 
redevelopment 
√  √ 
  
1. Construction project (bathing place, women’s group building, public 
cemetery fence, and drainage) 
“partnership” (joint 
decision making 
between Mercy 
Corps and the 
community, project 
funding 
management in the 
hands of the 
community) 
Project initiation √  √  
Design   √  
Construction √ √**   
Monitoring & 
evaluation √ √ √ 
 
2. Small grant project for individual(s) business “delegated power” 
(decision making 
and project funding 
management in the 
hands of the 
community) 
Project initiation √  √***  
Proposal making √  √***  
Running of 
business √   
 
Monitoring & 
evaluation   √ 
 
3. The establishment of the Village Owned Enterprise “informing” 
(decision making in 
the hands of Mercy 
Corps, residents 
were informed their 
rights, 
responsibilities and 
options) 
Project initiation   √  
Proposal making  √ √  
Running of the 
enterprise  √  
 
Monitoring & 
evaluation   √ 
 
*This table (and other similar tables in the next section of this chapter), especially the 
“construction project”  part, is adapted from Davidson C. H., et al.’s matrix of post-disaster 
housing project management.    
* *The village committee managed the process  
** *Mercy Corps facilitated the process 
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USAID/DAI (Lam Teungoh Case) 
1. Relief Activities 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supported Aceh reconstruction 
with a number of recovery efforts  including the cash-for-work projects (cleaning up village 
land), village planning facilitation, public infrastucture reconstruction, training on community 
empowerment and leadership (BRR, 2009e) . In implementing its programs, USAID cooperated 
with Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), a global consulting firm providing social and 
economic solutions in developing and transitioning countries.   
In Lam Teungoh USAID/DAI worked from March 2005 through December 2007. 
USAID/DAI finished the following projects: debris removal, village office construction, volley 
ball court construction, soccer field rehabilitation, provision of kitchenware for village women’s 
group as well as computers and tables for the village office, rice field rehabilitation, and training 
for food science, vehicle repairmen, leadership, etc (Gampong Lam Teungoh, 2008).  
 
2. Participatory Process 
 USAID/DAI in cooperation with influential village figures (particularly the head of the 
village and community leaders), facilitated village meetings to absorb the community’s 
aspirations and needs. In the meetings residents discussed their problems, needs and 
expected programs. More than 20 villagers usually attended the meetings. 
 Technical issues of programs were discussed in Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) consisting 
of village bureaucrats, members of the village advisory council (tuha peut), and 
representatives of various groups in the community (Farmers’ group, Fishermen’s group, 
Women’s group, Youth’s group, etc). FGD members were chosen by community members. 
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 USAID/DAI’s community facilitators also communicated with villagers, especially 
vulnerable people like women and children, in an informal manner to better understand their 
situations, problems, and needs. This communication was relayed to FGDs’ members. The 
results of this initiative was the provision of kitchenware for the village women’s group and 
food science training for village women.       
 One FGD consisted of 8-10 members and was assigned for one project with different 
members. However, due to their strategic positions and the consideration of project 
implementation smoothness, the head and secretary of the village served as members in 
every FGD. 
 Village Office was designed by the USAID/DAI’s technical staff, while its development 
mainly employed local laborers. Like in Mercy Corps’ projects, USAID/DAI did not need to 
hire any contractors for their projects due to simple construction of the projects. 
 USAID/DAI managed project funds and dealt with builders and material suppliers. 
According to USAID/DAI, this saved time and minimized the misuse of funds. 
 Program monitoring and evaluation was primarily done by USAID/DAI in cooperation with 
FGDs. Any complaints and consideration from both parties and communities were discussed 
mainly on a development stage basis.  
(Mulizarni, DAI’s communitcy facilitator March 2005 – Aug 2007, personal communication, 
June 8, 2010). 
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Table 5.3.: The role of residents and other actors for each phase of USAID/DAI’s 
construction projects (village office, volley ball court, and soccer field) in Lam Teungoh  
 
       Actor 
 
Activity 
Residents  FGDs USAID/ DAI 
Hired 
Contractor
Arnstein’s level 
of community 
participation 
Program 
initiation for 
village 
redevelopment 
√ √ √ 
 “partnership” 
(joint decision 
making between 
USAID/DAI and 
the community, 
but project 
funding was 
managed by 
USAID/DAI) 
Project initiation  √ √  
Design   √  
Construction √    
Monitoring & 
evaluation √ √ √ 
 
 
 
UPLINK (Lam Hasan Case) 
1. Relief Activities 
Urban Poor Linkage (UPLINK) is an urban poor community organizer focusing on urban 
poverty and impoverishment isues. In the reconstruction of Aceh after the tsunami, UPLINK 
worked in many village areas to provide homes,  infrastructure reconstruction, economic 
development, reinforcement of social relations and cultural cohesion, and environmental 
regeneration (Sudirman Arif, ex UPLINK’s community organizer, personal communication, May 
5, 2010).   
In Lam Hasan, UPLINK working with villagers constructed 236 new homes and 
rehabilitated 40. It also constructed roads and drainage systems and recovered village-based 
small scale economic activities. By adopting participatory reconstruction approaches in its 
development activities, UPLINK intended to increase community cohesion, resilence and 
reconciliation. The organization worked in Lam Hasan about four years from 2005-2008 
(Gampong Lam Hasan, 2008 & Gampong Lam Hasan, 2009).  
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2. Participatory Process 
 In cooperation with the Indian NGO Abhiyan, UPLINK established Udeep Beusaree 
Network (Jaringan Udeep Beusare or JUB) consisting of 25 neighboring coastal villages 
stretching from Ulee Lheue to Lam Pageu to enforce community involvement in post 
tsunami redevelopment. 
 JUB increased social cohesion of 25 village communities and was a medium for community 
workshops and empowering communities to manage their lives. It facilitated communities to 
discuss any issues and problems resulting from the tsunami and the possible solutions. In the 
early phase of relief efforts, rather than taking quick actions in carrying out construction 
projects in the tsunami-affected areas, UPLINK focused on facilitating JUB’s activities in 
light of strengthening communal spirit among community members, both intra- and inter-
villages.       
 Before starting its Community Based Housing Reconstruction Program (CBHRP), UPLINK 
had to settle the dispute over land ownership. Long disagreement about land-titling issues 
between BRR and the National Land Affairs Agency (BPN) led UPLINK to use a 
community land adjudication system through a community land mapping process. The 
results of  the process were published to finalize land boundaries. This participatory process 
was quite effective and avoided the long delays of the housing project. Later, the agreement 
among communities, in turn, resulted in the issuance of a land legal certificate from BPN.   
 In a series of meetings, communities sat together to develop a village spatial plan (facilitated 
by UPLINK) as a general reference for any development activities in the village, including 
the housing development project.  
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 Through CBHRP, UPLINK helped community members become involved in all aspects of 
the housing development process with the final decision in the hands of the communitiy. 
 In the first stage of housing development, residents actively participated in land surveying 
and mapping, data collection, and housing design. For the housing design, UPLINK adopted 
Community Action Planning (CAP) methodology. UPLINK technical staff helped 
communities prepare the housing design.  
 The Activity Managing Team  (Tim Pengelola Kegiatan or TPK) for housing construction was 
established. Its members consisted of 3 people (supervisor, supplier coordinator, and head of 
laborers) and were chosen by villagers. 
 Housing beneficiaries were grouped into clusters of 5 households. Leaders and 
representatives of clusters were elected by the clusters’ members themselves. Each cluster 
had a cluster savings account, to receive funds for construction. These funds were disbursed 
in 3 phases, based on construction progress. 
 UPLINK’s facilitators motivated community members to strengthen social ties through 
working with group members. UPLINK also provided the community with training to 
enhance community spirit and to support construction projects. The training included, 
among other things, mass mobilization, building design, building materials and construction.      
 Housing beneficiaries had latitude to employ laborers (including themselves if possible) and 
dealt with material suppliers for their housing development. In many cases, local laborers 
were optimally used which helped boost village economies. In the case that reconstruction 
laborers and resource requirements were not available in the village, they were supplied 
from other places.  
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 Housing beneficiaries with the help of TPK acted as building inspectors and evaluators for 
their own home construction or rehabilitation. 
 TPK managed funds for housing development. It also helped beneficiaries monitor, evaluate 
and report the development progress on a development stage basis. 
 For the small scale construction of roads and drainage, UPLINK also adopted community 
based approaches. A particular TPK was established for this and communities got involved 
in provision of laborers and material supply. In the asphalting phase, due to the work 
complexity, UPLINK hired a contractor. Meanwhile for drainage construction, participatory 
approaches were used for provision of materials and laborers for the entire construction 
process.  
 In the village economic recovery, UPLINK provided households with small grants (Rp 3.2 – 
3.5 million) that enable them to gain access to capital for income generating activities. One 
TPK consisting of 3 elected representatives was established to handle project administration. 
Households submitted their prioritized economic activities. Besides kinds of activities they 
planned to carry out, they had to break down budget for needed equipment. UPLINK 
provided households with technical assistance and finalized the proposal. The funds were 
disbursed by BRI through the opening of household bank accounts. Economic activities 
proposed by households included:  composting, mushroom cultivation, rice farming, cattle 
and poultry breeding, mechanical working, barbering, etc.  
(Sudirman Arif, UPLINK’s community organizer, personal communication, May 5, 2010 & 
Campagnoli, 2007). 
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Table 5.4.: The role of residents and other actors for each phase of UPLINK’s projects in 
Lam Hasan  
 
       Actor 
 
Activity 
Residents/ 
beneficiaries TPKs UPLINK 
Hired 
contractor 
Arnstein’s 
level of 
community 
participation 
Program initiation for village 
redevelopment √  √* 
 
 
 “delegated 
power” 
(decision 
making and 
project funding 
management in 
the hands of 
the 
community) 
1. Housing construction and renovation 
Project initiation √    
Design √  √*  
Construction √** √***   
Monitoring & evaluation √ √ √*  
2. Small scale drainage construction 
Project initiation √    
Design  √ √*  
Construction √ √***   
Monitoring & evaluation √ √ √*  
3. Small scale road construction 
Project initiation √    
Design  √ √*  
Construction √**** √***  √**** 
Monitoring & evaluation √ √ √* √ 
4. Small grants project for households’ business 
Project initiation √    
Proposal making √ √*** √*  
Running of business √    
Monitoring & evaluation √ √ √*  
* UPLINK facilitated the process 
** Beneficiaries could either build their houses or give the house construction to 
professional builders 
*** TPKs managed the process 
**** Residents did not participate in the last part of construction (asphalting) because of the 
work complexity; it was done by a hired contractor.  
 
 
AIPRD (Lam Hasan Case) 
1. Relief Activities 
Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD), jointly 
managed by the Australian and Indonesian Governments, was developed to support Indonesia’s 
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reconstruction and development efforts both in and beyond tsunami-affected areas. In Aceh, 
AIPRD reconstructed public infrastructure, rebuilt people’s livelihoods, strengthened 
government service delivery, democracy, and peace in the province (AIPRD, 2010). 
AIPRD worked from January 2006- December 2007 in Lam Hasan. AIPRD successfully 
constructed Village Office, tsunami victims’ cemetary fence and volleyball and table tennis 
courts. AIPRD also provided stationery for village office and equipment for village health clinic 
as well as conducting training for management and leadership (for village bureaucrats and 
community leaders), capacity building of village development cadre, women’s empowerment, 
five year development plan and craftsmanship (Gampong Lam Hasan, 2008 & Gampong Lam 
Hasan, 2009). 
 
2. Participatory Process  
 AIPRD consulted with village authorities to discuss the possible efforts to rebuild the village 
and the community.  
 Supported by village leaders, AIPRD organized village meetings to gather community’s 
wishes and aspirations. The decision making process concerning projects was based on 
agreement between the community and AIPRD.  
 The Activity Managing Teams (Tim Pengelola Kegiatan or TPK) were established for all 
development projects (tsunami victims’ cemetery fence construction, and volleyball court 
construction), except for village office construction. One TPK was assigned for one project. 
It consisted of 3 community representatives and was elected by the community. 
 AIPRD techical staff made the construction designs by taking residents’ input and 
consideration into account. 
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 TPKs managed funds and laborers (except for village office construction). Local laborers 
were prioritized for the construction process to provide jobs and empower the community’s 
economy. The village office was constructed by a hired contractor and laborers from outside 
of the village were employed for its construction.    
 Program monitoring and evaluation were done by AIPRD supported by communities. 
Communities directed input and any comments regarding projects to AIPRD. Specifically 
for village office construction, it was monitored and evaluated by the hired contractor and 
AIPRD. 
(Marziani, AIPRD’s community facilitator, Jan 2006 – Dec 2007, personal communication, July 
27, 2010). 
 
Table 5.5.: The role of residents and other actors for each phase of AIPRD’s construction 
projects (Village Office, tsunami victims’ cemetery fence, and volleyball and table tennis 
courts) in Lam Hasan  
 
       Actor 
 
Activity 
Residents  TPKs  AIPRD Hired Contractor 
Arnstein’s level 
of community 
participation 
Program 
initiation for 
village 
redevelopment 
  √ 
  “partnership” 
(joint decision 
making between 
AIPRD and the 
community, 
project funding 
management in 
the hands of the 
community) 
Project 
initiation   √ 
 
Design   √  
Construction √   √* 
Monitoring & 
evaluation √ √ √ √* 
*For the village office, construction as well as monitoring and evaluation was done by a hired 
contractor. For cemetery fence, and volleyball and table tennis courts, the contractor was not 
involved in the project management. 
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World Vision (Lambung Case) 
1. Relief Activities 
In response to the tsunami, World Vision, a Christian relief, development and advocay 
organization, carried out programs pertaining to supporting tsunami survivors, rehabilitating 
livelihoods and construction of public facilities. Food was distributed and equipment and 
supplies were provided to clinics, hospitals and schools. World Vision also built temporary 
shelters, permanent houses, temporary and permanent schools as well as facilitating massive 
training for teachers to achieve quality education (World Vision Indonesia, 2010).     
During its work time in Lambung, 2005-2010, World Vision has built temporary shelters, 
warehouses, and artesian wells. Work Vision has also provided knockdown buildings for a 
temporary clinic and a temporary kindergarten. This construction work was tackled during the 
emergency period soon after the tsunami through Indonesian Tsunami Response Programs. Since 
2007 (until present), with its Aceh Development Program, World Vision has focused on 
economic activities and community health service empowerment. In the health sector, World 
Vision has helped the village health clinic develop its service through training for clinic workers 
and provision of initial medical equiment and medicine. In the economic sector, World Vision 
has strengthened village long-term livelihood  prospects, as well as strengthening residents’ 
confidence, skills and expertise through the combination of training and various economic 
activities. The economic activities supported by World Vision include producing Acehnese cakes 
(doi, meusekat, etc) and other cakes, embroidering, and village fish pond development. In 2010, 
the latter activity is still in progress by strengthening the Village Fish Pond Farmer Association 
(the establishment of the association was facilitated by World Vision) (Gampong Lambung, 
2009). 
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2. Participatory Process 
 In the Lambung reconstruction relief right after the tsunami until about 2 years later, World 
Vision mostly accomodated Lambung community’s proposal for needs and priorities in in the 
village reconstruction. Like many other relief organizations operationg in Aceh, World Vision 
used a PRA (Participatory Rapid Appraisal) method in the decision making process. In this 
regard, World Vision helped community members identify the problems, design and 
implement program activities. From its meetings with village authorities and the community, 
World Vision approved communities’ proposals for the following reconstruction: barracks,  
artesian well, temporary clinic, temporary kindergarten building and warehouse.  
 Communities got involved in the artesian well reconstruction through the bidding process with 
the bidding participants from Lambung community.   
 In health sector development, community members were voluntarily involved in providing 
service for patients in the World Vision’s village clinic enhancement project. World Vision 
itself provided some needed equipment for the clinic.    
 In the next period of time (2007-present), World Vision has focused its work mainly on 
economic and education development.  In Lambung, economic development has taken up a 
large portion of World Vision’s programs. World Vision proposed small and medium 
enterprise development and the establishment of the fish pond farmer cooperative.  
 World Vision conducted training (on bookkeeping, marketting, etc) for small business 
development  and provided the community with the financial support for the establishment of 
the cooperative for fish pond farmers. The financial support was used for the process of 
administering the cooperative as a corporate body. World Vision came up with the idea of 
establishing the cooperative based on their own initiative to boost the future village economy. 
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World Vision, in cooperation with Aceh microfinance institutions, also provided technical 
assistance to strengthen cooperative management and performance. So far, this cooperative 
has 25 members who have been participating in this economic project by making initial and 
monthly member contributions.      
(Mukhlishin, World Vision’s community development coordinator, Sept 2009 –Sept 2010, 
personal communication, July 23, 2010) 
 
Table 5.6.: The role of residents and other participants for each phase of World Vision’s 
artesian well construction project in Lambung  
 
       Actor 
 
Activity 
Residents/ 
benefeciaries Committees 
World 
Vision 
Hired 
contractors 
Arnstein’s level 
of community 
participation 
Program initiation for 
village redevelopment √  √  
 
1. Artesian well construction  “partnership” (joint 
decision making 
between World 
Vision and the 
community, project 
funding 
management in the 
hands of the 
community) 
Project initiation √  √  
Design √    
Construction √    
Monitoring & 
evaluation √  √  
2. Small business development (producing cakes, embroidering, etc) “partnership” (joint 
decision making 
between World 
Vision and the 
community) 
Project initiation √  √  
Proposal making √  √*  
Running of business √  √**  
Monitoring & 
evaluation √ √ √* 
 
3. The establishment of the cooperative for fish pond farmers “informing” 
(decision making in 
the hands of World 
Vision, residents 
were informed their 
rights, 
responsibilities and 
options) 
Project initiation   √  
Administering of the 
cooperative as a 
corporate body  
  √  
Managing the 
cooperative √  √***  
Monitoring & 
evaluation √ √ √  
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*World Vision facilitated the process 
**World Vision conducted training (on bookkeeping, marketting, etc) for beneficiaries 
***World Vision in cooperation with microfinance institutions have been providing technical 
assistance 
 
 
UN-HABITAT (Merduati Case) 
1. Relief Activities 
Immediately after the tsunami, United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-
HABITAT), the agency for human settlements in the UN system, started working  to assess the 
damage and support survivors to rebuild their lives, their communities and economic 
activities. UN-HABITAT, through the Aceh-Nias Settlements Support Programme (ANSSP), 
which was part of the UNDP’s broader Aceh Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery 
(ERTR) Programme, was involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction of housing and 
community infrastructure, introduction of risk mitigation infrastructure, mapping of basic 
information at the level of the settlement, and technical assistance and policy support to the Aceh 
Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) (UNDP & UN-HABITAT, 2006; UN-
HABITAT, 2006).   
In Merduati, UN-HABITAT facilitated the formulation of short‐term  community 
 planning  (Perencanaan  Jangka  Pendek  or  PJP) and reconstructed 486 houses (445 new units 
and 41 rehabilitated ones). The housing reconstruction project in the village and Peulanggahan 
Village (both part of Kuta Raja subdistrict) was  funded  through  support  from  the 
 Government  of  United  Arabs  Emirates. The project started  operating in  July  2005  with  the 
 establishment  of  the  field  office,  recruitment  of  staff  and  staff  training and ended in 
December 2007 (PNPM-Mandiri 2008; Turmuzi, personal communication, August 14, 2010).  
2. Participatory Process  
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 Consultations with head of Merduati, the committee for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction’ 
(Komite Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi or KERAP) members and  the community to build a 
common vision in the relief effort process. KERAP was part of P2KP project and was 
formed beforehand.  
 KERAP facilitated discussions on the community’s needs to rebuild their lives by using the 
Community Action Plan (CAP) methodology. The product of the discussions  was  a 
 document  on  short‐term  community  planning  (Perencanaan  Jangka  Pendek  or  PJP). 
This document was approved by the village community and verified in the focus group 
meetings attended by community representatives. PJP prioritized construction of the 
following infrastructure: roads,  water supply, drainage, school, mosque, and  community 
hall.  
 Participatory mapping of the land ownership boundaries was conducted to prepare the 
settlement layout plan (the community land adjudication system). This was important for the 
land certification process required by BPN.  
 After the settlement layout was approved, a series of meetings were organized to determine 
whether the reconstruction was still in the same location or relocation was required. The 
communities finally decided to  rebuild in the same area.  
 In the first stage of house  construction,  UN-HABITAT facilitated communities to share 
their ideas on house designs, construction and the terms of their  participation.   
 Seven to thirteen households form one cluster (Kelompok Pembangunan Rumah or  KPR). 
Each  cluster  had  plotted  their  previous  land  boundaries  in  coordination  with  the 
 surviving  neighbours. KPR consisted of 3 cluster representatives: chair, secretary, and 
treasurer. They had the authority to operate the KPR’s bank account to receive funds from 
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UN-HABITAT as well as managing other issues related to the housing reconstruction. At 
the village level, beneficiaries were represented by TPK consisting of 3 representatives of all 
KPRs (chair, secretary, and treasurer).    
 Monitoring started with supervision in each KPR group (by a supervisor of each KPR).  The 
report to the village level will be made if needed.  
(UNDP & UN-HABITAT, 2006; UN-HABITAT, 2006). 
 
Table 5.7.: The role of beneficiaries and other participants for each phase of UN-
HABITAT’s housing project in Merduati 
 
       Actor 
 
Activity 
Benificiaries  Committees  UN-HABITAT 
Hired 
contractors 
Arnstein’s level 
of community 
participation 
Program 
initiation for 
village 
redevelopment 
√  √  
“partnership” 
(joint decision 
between UN-
HABITAT and 
the community, 
project funding 
management in 
the hands of the 
community) 
Project 
initiation √  √  
Design √  √*  
Construction √**    
Monitoring & 
evaluation √ √ √  
*UN-HABITAT facilitated the process 
**Beneficiaries could either build their houses or give the house construction to professional 
builders 
 
 
Administrative Participation 
BRR (in 4 Case Study Village) 
1. Relief Activities 
The Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (Badan 
Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh dan Nias, BRR), established by the Government of 
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Indonesia  on April 16, 2005 through the issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law 
(Perpu) No. 2/2005, functioned to coordinate and jointly implement a community-driven 
recovery program for Aceh and Nias (BRR, 2009j). BRR basically had the dual roles: 
coordinating domestic and international efforts to rebuild Aceh and Nias as well as implementing 
its own projects (BRR, 2009c). BRR ended its term on April 16, 2009. The relay of recovery 
work was continued by the associated ministries/agencies and regional governments. 
In the four case study villages, BRR carried out the following projects: house 
construction (in Lam Teungoh, Lam Hasan, Merduati), road construction (in all case study 
villages), construction of drainage, prayer house, village meeting hall, building for producing 
cakes and Mukim (a legal communit unit formed from several villages) Office (in Lambung), 
mosque rehabilitation and water supply (in Merduati) (Gampong Lambung, 2009; Gampong 
Lam Hasan, 2008; Gampong Lam Teungoh, 2009; PNPM-Mandiri, 2008). In addition, BRR also 
provided grants and loans for the tsunami victims to restart small businesses. Grants were given 
directly from BRR (right after the tsunami), while loans were then given through microfinance 
institutions and cooperatives until 2008.     
 
2. Participatory Process 
 Through the Committee for Acceleration of Housing and Settlements Development (KP4D), 
established by BRR’s initiative with some of its members were community representatives, 
BRR conducted surveys about housing needs assessment (except for Lambung which its 
housing project was tackled by the Ministry of Public Works in cooperation with the Multi 
Donor Funds). These surveys involved community members at the grassroots level 
coordinated by KP4D. The final decision on the overall housing development (number, 
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beneficiaries, etc) was made by BRR. Housing design and funds were also managed by BRR, 
while the construction was done by contractors. These housing development approaches 
which enable communities to participate in the project in a less meaningful way were adopted 
by BRR to prevent the high risks borne by this new relief agency. The BRR housing project 
was the biggest housing construction project of all housing projects managed by aid 
organizations/agencies in the reconstruction process. 
 Using its own and other parties’ data and assessment (NGOs’, etc), BRR built infrastructure 
such as roads, bridges, etc by hiring contractors without necceseraly employing village 
laborers in order to achieve timely project targets (commercial contracting model), in the 
tsunami-affected areas. The choice of hiring contractors was made in a situation where BRR 
was a new relief agency which had a lot of responsibilities in coordinating all recovery efforts 
and in implementing its own projects in a relatively short period of time. In terms of 
implementing its own project, BRR was responsible for the biggest housing development 
project of all aid organizations/agencies. In such a situation, BRR should carefully consider 
the extent to which communities would participate in its projects to avoid the delay and 
unsuccesfull results.     
 BRR provided grants for housing renovation (BLT/Bantuan Langsung Tunai) and grants for 
business capital (BLM/Bantuan Langsung Masyarakat) for tsunami victims the community at-
large. BLT funds were fixed amounts decided by BRR. BLM were given based on proposals 
made by individuals or parties considering the feasibility of projects offered and the eligibility 
of benefeciaries (economic conditions, etc). 
 Later, BRR provided loans instead of grants through microfinance institutions and 
cooperatives for tsunami victims’ businesses and other community members economic 
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activities. This scheme also required beneficiaries to make business proposals. The 
microfinance institutions or cooperatives would select the beneficiaries based on the 
proposals. The microfinance institutions and cooperatives received technical assistance 
(management assistance, training, internship programs, etc) from BRR.  Unfortunately, the 
low return on loans caused by the misconception among borrowers that the loans belong to 
them still remains the biggest challenges.     
 Program monitoring and evaluation for housing construction was done by hired contractors 
and BRR, while provision of loans and grants by BRR and associated microfinance 
institutions and cooperatives. 
(Nazarul Khairi & Iqbal Barata, personal communication, June 15, 2010, & August 18, 2010 
respectively; BRR, 2009h). 
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Table 5.8.: The role of project participants for each phase of BRR’s projects in the four 
case study villages  
 
       Actor 
 
Activity 
Residents/ 
beneficiaries  
Community’s 
committees  BRR 
Hired 
contractors 
Arnstein’s 
level of 
community 
participation 
Program initiation 
for village 
redevelopment 
  √  
 
1. Small scale public infrastructure and housing construction 
(roads, drainage, village hall, prayer house, etc) 
“consultation” and 
“placation” 
(community’s 
input was 
considered 
through surveys 
and the 
involvement of 
their 
representatives in 
KP4D, but the 
final decision was 
in the hands of 
BRR) 
Project initiation  √ √  
Design   √  
Construction    √ 
Monitoring & 
evaluation 
  √ √ 
2. Housing renovation “partnership” 
(joint decision 
between BRR and 
the community, 
project funding 
management in 
the hands of the 
community) 
Project initiation √  √  
Design √    
Construction √*    
Monitoring & 
evaluation √  √  
3. Grants and loans for supporting survivors’ economic activities  “partnership” 
(joint decision 
between BRR and 
the community, 
project funding 
management in 
the hands of the 
community) 
Project initiation √  √  
Business 
proposal making √  √**  
Running of 
business √    
Monitoring and 
evaluation   √***  
* Beneficiaries could either build their houses or give the house construction to 
professional builders 
** BRR (through microfinance institutions or cooperatives) facilitated the process 
***  Loans were monitored and evaluated by associated microfinance institutions and 
cooperatives which gave the loans 
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The Ministry of Public Works and BRR/ ReKompak (Lambung Case) 
1. Relief Activities 
The Community-Based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project 
(Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Masyarakat dan Permukiman or ReKompak) provided grants to 
rebuild and repair houses and to rehabilitate infrastructure using a community-driven approach in 
the tsunami-affected areas in Aceh. Funds for village infrastructure development were distributed 
through the Urban Poverty Project (Program Penanggulangan Kemiskinan di Perkotaan or 
P2KP) and the Kecamatan Development Project (Program Pengembangan Kecamatan or PPK). 
At the beginning, ReKompak, launched in early 2006, was executed under the coordination of 
Ministry of Public Works. Later, going through a step by step process, the management and 
execution of the program was handed over to BRR (BRR, 2009f). 
As a whole, the work of ReKompak following the Aceh tsunami was funded by the Multi 
Donor Fund (MDF), International Development Agency (IDA) and the Government of Indonesia 
represented by BRR in cooperation with Directorat General for Settlements, Ministry of Public 
Works. Meanwhile in the Lambung reconstruction, ReKompak’s funding source came from 
MDF.  
Three parties were involved in MDF: the Government of Indonesia represented by BRR, 
donors represented by the European Commission and the World Bank as manager of MDF. 
MDF’s members included donor countries and international institutions, such as the European 
Commission, United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Canada, Belgium, Finland, the 
United States, New Zealand, Ireland, and the Asian Development Bank (BRR, 2009e). 
ReKompak operated in Lambung from 2006-2009 focusing on the construction of 309 new 
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homes (Dedi Setiawan, ReKompak’s housing facilitator, 2006-2009, personal communciation, 
September 3, 2010)  . 
 
2. Participatory Process 
 Supported by Rekompak, residents mapped and assessed the damages in the village to 
identify construction needs and housing benefeciaries. 
 At the beginning, housing designs were offered to the community. However, communities 
wanted the designs were prepared by the Rekompak team. In response to this request, 
ReKompak provided  a couple of alternative designs and communities picked one. 
 Communities formed the Settlers Groups (Kelompok Pemukiman or KP), a group of 
beneficiary families consisting of about 10 household leaders. In total, there were 33 KPs on 
the list. Each household democratically chose three representatives to manage its own KP 
(chair, secretary, and treasurer). At the village level, the Activity Managing Team (TPK) 
was responsible for the whole rehabilitation and reconstruction of settlements in the village. 
 KP representatives opened and operated the KPR’s bank account to receive funds from 
ReKompak. Fund disbursement was set up into 3 phases, based on the construction progress. 
Funds allocated for a new house were Rp 45 million and for a rehabilitated one, Rp 15 
million maximum.  
 The community decided whether to choose the self-employed or to work with builders 
especially the local ones (collectively organized by each cluster group). Benefeciaries could 
use their own funds to build bigger houses with the help of ReKompak in building designs.  
 Monitoring was done by each KP and each beneficiary household leader.  Both beneficiary 
household leaders and KPs should make progress reports on the reconstruction progress.  
 
 
125 
 
 Housing facilitators accompanied TPK and KP in the housing development process. One 
facilitator was assigned to 3 KPs which consisted of about 30 households. 
(Dedi Setiawan, ReKompak’s housing facilitator, 2006-2009, personal communciation, 
September 3, 2010). 
 
Table 5.9.: The role of residents and other participants for each phase of ReKompak’s 
housing project in Lambung  
 
       Actor 
 
Activity 
Beneficiaries TPK  ReKompak Team 
Hired 
contractors
Arnstein’s level of 
community 
participation 
Program 
initiation for 
village 
redevelopment 
√  √  
 “partnership” 
(joint decision 
between 
Rekompak team 
and the 
community, 
project funding 
management in the 
hands of the 
community 
Project 
initiation √  √  
Design   √  
Construction √*    
Monitoring & 
evaluation √ √ √  
*Beneficiaries could either build their houses or give the house construction to professional 
builders 
 
 
The Ministry of Public Works/PNPM-Mandiri (Merduati Case) 
1. Relief Activities 
The National Community Empowerment Program (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan 
Masyarakat Mandiri or PNPM-Mandiri), a government flagship program coordinated by the 
Ministry of Planning (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional or Bappenas) and the 
Coordinating Ministry Social Welfare (Kementrian Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat or 
Menko Kesra), aims to  increase community capacity to implement a participatory development 
process in reducing poverty and creating jobs through the provision of investment resources to 
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support proposals developed by communities. PNPM-Mandiri was launched in 2007 and  
implemented through the PPK and P2KP. Beginning in 2008, all community empowerment 
programs for poverty reduction managed by government ministries and agencies were integrated 
into PNPM Mandiri (PNPM-Mandiri, 2008; Ministry of Public Works, 2009).  
Following the tsunami, PNPM-Mandiri’s projects in Aceh, especially in the tsunami-
affected areas, were then linked to the reconstruction effort. PNPM-Mandiri’s reconstruction 
projects in Aceh included infrastructure reconstruction (roads, drainage, water and sanitation 
facilities, etc), provision of capital and financial resources through micro credit for the poor, and 
inreasing community and local government capacity through training and disseminating 
information on business skills and good governance.    
In Merduati, as of 2008, community block grant (Bantuan Langsung Masyarakat or 
BLM) managed by PNPM-Mandiri was allocated for two main activities: construction of 
economic and social infrastructure as well as providing microcredits through community-
managed revolving fund. The former comprised, among others, construction of drainage, roads, 
and a warehouse. The latter included providing revolving funds for poor families who have no or 
limited access to other sources of credit. These funds were used to develop economic activities 
of, among others, cattle and poultry breeders, fishermen, notions traders, and meatball vendors 
(PNPM-Mandiri, 2008). 
 
2. Participatory Process 
 The socialization of the program (pertaining to its objectives, participatory approaches, basic 
principles, etc) was conducted in the village and hamlet level meeting.  
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 A representative body to supervise PNPM-Mandiri programs at the village level, the 
Community Self-help Body  (Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat or BKM), was elected by the 
residents. To syncronize its programs with the whole village development plan, PNPM-
Mandiri coordinated with the village head.  
 The revolving funds were managed by the Financial Management Unit (Unit Pengelola 
Keuangan or UPK) set up within BKM. UPK  members along with volunteers and other 
development teams/units for construction related activities were elected in the village 
meeting.  
 The community mapped and identified local potential, problems and needs. The results of 
this process were used by the community for preparing community development plans, 
namely the Three Year Village Development Plan and the Annual Village Development 
Plan. This plan contained programs and activities designed to improve the village 
conditions. 
 Based on the community development plan, villagers selected and determined the local 
institution which would get involved in the activity implementation, as well as discussing 
funds disbursement, provision of laborers, material and logistics. 
 All activities were carried out by the community facilitated by community facilitators, a 
consultant, and local government staff. For construction related activities, local resources 
(laborers, skills, etc) were prioritized.  
 A review of the whole project performance was undertaken by UPK and reported to BKM. 
In particular, facilitators, the consultant, and local government officials conducted financial 
and performance audits. 
 
 
128 
 
 Project implementation progress was reported on a monthly/couple of month basis. The 
report included detailed project implementation and problems faced on the ground. 
 Complaints and questions as to the projects were directed to UPK, related development 
teams, BKM and facilitators. These both followed up the reported complaints and questions 
if needed.  
 In providing microcredits for poor families, PNPM-Mandiri targeted residents with small 
businesses. However, loan was also allocated for other purposes (for instance for education 
in Merduati case). The microcredits were distributed through group lending (about 10 people 
per group) with the guarantee from the group. Group leaders were responsible for collecting 
loan repayments from their group members, as well as in monitoring and managing delinquent 
loans. Loan repayments are usually made on a monthly basis and collected by the group leaders 
who, in turn, repay UPK on behalf of the group. Training on bookeeping was provided to 
microcredit groups, while technical assistance as to revolving funds managment was provided to 
UPK.    
(Ministry of Public Works, 2009; PNPM-Mandiri, 2008; Raja Dalam, personal communication, 
August 19, 2010) 
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Table 5.10.: The role of residents and other participants for each phase of PNPM-
Mandiri’s projects in Lambung  
 
       Actor 
 
 
Activity 
Residents/ 
beneficiaries 
Community 
Development 
Team  
PNPM-
Mandiri 
Team 
Hired 
contractors 
Arnstein’s 
level of 
community 
participation 
Program initiation 
for village 
redevelopment 
  √  
 
1. Small scale construction project (drainage, roads, and warehouse) “partnership” 
(joint decision 
between 
PNPM-Mandiri 
Team and the 
community, 
project funding 
management in 
the hands of the 
communty) 
Project initiation √ √ √*  
Design √    
Construction √    
Monitoring & 
evaluation √  √  
2. Microcredits for poor families 
Project initiation √  √*  
Proposal making √ √ √*  
Running of business √    
Monitoring & 
evaluation √ √ √ 
 
*PNPM-Mandiri team facilitated the process 
 
Summary of Aid Organization/Agency-promoted Participation and Administrative Participation 
in the Four Case Study Villages 
 
 Based on aid organization/agency experience in exercising community participation in 
post-tsunami redevelopment described above, it can be concluded that there are many ways that 
communities could participate in post-tsunami redevelopment both in decision making and 
project management. In decision making, communities in cooperation with or facilitated by aid 
organizations/agencies could play a role in the program and project initiation process. This 
process begin with the identification of the existing situation, problems and needs as well as 
setting priorities. Specifically, in terms of the infrastructure projects, the participation ranges 
from design, construction, and monitoring and evaluation. Meanwhile, in the case of grants or 
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loans for small businesses,  the participation includes proposal making for businesses, operation 
of businesses, and monitoring and evaluation.  
 Of all aid organizations/agencies, UPLINK was the only party applying “delegated 
power” level of participation in its recovery projects in Lam Hasan, including housing 
construction and renovation, public infrastructure construction, and small business development. 
In the whole process of its infrastructure, economic, and other projects, UPLINK consistently 
empowered the community by facilitating the community in decision making and project 
management. The final decision was in the hands of the community. 
All aid organizations/agencies, except for the Ministry of Public Works (PNPM-Mandiri) 
and BRR (Indonesian government agencies), endorsed communities to participate in the 
development of recovery programs and projects. The absence of community participation in 
decision making of PNPM-Mandiri’s program was caused by the fact that PNMP-Mandiri is the 
continuation of the previous programs that had been designed by the central government long 
before the tsunami. Meanwhile, BRR with no experience in implementing community 
participation approaches (as a new agency) and its large scale housing and infrastructure 
construction projects (for housing projects, the biggest in all tsunami affected areas in Aceh 
compared to other aid organizations/agencies), did not want to risk its projects and relied very 
much on its own and contractors’ roles in project management. In this regard, BRR only engaged 
communities in the rebuilding process by considering their input through surveys and the 
involvement of communities’ representatives on the related board. The final decision was in the 
hands of BRR. Only in housing renovation projects and small grants projects for business which 
had relatively low risk, BRR gave more space for the community to participate by joint decision 
making between BRR and the communitiy/beneficiaries (“partnership” level of participation).  
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 Except for BRR’s housing reconstruction project, most aid organization/agencies applied 
“partnership” Arnstein’s level of participation in implementing their construction projects. They 
made decisions regarding projects together with communities and involved communities in 
project management in a meaningful manner. In project design, they facilitated communities in 
the design process (UPLINK and UN-HABITAT). In cases where communities were not capable 
of making the design (based on their or communities’ appraisal), they handled it (Rekompak, 
Mercy Coprs, AIPRD, USAID/DAI, PNPM, and World Vision). Construction was handled by 
communities (managed by communities through self-help or appointing professional builders). 
The use of local laborers contributed to boosting village economies. However, the complexity of 
asphalting work in road construction in Lam Hasan led UPLINK to hire a contractor for finishing 
the work. Only village office construction (AIPRD’s project in Lam Hasan) was handled by a 
hired contractor. With regard to monitoring and evaluation, aid organizations/agencies and 
communities mostly worked together except for the few number of contractor-based projects.  
Two economic projects, namely the establishment of the village owned enterprise in Lam 
Teungoh (Mercy Corps) and the establishment of the cooperative for fish pond farmers in 
Lambung (World Vision) fall into the “informing” level of participation due to the absence of 
communities involvement in the decision making process. However, this occured because these 
projects were advanced ones in which communities had no initial idea on these matters, while 
Mercy Corps and World Vision considered the projects important for boosting the future village 
economy. Meanwhile, the other economic project, i.e. small business development for low 
income community members supported by Mercy Corps, World Vision, and PNPM-Mandiri fall 
into the “partnership” category since the final decision was made based on the agreement from 
the aid organizations/agencies and communities.              
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 Consequently, it is obvious that the extent to which communities participate in the 
reconstruction effort is associated with the willingness and capacity of aid 
organizations/agencies, the nature of recovery projects and the readiness of communities to 
participate. It is also important to note that adequate time in exercising participation (UPLINK 
case in Lam Hasan) and community facilitators’ informal approaches to engage  communities in 
the reconstruction effort (USAID/DAI case in Lam Teungoh) are also significant for optimizing  
participation.   
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Table 5.11.: The comparison of communities and other participants’ roles for each phase of 
Aid Organizations/Agencies’ projects  in the four case study villages (the role of 
communities is highlighted)  
 
       Actor 
 
 
Activity 
NGOs International Agencies 
Indonesian Gov’t Agencies 
Ministry of Pub. 
Works BRR  
(4 case 
study 
villages) 
Mercy 
Corps 
(Lam 
Teungoh) 
UP 
LINK 
(Lam 
Hasan) 
AIPRD 
(Lam 
Hasan) 
World 
Vision 
(Lam-
bung) 
USAID/ 
DAI 
(Lam 
Teungoh) 
UNHA-
BITAT 
(Mer-
duati) 
Rekom-
pak 
(Lam-
bung) 
PNPM
-Mand. 
(Mer-
duati) 
Program 
initiation for 
village 
redev’t 
Mercy-
Comm 
UPLIN
K-
Comm 
AIPRD- 
Comm 
WV-
Comm 
USAID- 
Comm 
UNHA
BITAT-
Comm 
Rek-
Comm 
PNPM
-Mand. BRR 
1. Housing construction 
Project 
initiation - Comm - - - 
UNHA
BITAT-
Comm 
Rek-
Comm - 
BRR 
Design - Comm - - - Comm Rek - BRR 
Construction - Comm - - - Comm Comm - Con 
Monitoring & 
evaluation - 
UPLIN
K- 
Comm 
- - - 
UNHA
BITAT-
Comm 
Rek-
Comm - 
Con-
BRR 
Arnstein’s 
level of 
participation 
- 
Dele-
gated 
power 
- - - Partner-ship 
Partner-
ship - 
Consulta
-tion & 
placation 
2. Housing renovation 
Project 
initiation - Comm - - - 
UNHA
BITAT-
Comm 
- - 
BRR-
Comm 
Design - Comm - - - Comm - - Comm 
Construction - Comm - - - Comm - - Comm 
Monitoring & 
evaluation - 
UPLIN
K- 
Comm 
- - - 
UNHA
BITAT-
Comm 
- - 
BRR-
Comm 
Arnstein’s 
level of 
participation 
- 
Dele-
gated 
power 
- - - Partner-ship - - 
Partner-
ship 
3. Small scale public infrastructure project
Project 
initiation Mercy-Comm Comm 
AIPRD- 
Comm 
WV 
 
USAID- 
Comm - - 
PNPM
-
Comm 
BRR 
Design Mercy Comm  AIPRD Comm USAID - - Comm BRR 
Construction 
Comm 
Comm 
& 
Con-
Comm 
Comm 
& Con-
Res’t 
Comm 
Comm - - 
Comm Con 
Monitoring & 
evaluation Mercy-Comm 
UPLIN
K- 
Comm 
AIPRD-
Comm-
Con 
WV-
Comm USAID- Comm - - 
PNPM
-
Comm 
Con-
BRR 
Arnstein’s 
level of 
participation 
Partner-
ship 
Dele-
gated 
power 
Partner-
ship 
Partner
ship 
Partner-
ship - - 
Partner
ship 
Consulta
-tion & 
Placation 
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4. Small business development (grants, loan, training, etc)
Project 
initiation Mercy-Comm Comm - 
WV-
Comm - - - 
PNPM
-
Comm 
BRR 
Proposal 
making 
Comm Comm - Comm - - - Comm Comm 
Running of 
business 
Comm Comm - Comm - - - Comm Comm 
Monitoring & 
evaluation Mercy 
UPLIN
K-
Comm 
- 
WV-
Comm - - - 
PNPM
-
Comm 
BRR-
Comm 
Arnstein’s 
level of 
participation 
Partner-
ship 
Dele-
gated 
power 
- Partnership - - - 
Partner
ship 
Partner-
ship 
Comm: The community; Con: Hired contractor 
Arstein’s level community participation: 
 Delegated power: decision making was in the hands of the community, the aid 
organization/agency only facilitates the process 
 Partnership: joint decision making between the aid organization/agency and the community  
 Consultation and placation: community’s input was considered through surveys and the 
involvement of its representatives on the related board, but the final decision was in the 
hands of the aid organization/agency 
 
 
Benefits, Supporting Factors and Constraints of Community Participation  
Community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment in four case study villages has 
brought about positive impacts on tsunami survivors, villagers and villages as a whole. Particular 
benefits were gained by each village. Immediate survivors’return to the village coordinated by 
their charismatic head of village in Lam Teungoh accelerated the villagers’ economic recovery 
process. The majority of residents who worked as fishermen were able to go to sea to make a 
living again.  The return also encouraged various aid organizations/agencies to take quick efforts 
to rebuild the village (Husaini, personal communication, March 8, 2010). The choice of qualified 
Activity Managing Teams’ (TPKs) members in Lam Hasan resulted in a relatively quick process of 
project management (Marziani, personal communication, July 27, 2010). Lambung community 
members’ endurance and preserverance in a long and tough village mapping and land 
consolidation process, as well as their willingness to give their land without any compensation 
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resulted in more organized existing settlements (Zaidi, personal communication, July 2, 2010). 
The role of community leaders, particularly religious leaders, in involving residents in the 
reconstruction projects in Merduati influenced the increase in the number of residents involved 
in the participatory process (Raja Dalam, personal communication, August 19, 2010), although 
its number (percentage) still lagged behind the three other villages.    
Aside from specific achievements, the four case study villages also gained similar 
benefits by exercising community participation in their village redevelopment. The major 
benefits included improving community capacity building in organizing community resources 
and project management (planning, funding, design, construction and monitoring and 
evaluation); meeting community’s needs; reducing traumatic feelings among survivors; and 
providing more income for communities from reconstruction related jobs (through the cash-for-
work projects and community contracting model of housing and public infrastructure projects, 
etc). In terms of reducing traumatic feelings, survivors’ involvement in the village relief efforts, 
to some extent, shifted their attention from post-tsunami depression (due to loss of family 
members, etc) to reconstruction activities (Husaini, Bukhari, Turmuzi, & Zaidi, personal 
communication, March 8, 2010, May 9, 2010, August 14, 2010, & July 2, 2010, respectively). 
  In terms of constraints and supporting factors of the participation process, they varied 
from village to village. Socio-cultural and economic conditions, leadership, communities’ 
endurance in participatory process,  and social ties determined the success of community 
participation in post-tsunami redevelopment. In the case of Lam Teungoh, lack of knowledge 
among community members (especially vulnurable people like women and children) which was 
caused by low income conditions inhibited them from actively participating in decision making. 
In this regard, the situation was handled by the role of community USAID/DAI’s facilitators in 
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improving their self confidence and absorbing their aspirations through informal interaction 
between the aid organization and the community. The facilitators also played an important role 
in channeling their wishes to FGDs members, which in turn, resulted in the accommodation of 
their needed projects such as provision of women’s group building and kitchenware (Husaini, 
personal communication, March 8, 2010). Meanwhile, native inhabitants tended to be more 
attached to their village and had strong social ties which helped the participatory process. In 
cases of Lam Teungoh and Lambung (the majority of their inhabitants were native), for instance, 
villagers were relatively easy to mobilize for collective action (Husaini & Bukhari, personal 
communication, March 8, 2010 & May 9, 2010 respectively). Merduati which had a lot of new 
inhabitants had difficulties in involving them in the participatory process (Turmuzi, personal 
communication, August 14, 2010). In the future it is important for Merduati to conduct any 
activities that can improve the sense of village ownership among new inhabitants, so that they 
will be willing to get involved in the village development process.  
Other constraints of community participation included communities’ reluctant to relocate 
or give their land for public facilities, low coordination between aid organizations and 
government, time consuming process of participation, and the negative effect of “the cash-for-
work” projects. In Lam Teungoh, Lam Hasan, and Merduati, a common agreement concerning a 
redrawing of boundaries and land-use pattern between residents could not be achieved because 
post-tsunami land certification process from BPN (National Land Affairs Agency) took place 
slowly and/or the reluctance of residents to give their ancestor-inherited land even with 
compensation (Husaini, Bukhari, & Turmuzi, personal communication, March 8, 2010, May 9, 
2010, & August 14, 2010 respectively). On the contrary, Lambung leaders (the head of the 
village and religious leaders) succeded in convincing residents to give their land to build more 
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organized settlements. The leaders stated that contributing land was part of religious service 
which would bring merit to residents’ ancestors (Zaidi, personal communication, July 2, 2010)  
  Low coordination between aid organizations and government particularly in the 
beginning periode of reconstruction leading to unsuccesful projects in Lam Teungoh and Lam 
Hasan, for instance, also resulted in the decrease in community’s moral in getting involved in the 
participatory process. The unusable boat dock due to the mistake of development location choice 
(quite far from the beach line) done by BRR in Lam Teungoh and the unfunctioned tab water 
pipelines built in Lam Hasan by BRR because of not gaining support from Local-owned Water 
Supply Company or PDAM) resulted in disappointment among communities. Apart from the 
unproper feasibility study of the project, the former case also happened since BRR did not 
properly involve the community, especially fishermen, in the planning phase of the project. The 
fishermen then ignored the implementation of the project although they apprehended the wrong 
project location choice. The latter case was caused by the careless of BRR as the coordinator 
agency of post-tsunami redevelopment in involving the related agency in its project management 
(Husaini & Bukhari, personal communication, March 8, 2010, & May 9, 2010, respectively). 
In Lambung, a common agreement on village mapping land consolidation among 
community members took a long and tough process. Permanent homes for residents could be 
occupied around 2007. However, residents’ endurance and patience in the negotiation process as 
well as trust among them resulted in more organized settlements (Zaidi, personal 
communication, July 2 , 2010).  
The involvement of community members in the reconstruction effort was also distracted 
by the implementation of the cash-for-work (cleaning up the village) projects managed by 
several NGOs in the four case study villages. This project was a dilemma. One the one hand, it 
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provided an income for survivors in the emergency period. On the other hand, it led many 
community members to be reluctant to work for pure voluntary relief activities after the 
emergency period. They would seriously consider participating in the voluntary activities 
(attending village meetings, being reconstruction committee members, etc) as long as there were 
financial incentives in return. Nowadays, after the reconstruction process is over, gotong royong 
kampung (a traditional community self-help at the village level) that provides no financial 
incentives tends to be attended by a small number of residents (Husaini, Bukhari, Turmuzi, & 
Zaidi, personal communication, March 8, 2010, May 9, 2010, August 14, 2010, & July 2, 2010, 
respectively). 
Aside from social ties, the performance and capacity of village bureaucrats and 
community leaders apparently was also a major determinant of involving the community in the 
village rebuilding process. The charismatic head of Lam Teungoh village took a leading role in 
the return of survivors to their village and initial post tsunami redevelopment in Lam Teungoh 
(Husaini, personal communication, March 8, 2010). Decisive action shown by head of Lam 
Hasan village by cancelling some delayed UPLINK’s projects enabled this village to receive 
support from other relief organizations/agencies to maitain the continuity of the reconstruction 
efforts. Head of this village also contributed in giving input for capable candidates for TPKs’ 
members, which in turn, accelerated village relief (Marziani, personal communication, July 27, 
2010).  In Merduati, close relations between village bureaucrats and informal community leaders 
led to a relatively smooth reconstruction management at the village level (Raja Dalam, personal 
communication, August 19, 2010). In Lambung, the head of the village’s bravery and exact 
calculation in a community land adjudication decision was a starting point for the success of 
creating more orderly and planned village. In addition, his decision on the uniformity of  house 
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construction types (by allowing only Rekompak/MDF to manage the whole housing project in 
the village) strengthened togetherness and avoided jealous feelings among community members 
(Dedi Setiawan, personal communication, September 3, 2010). 
 Last but not least, the community participation process also needs to be supported by 
networking and creativity. Lambung case shows that village’s broad networking with various 
parties and individuals gave the village access to financial support and reconstruction 
information. Lambung’s creative initiatives for opening a community bank account to receive 
donations (with public announcement) as well as the advertisement of village meetings in the 
media were also significant for creating a conducive environment for community driven 
development.  
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Table 5.12. : Constraints, supporting factors, and benefits of community participation in 
the four case study villages 
 
 
Village 
 
 
Component 
Lam Teungoh 
(less developed, very 
severely affected) 
Lam Hasan 
(less developed, 
moderately to 
severely affected) 
Lambung 
(more developed, 
very severely 
affected) 
Merduati 
(more developed, 
moderately to 
severely affected) 
Socio-culture -coastal rural area 
-education level: 40% 
have no education 
-lots of native 
inhabitants 
 
-coastal rural area 
-education level: 58% 
senior high, 7% 
undergraduate and 
higher 
-mix of native and 
new inhabitants  
-semi urban area 
-education level: 
62% senior high, 
21% 
undergraduate 
-lots of native 
inhabitants 
-urban area 
-education level: 48% 
senior high, 20% 
undergraduate and 
higher 
-lots of new 
inhabitants 
Economy -major occupation: 
fishermen and farmers 
-very low income (Rp 
800,000 – 1 million) 
-major occupation: 
private & state 
company  workers 
and farmers 
-low income (Rp 1 – 
1.2 million) 
-major 
occupation: 
private company 
workers and civil 
servants 
-middle income 
(Rp 1.5 – 1.75 
million) 
-major occupation: 
private company 
workers, civil 
servants,  and traders 
-middle income (Rp 
2.5 million) 
Supporting 
factors of 
community 
participation 
(strategies of 
participation) 
-strong leadership 
-strong social ties 
-USAID/DAI 
facilitators’ informal 
approaches to engage  
uneducated villagers in 
redevelopment 
-capable 
community’s 
committee members 
-decisive head of 
village’s decision on 
reconstruction efforts 
-adequate time in 
exercising 
participation  
-capable head of 
village and 
comunity leaders  
-strong social ties 
-creativity (public 
account, meeting 
adv’t) 
-broad networking 
-religious 
approach 
--residents willing 
to relocate or give 
their land for 
village redev’t 
-One type of 
house design and 
construction for 
all beneficiaries  
-close working 
relations between 
village bureaucrats 
and community 
leaders 
Constraints of 
community 
participation 
-reluctant to relocate or 
to contribute land  
-low coordination 
among aid 
organizations 
-lack of knowledge and 
skills among lots of 
community members 
-“income generated” 
cash-for-work projects 
(debris removal) ruin 
traditional volunteer 
program  gotong 
royong   
-reluctant to relocate 
or to contribute land  
-low coordinations 
among aid 
organizations 
-“income generated” 
cash-for-work 
projects ruin 
traditional volunteer 
program  gotong 
royong 
 
-time consuming 
process of village 
mapping and land 
consolidation 
(about 2 years) 
- many new residents 
were difficult to 
mobilized because of 
many of new 
residents 
- reluctant to relocate 
or to contribute land 
--“income generated” 
cash-for work-
projects ruin 
traditional volunteer 
program  gotong 
royong 
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Benefits of 
community 
participation 
Immediate 
community’s return to 
the village after tsunami  
accelerated the village 
recovery process 
Qualified committee 
members resulted in 
the quickness of 
project management 
More organized 
settlements as a 
result of villagers’ 
endurance in the  
participation 
process & their 
willingness to 
contribute their 
land 
Improved sense of 
village ownership (a 
little) among 
inhabitants due to the 
religious leaders’ role  
-Improving community capacity building in project management  
-Meeting community’s needs 
-Providing more income for communities (from reconstruction jobs) 
-Reducing traumatic feelings. 
 
 
 
 
 
Community Members’ Perceptions of and Preferences for Community Participation in the 
Redevelopment Efforts after the Aceh Tsunami 
 
Profiles of the Respondents 
Personal data 
The sample size of the survey consists of 200 respondents (65.5% males and 34.5% 
females). The age of most respondents was between 26 and 55 years old (76.5%). The age of 
other respondents comprised 15-25 years old (12%) and over 55 years old (11.5%).  
 In terms of occupations, most of the respondents worked as merchants (18%). State and 
private company workers (prime occupations in Lam Hasan, Lambung and Merduati) and 
fishermen (prime occupations in Lam Teungoh), although not the largest numbers of 
respondents, were represented by 10% and 8%, respectively.  Other respondents’ major 
occupations were housewives (14.5%), construction related professionals (10.5%), government 
employees (8.5%), and farmers (5.5%) (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1. Percentage distribution of respondents by occupation 
  
Other profiles of respondents included ethnic group, marital status, level of education, 
daily income and level of effect of the tsunami. With regard to ethnic groups, the majority of 
respondents were Acehnese (91.5%) and the remaining respondents were Javanese, Padangnese, 
Bataknese and other ethnic groups (8.5%). As for marital status, 69% were married, 24.5% 
single, and 6.5% widows/widowers. The high percentage of widows/widowers in this survey is 
understandable since many of Acehnese lost their spouses in the tsunami disaster.  
 Level of respondents education varied from no education to the university level of 
education (see Figure 5.2). Respondents with senior high education were the majority (56%) 
followed by junior high (24%), university (12%), elementary (2%) and no education (6%).  
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Figure 5.2. Percentage distribution of respondents by level of education 
 
Like level of education, respondents’ daily incomes also vary (Figure 5.3). Most 
respondents represents those with low to medium level of incomes, that is, between Rp 50,000 – 
< 75,000/day (32.5%), while the remaining respondents  had an income of between Rp 25,000 – 
<50,000 (27%),  no income (20.5%), more than Rp 75,000 (10%) and less than Rp 25,000 
(10%).  Housewife and student respondents were those who accounted for the large number of 
the “have no income” category.  
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Figure 5.3. Percentage distribution of respondents by daily income 
 
In terms of level of effect of the tsunami on respondents (Figure 5.4), the majority of 
respondents experienced a very severe impact (64.5%), others experienced severe, moderate, 
minimal, and  no impacts (22.5%, 10%, 1.5% and 1.5 %, respectively). The figures below 
describe percentage distributions of respondents by education, income, and the level of impact of 
the tsunami they experienced. 
 Details of the descriptive information about the respondents of each of the case study 
villages are presented in Appendix E (Table 5.20).   
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Figure 5.4. Level of impact of the tsunami on the respondents 
 
The Involvement in Post-Tsunami Redevelopment 
 87% of respondents stated that they participated in the tsunami relief efforts, 13% did not 
participate. Those who participated in the relief efforts got involved in a variety of activities, 
mostly in debris removal (31%) and village development planning (17%). This is not surprising 
given cash-for-work projects and village development planning were one of the massive 
recovery activities carried out by aid organizations/agencies following the tsunami. Those who 
participated in more than one activity, that is, debris removal and evacuation also indicated a 
significant number (9%). Others participated in barrack development, house development, public 
facilities development and the combination of those activities. Figure 5.5 presents the 
respondents’ involvement in the tsunami relief efforts. 
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Figure 5.5. Percentage distribution of respondents’ involvement in post-tsunami relief 
activities 
 
Respondents had various reasons why they got involved in the tsunami relief efforts. 
Interestingly, most of them stated that they participated because they wanted to rebuild their 
villages (40%), surpassing the number of those who intended to meet their needs (18%) and that 
of those who wanted to meet their needs and rebuild their villages at the same time (16%). This 
is not surprising since the development of the tsunami-affected areas  would indirectly helped the 
improvement of their inhabitants’ lives (socially, economically) given the tremendous effects of 
the tsunami. Figure 5.6 shows the respondents’ various reasons to participate in the tsunami 
relief efforts.     
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Figure 5.6. Percentage distribution of respondents’ reasons to participate in the tsunami 
relief efforts  
 
 
 When asked about their level of satisfaction concerning their participation in the tsunami 
relief efforts, around 85.6% of the respondents stated they were very satisfied or satisfied. It 
means respondents were pleased with the participatory process they went through during the 
tsunami recovery. A small number of respondents were unsatisfied (2.9%) and neutral (11.5%), 
while there was no respondent who answered very unsatisfied. Figure 5.7 presents level of 
respondents’ satisfaction on the involvement in the tsunami relief efforts 
18%
40%
3%
4%
16%
3%
11%
3%
1%
1%
To meet my needs
To rebuild my village/neighborhood
To gain experience
To improve my skills in dealing with post-disaster redevel
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Figure 5.7. Level of respondents’ satisfaction on the involvement in the tsunami relief 
efforts  
 
 
In terms of how respondents participated in the relief efforts, the majority of the 
respondents stated their participation was based on their own awareness and initiative (88.5%). 
The remaining respondents were motivated by the following: village bureaucrats (5.8%), their 
families/relatives (4.6%), and their friends (1.1%). This underlines that respondents were quite 
independent in making decisions on their involvement in the tsunami relief efforts.  
With respect to those who did not participate in the tsunami relief effort, they raised 
several reasons (see Figure 5.8). “Post-tsunami redevelopment is government’s responsibility” 
was the main reason of the respondents (38.5%), followed by “post-tsunami redevelopment had 
no appropriate financial, social, or other incentives” (26.9%), and “the relief efforts were not 
related to my life and interests” (15.4%). The combination of those reasons were stated by 19.2 
% of the respondents. 
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Figure 5.8. The reasons why respondents did not participate in the tsunami relief effort 
 
  
To some extent, the portrait of respondents’ involvement in post-tsunami redevelopment 
in all case study villages explained above is relatively the same as that in each of the case study 
villages. The majority of respondents in each of the case study villages stated that they 
participated in the tsunami relief efforts. Most respondents of the case study villages, except for 
respondents from Merduati, stated that they participated because they wanted to rebuild their 
villages. Meanwhile, most respondents from Merduati participated because they intended to meet 
their needs. Except for respondents from Lambung, most of respondents of the case study 
villages participated in the cash-for-work projects (debris removal). In terms of how respondents 
participated in the relief efforts, the majority of respondents in each village stated they got 
involved in those activities because of their own awareness and initiatives. Most of the 
respondents in each village were also very satisfied or satisfied with their participation.  
 The differences among respondents in each village include the kinds of relief efforts in 
which they participated and the reasons why some respondents did not participate in the tsunami 
relief efforts. There were no respondents from Merduati, for instance, that got involved in 
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barrack development because of the absence of barrack development in this village. Meanwhile, 
most respondents from Lambung participated in the village development planning. This is not 
surprising given the success of this village’s community leaders in mobilizing their residents to 
get involved in this relief activity. With regard to why respondents did not participate in the 
tsunami relief efforts, the majority of respondents from Merduati stated they did not participate 
because post-disaster redevelopment is government’s responsibility. Most of the respondents 
from Lam Teungoh and Lam Hasan stated that their main reasons for not participating were that 
the tsunami relief efforts were not related to their life and interest and they had no appropriate 
financial, social, or other incentives. Meanwhile, respondents from Lambung did not have 
dominant reasons related to this issue. For detailed information about respondents’ responses to 
their involvement in post-tsunami redevelopment and general development activities, see table 
21 in Appendix E.        
  
Community Members’ Perceptions of Community Participation in the Redevelopment Efforts 
after the Aceh Tsunami 
 
 Community Members’ Perception of the Importance of Community Participation in the 
Redevelopment Efforts after the Aceh Tsunami 
 
Respondents’ perceptions of the importance of community participation in Aceh post-
tsunami redevelopment (by clustering the profiles of respondents) are examined by cluster 
analysis. This analysis is intended to group the respondents according to the their perceptions on 
the matter. The importance of community participation asked in the survey includes the 
following four aspects: meeting the needs of communities, improving capacity building of 
communities, reducing traumatic feelings, and giving hope for a better future for communities 
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(see questions 1-4 of section III-A of the questionnaire). Cluster analysis in this research is 
guided by a non-hierarchy method (K-Means).  
Using respondents’ answers on the five-point scale of  satisfaction with the importance of 
community participation in Aceh post-tsunami redevelopment, cluster analysis identifies two 
clusters,  “tend to agree” with the importance of participation (cluster 1) and “tend to disagree” 
with the importance of participation (cluster 2). Each respondent is grouped into either one of the 
clusters based on their  answers on the four aspects asked in the questionnaire. The first cluster,  
“tend to agree” with the importance of participation, consists of 172 respondents, and the second 
one,  “tend to disagree” with the importance of participation, only consists of 28 respondents.   
To know the profiles of repondents who “tend to agree” or “tend to disagree” with the 
importance (benefits) of participation in post-tsunami redevelopment mentioned above, cross-
tabulations are used. In this case, respondents’ sex, age, education and income are variables 
selected for cross-tabulation with the results of the cluster analysis. Below is the distribution of 
respondents’ sex, age, education and income by the two clusters. 
 
Table 5.13. Distrubution of sex by the two clusters 
Sex 
Cluster 
Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male 109 22 131 
 (83%) (17%) (100%) 
Female 63 6 69 
 (91%) (9%) (100%) 
Total 172 28 200 
 (86%) (14%) (100%) 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
Table 5.14. Distribution of age by the two clusters 
Age 
Cluster 
Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
15-25 22 2 24 
  (92%) (8%) (100%) 
26-55 131 23 154 
  (85%) (15%) (100%) 
>55 19 3 22 
  (86%) (14%) (100%) 
Total 172 28 200 
  (86%) (14%) (100%) 
 
 
Table 5.15. Distribution of education by the two clusters 
Education Cluster Total 1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
No education 8 4 12 
  (66.67%) (33.33%) (100%) 
Elementery 3 1 4 
  (75%) (25%) (100%) 
Junior High 41 7 48 
  (85%) (15%) (100%) 
Senior High 99 13 112 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
University 21 3 24 
 (86%) (14%) (100%) 
Total 172 28 200 
  (86%) (14%) (100%) 
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Table 5.16. Distribution of income by the two clusters 
Income Cluster Total 1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
None 33 8 41 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
<25,000 18 2 20 
  (90%) (10%) (100%) 
25,000 - <50,000 46 8 54 
  (85%) (15%) (100%) 
50,000-75,000 60 5 65 
  (92%) (8%) (100%) 
>75,000 15 5 20 
  (75%) (25%) (100%) 
Total 172 28 200 
  (86%) (14%) (100%) 
 
 
Based on distribution of sex, age, education and income by the two clusters above, it is 
obvious that for all tables, the number of respondents in cluster 1 outnumber that in cluster 2. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that most repondents, regardless of sex, age group, education, and 
income level, agreed that community participation in Aceh post-tsunami redevelopment has 
benefited communities in terms of meeting needs, capacity building, reducing traumatic feelings 
and giving hope for a better future for communities. The smallest number of respondents who 
agreed with the aforementioned benefits of participation was in the “no education” category of 
respondents (66.67%). The highest numbers are in the “age of 15-25” and the “income of Rp 
50,000-75,000” categories. These results indicate that respondents with the lowest level of 
education perceived that community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment was less 
important than those with higher levels of education. Meanwhile, young and middle- income 
respondents considered that participation has given more benefits than those of other group of 
ages and other level of incomes. These findings mean that respondents’ perceptions of  the 
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benefits (importance) of participation by sex, age, education level and income clusters are in line 
with the benefits of community participation in post-disaster relief suggested in theory.    
 The results of cluster analysis for all respondents above are in line with those for 
respondents of each of the case study villages (see Appendix F). Most respondents from each of 
the case study villages, regardless of sex, age, group, and education and income level, agreed that 
community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment in Aceh has benefited communities in 
terms of meeting needs, capacity building, reducing traumatic feelings, and giving hope for a 
better future for communities. The smallest number of respondents who agreed with those 
benefits was from Lam Hasan with the “level of education of elementary school” category 
(50%).  
     
Community Members’ Perception of the Constraints of Community Participation in the 
Redevelopment Efforts after the Aceh Tsunami 
 
In this part, this research intends to exanine whether a number of  aspects have impeded 
the implementation of  community participation in Aceh post-tsunami redevelopment. As 
discussed in the literature section, constraints on community participation in general 
development come from both the government and the community. The success of community 
participation depends on the government’s political will and skills to stimulate the participatory 
process, as well as the awareness and abilities of community members to participate in the 
process. Meanwhile, especially in the post-disaster term, the demand for quick decisions and 
issue complexity are also the main impedements for adopting the participatory approaches. In 
post-disaster redevelopment, the role of NGOs in the implementation of community participation 
was also critical since they are also the actors who execute the reconstruction effort along with 
other aid organizations or agencies.       
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 The aspects (variables) which impeded the implementation of participation in post-
tsunami redevelopment in Aceh examined in this research included the following (questions 3-14 
of section III-B of the questionnaire presented in Appendix D): 
 The demand for quick decision and actions 
 Issue complexity caused by the tsunami 
 BRR’s political will to implement the participatory process 
 BRR’s skills to manage the participatory process 
 NGOs’ intention to implement the participatory process 
 NGOs’ skills to manage the participatory process 
 Citizens’ enthusiasm to get involved in the participatory process 
 Citizens’ skills to get involved in the participatory process 
 The influence of Aceh’s past military conflict on community members’ awareness and 
capability of getting involved in the participatory process 
 The influence of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on community members’ awareness of 
getting involved in the participatory process 
 The influence of Aceh’s past military conflict on government’s capability to deal with the 
participatory process 
 The influence of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on government’s ability to deal with the 
participatory process 
 
It is important to note that Aceh’s past military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian 
regime eras are deemed important aspects since these eras were times in which Aceh community 
members and any other elements in society did not have freedom to speak up and act in social 
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activities. In many ways, the unsafe and uncomfortable enviroment during these periods 
prevented the community at large from improving their socio-cultural lives. 
To identify underlying factors (variables), that explain the pattern of correlation within a 
set of observed variables presented above, factor analysis is conducted. But a KMO (Kaiser-
Meiyer-Olkin) and Bartlett test should be applied beforehand to determine whether factor 
analysis can be employed to those variables. The test shows that KMO is 0.659 (> 0.5) which 
means that factor analysis can be employed. The results of the KMO and Bartlett test is 
displayed below. 
 
Table 5.17. KMO and Bartlett Test 
KMO 
Bartlett	Test	of	Spherity	
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
Df Sig. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.659 719.400 66 0.000 
 
 Meanwhile, the Total Variance Explained table shows that there are five factors obtained 
(based on Kaiser criteria). These factors explain 73.366% of the constraints of participation of 
the variance among all of the questions (see table 5.18). In the Rotated Component Matrix table, 
the correlations between 12 indicator variables and factor loadings (with the varimax rotation 
method) are presented. 
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Table 5.18. Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial 
Eigenvalues
% of Variance Cumulative % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 3.270 27.250 27.250 
2 1.650 13.748 40.997 
3 1.529 12.739 53.736 
4 1.302 10.849 64.585 
5 1.054 8.781 73.366 
 
Table 5.19. Rotated Component Matrix 
No. Variable 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Quick_decision .845 -.012 .088 -.005 .142 
2. Issue_complexity .836 .046 .085 -.025 .154 
3. BRR_political will .228 -.047 -.064 .772 .071 
4. BRR_skills -.067 .064 .023 .863 .036 
5. NGO_intention -.084 .200 .078 -.021 .842 
6. NGO_skills .226 -.207 .054 .144 .754 
7. Citizen_enthusiasm .184 .206 .780 .058 .267 
8. Citizen_skills .090 .009 .905 -.078 -.067 
9. Aceh_conflict impact_citizen .630 .326 .166 .250 -.201 
10. Soeharto’s regime impact_citizen .599 .416 .085 .254 -.128 
11. Aceh_conflict impact_gov .133 .873 .114 .038 .065 
12. Soeharto’s regime impact_gov .098 .896 .052 -.042 -.015 
 
Given correlation between indicator variables and factor loadings in the Rotated 
Component Matrix table above,  it can be concluded that the constraints on community 
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participation in post-tsunami redevelopment from the biggest to the smallest according to 
respondents are as follows: 
1. The demand for quick decisions and actions, issue complexity caused by the tsunami, and 
the impact of Aceh’s military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on citizens’ 
awareness and capability of getting involved in the participatory process (27.25% of 
variance explained). 
2. The impact of Aceh’s military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on government’s 
capability of dealing with the participatory process (13.748% of variance explained).  
3. Citizens’ enthusiasm and skills to get involved in the participatory process (12.739% of 
variance explained). 
4. BRR’s political will and skills to implement and manage the participatory process (10.849% 
of variance explained). 
5. NGOs’ intention and skills to implement and manage the participatory process (8.781% of 
variance explained).  
 
With regard to the biggest constraints on community participation in post-tsunami 
redevelopment for each of the case study villages, factor analysis show different results among 
the villages. The biggest constraints for each village include NGOs’ intention and skills to 
implement and manage the participatory process, and citizens’ enthusiasm to get involved in the 
participatory process (in Lam Teungoh, 28.839% of variance explained); NGOs’ intention and 
skills to implement and manage the participatory process (in Lam Hasan, 22.281% of variance 
explained); the demand for quick decisions and actions, issue complexity caused by the tsunami, 
BRR’s political will to implement and manage the participatory process,  and the impact of 
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Aceh’s military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on citizens’ awareness and 
capability of getting involved in the participatory process  (in Lambung, 34.651% of variance 
explained); and citizens’ enthusiasm to get involved in the participatory process, and and the 
impact of Aceh’s military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on government’s 
capability of dealing with the participatory process (in Merduati, 30.243% of variance explained) 
(for detailed information, see Appendix G).  
       
Community Members’ Preferences for the Community Participation Approaches in the 
Redevelopment Efforts after the Aceh Tsunami  
 
 Community members’ preferences for the community participation approaches in Aceh 
post-disaster redevelopment asked in the survey relate to several issues (questions 1-6 of section 
IV of the questionnaire). In this regard, community members were asked to what extent they 
agree with the issues. The first issue is provision of education and training as to participatory 
approaches for all stakeholders (community members, associated government agency employees, 
NGO workers, etc). The second issue is the formulation of specific guidlines for community 
participation in the rebuilding process. The third issue is representative participation in decision 
making (community members are represented by their representatives). The fourth issue is direct 
participation in which community members get involved in decision making through public 
hearings and public meeting. In addition, respondents were also asked to choose the best 
participatory approaches promoted by the government and NGOs based on Arnstein’s level of 
participation. 
 Research findings show that most of the respondents agreed with provision of education 
and training as to participatory approaches for all stakeholders and the formulation of specific 
guidlines for community participation (92.5% and 88% respectively). With respect to 
 
 
160 
 
representative and direct participation, the majority of respondents were in favor of the adoption 
of both representative participation (85%) and direct participation (86%). In this regard, based on 
interviews with community leaders, direct participation usually took place in identifying 
problems, setting goals and priorities, while representative participation took place in the 
advanced stages (the detailed planning and operational process, etc). In terms of Arnstein’s level 
of participation, the most preferable level of participations chosen by respondents was the 
“partnership” category in which government/NGOs collaborate with citizens and where the final 
decision is made based on agreement from government/NGOs and citizens. In the case of 
government-executed projects, the “partnership” category was chosen by 55% of the respondents 
(Figure 5.9), while for NGO-executed projects, this category was chosen by 61% of the 
respondents (Figure 5.10). More expectation on level of participation in NGO-executed projects 
perhaps resulted from better capacities of NGOs (compared to the government) in dealing with 
participatory approaches after disasters according to respondents.      
 
 
Figure 5.9. The best way for the government to involve communities in post-disaster 
redevelopment according to respondents 
 
7%
14%
16.5%
55%
7.5%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Informing Consulting Placation Partnership 
(collaboration)
Delegated 
power
 
 
161 
 
 
Figure 5.10. The best way for NGOs to involve communities in post-disaster redevelopment 
according to respondents  
 
 
Given the research findings above, it can be concluded that most of the respondents 
considered provision of education and training as to participatory approaches for all stakeholders 
(92.5%) as well as the formulation of specific guidlines for community participation (88%) 
important to support community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment. Interestingly, most 
of the respondents agreed with both representative participation and direct participation (85% 
and 86%, respectively). It means most respondents hoped the implementation of the two types of 
participation in decision making as suggested by theory. In accordance with to what extent 
governments/NGOs should cooperate with community members in executing 
governments/NGO’s relief projects, more than half respondents were in favor of supporting 
collaboration approaches (the “partnership” level of participation). 55% respondents agreed with 
the “partnership” participation for government-executed projects and 61% respondents also 
agreed with this level of participation for NGO-executed projects. This means many respondents 
wanted to get involved actively in the recovery efforts and they hoped they had the same 
bargaining position as the governments and/or NGOs in decision making.     
4.5%
11%
14%
61%
9.5%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Informing Consulting Placation Partnership 
(collaboration)
Delegated 
power
 
 
162 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Thic chapter includes the summary of findings, the limitations of the study and a 
discussion of future research. The summary of findings includes the implementation of 
community participation and community members’ perceptions of and preferences for 
community participation in the Aceh post-tsunami redevelopment. This chapter begins with the 
summary of findings and then followed by the limitations of the study and future research, and 
conclusion and recommendations. 
 
Summary of Findings 
In terms of the implementation of community participation, the research findings show 
that the occurance of “ad hoc” participation (participatory activities mainly mobilized by 
community members) in the four case study village was basically related to communities’ urgent 
needs right after the tsunami as well as community members’ creativity and networking. The 
urgent needs of communities led the residents of the four case study villages to partipate in (1) 
corpse evacuation; (2) data collection on the death toll in their own village; and (3) disseminating 
disaster-related information. Communities had no choice except to participate in these activites 
because aid agencies were still not involved actively in the relief effort at that time. All case 
study villages, except for Merduati, also participated in barrack/temporary shelter development. 
The non-existence of temporary shelter development in Merduati resulted from the lack of 
coordination among its community members due to the death of its former head of village in the 
tsunami and its proximity to the capital city which resulted in easy access to relief assistance. 
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The role of creativity and networking in exercising “ad hoc” particpation can be seen in the case 
of Lambung village. This village made some breakthroughs through resident initiatives in village 
development planning, land contribution for public facilities, opening a bank account for public 
donations, advertising village meetings, and public facility construction with village funds.  
With regard to aid organization/agency-promoted participation (participation promoted 
by NGOs, international agencies, and Indonesian Government Agencies), the findings indicate 
that the extent to which communities were involved in this kind of participation was associated 
with the willingness and capacity of aid organizations/agencies, the nature of recovery projects, 
and the readiness of communities to participate. In addition, adequate time in exercising 
participation (UPLINK case in Lam Hasan), and community facilitators’ informal approaches to 
engage communities in the reconstruction effort (USAID/DAI case in Lam Teungoh) are also 
significant for optimizing participation. 
 According to the interviews with the heads of the case study villages, the specific 
benefits of the implementation of community participation for communities included 
accelerating the village economic recovery process (Lam Teungoh case), a quick process of 
project management (Lam Hasan case), more organized settlements (Lambung case), and an 
improved sense of village ownership among inhabitants (Merduati case). Based on information 
from the heads of the villages, it can be concluded that constraints of community participation 
included low coordination among aid organizations/agencies (Lam Teungoh and Lam Hasan 
cases), lack of knowledge among community members (Lam Teungoh case), the long 
participatory process (Lambung case), and the bad influence of “income generated” cash for 
work projects (Lam Teungoh, Lam Hasan, and Merduati cases). Meanwhile, supporting factors 
of participation included leadership (Lambung, Lam Hasan, and lambung cases), social ties (Lam 
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Teungoh and Lambung cases), community facilitator’s approaches (Lam Teungoh case), as well 
as information on participatory activities, networking, religious approaches, and residents’ 
willingness to make  contributions (Lambung case). 
With respect to perceptions of community participation in Aceh post-tsunami 
redevelopment, most respondents, regardless of sex, age group, and education, and income level, 
agreed that community participation in the relief efforts has benefited communities in terms of 
meeting needs, capacity building, reducing traumatic feelings, and giving hope for a better future 
for communities (on average 86%). In terms of the constraints of participation, factor analysis 
indicates that, according to the respondents, the biggest constraints of community participation in 
post-tsunami redevelopment include the demand for quick decisions and actions, issue 
complexity caused by the tsunami, and the impact of Aceh’s military conflict and Soeharto’s 
authoritarian regime on citizen awareness and capability of getting involved in the participatory 
process (27.25%).  
In terms of preferences for community participation approaches, most respondents agreed 
with provision of education and training for participatory approaches for all stakeholders and the 
formulation of specific guidelines for community participation in post-disaster redevelopment 
(92.5% and 88%, respectively). The majority of respondents were also in favor of the 
implementation of both direct and representative participation (85% and 86%, respectively) in 
decision making. In terms of the extent to which respondents participate in the redevelopment 
activites executed by the governments and NGOs, more than half of respondents chose the 
partnership category of Arnstein’s level of participation (55% for government-executed projects 
and 61% for NGO-executed projects, respectively). 
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Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
This study has several limitations, many of which should be addressed in future research. 
The first is that community participation in the four case study villages cannot really represent 
community participation in Aceh. A much larger number of villages with representative 
districts/cities affected by the tsunami will better reflect the portrait of community participation 
in the tsunami affected villages in the entire Province. Second, for the aid organization/agency, 
besides the addition of its number, its variety (in terms of, for instance, the scale of funding and 
country of origin) should also be considered so that aid organizations/agencies selected are more 
representative of all aid organizations.  
  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The research findings suggest that the success of community participatory approaches 
requires the willingness and readiness of stakeholders (government, aid organizations/agencies, 
community leaders, and community members) and cooperation among them. Results also 
suggest that government should educate and train all stakeholders as to community participation 
approaches. The hope is that this effort help improve the awareness and capacities of the 
stakeholders in implementing community participation in post-disaster redevelopment. In 
addition, the government also needs to formulate specific guidelines for community participation 
as the basis for the legal participation action. Specifically, the guidelines should include minimum 
standards, forms, and techniques of community participation in the rebuilding process. The 
“partnership” participation, chosen as the best way of community participation by research 
respondents, should also be considered in revising the policy of community participation model 
in post-disaster redevelopment in Aceh and Indonesia in the future. 
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APPENDIX C 
Interview Questions for Government Officials, Aid Organization/Agency Workers and 
Community Leaders  
 
1. Describe the actual process of community participation in redevelopment that took place in 
Aceh Province after the tsunami disaster. 
 
2. Do you think community members should participate in the general policymaking process? 
Why or why not? 
 
3. Do you think community members should have participated in the redevelopment efforts 
after the Aceh tsunami? Why or why not? 
 
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of community participation in the general 
policymaking process?  
 
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of community participation in post-disaster 
redevelopment? 
 
6. Describe the process of community participation in post-disaster redevelopment in Indonesia 
before the Aceh tsunami. 
 
7. Could you explain the participatory approach in the tsunami relief efforts stated in the Master 
for the Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction? What were the reasons behind the 
adoption of this approach? 
 
8. What have been the constraints to community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment in 
Aceh? 
 
9. How have government agencies and other actors (community members, community leaders, 
NGOs) supported or opposed the implementation of community participation after the 
tsunami? 
 
10. To what extent have community members participated in the redevelopment process? Could 
you explain? 
 
11. To date, what have been the effects of community participation following the Aceh tsunami? 
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APPENDIX D 
Questionnaire questions for community members  
 
I.   Personal Data 
1. Village’s/neighborhood’s name: 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Address: __________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Occupation:  
____Fisherman ____Poultry breeder ____ House wife 
____Farmer ____Cattle breeder ____ Unemployed 
____Carpenter ____Unorganized day laborer ____ Other (explain) ______ 
____ Merchant ____Government employee  
4. Age: ______________ 
5. Sex: ______________ 
6. How long have you been living in your village/neighborhood ________________________ 
7. Ethnic group (please check one) 
____ Acehnese ____ Sundanese ____ Padangnese 
____ Javanese ____ Bataknese ____ Other (please explain) ____________ 
8. Are you (please check one)? 
___ Single    ___ Married  ___ Widow/widower 
9. What is your highest level of education? (please check one) 
___ No education   ___ Elementary   ___ Junior High   ___ Senior High   ___ University 
10. What is your daily income? 
_None   _less than 25,000 R   _25,000–less than 50,000 R   _50,000–75,000 R   _More than 75,000 R 
11. Level of effect of the tsunami on you  
a. very severe     b. severe     c. moderate     d. minimal     e. none 
 
II.  General  
1. Have you participated in any tsunami relief effort? ____Yes ____No (if no, go to question 6)  
2. If yes, in what kind of relief effort(s) have you participated? (you may choose more than one) 
a. evacuation of dead people/ 
    victims 
d. village development planning g. other (explain) ___ 
e. house development 
b. barrack development f. public facilities development  (edu-
cation buildings, infrastructure, etc) 
 
c. debris removal 
3. Why have you participated in the tsunami relief effort(s)? (you may choose more than one) 
a. To meet my needs c. To gain experience e. other (explain) _____ 
b. To rebuild my 
village/neighborhood 
d. To improve my skills in dealing  
with post-disaster redevelopment 
 
4. How have you participated in the tsunami relief effort(s)?  
a. by my own awareness and initiative c. motivated by my friends 
b. motivated by my family/relatives d. motivated by village bureaucrat(s) 
5. How satisfied were you with your involvement in the tsunami relief effort(s)? 
a. very satisfied     b. satisfied     c. neutral     d. unsatisfied    e. very unsatisfied      
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6. If you have not participated in the tsunami relief effort (s), what have been your reasons? (you may 
choose more than one) 
a. There have no appropriate financial, social, or other incentives. 
b. The tsunami relief efforts have not been directly related to my life and interests 
c. Post-disaster redevelopment is government’s responsibility 
d. Other (please explain) 
_________________________________________________________ 
7. The governments promote participatory approaches in tsunami relief efforts ___ Yes ___ No 
8. Have you previously participated in any development process before the Aceh tsunami?  __Yes__No  
9. If yes, what the development activity (ies) have you participated in? (you may choose more than one)  
a. Musrenbang at the village level (the deliberative multi-stakeholder forum for development 
planning) 
b. Gotong royong kampung (community self-help at the village level) 
c. Other (explain) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
10. How satisfied were you with your involvement in the aforementioned development activity (ies)? 
a. very satisfied     b. satisfied     c. neutral     d. unsatisfied    e. very unsatisfied      
 
III. Perceptions of Community Participation in Aceh Post-Tsunami Redevelopment 
A.  The importance of community participation  
1. Community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment was vital to meeting the need of 
communities. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
2. Community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment was vital to improving capacity building of 
communities. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
3. Community participation in needs assessment in post-tsunami redevelopment has reduced 
communities’ traumatic feelings. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
4. Community participation in needs assessment in post-tsunami redevelopment has given hope for a 
better future for communities. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
 
B.  The extent and constraints of community participation  
1. In general, which of the following do you think the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency of 
Aceh and Nias (BRR) have done to involve communities in post-tsunami redevelopment? (circle 
only one) 
a. Informing citizens about the activities/programs that would be executed without involving them 
in decision making. 
b. Consulting with citizens (through surveys, neighborhood meetings, or public hearings) about the 
activities/programs that would be executed, but the final decision has been made by BRR. 
c. Involving community representatives on planning boards, but the final decision has been made by 
BRR. 
d. Collaborating with citizens where the final decision has been made based on agreement from both 
parties. 
e. Empowering citizens by placing final decision-making in the hands of citizens. 
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2. In general, which of the following do you think the Non Government Organization(s) has (have) done 
to involve communities in post-tsunami redevelopment? (circle only one) 
a. Informing citizens about the activities/programs that would be executed without involving them 
in decision making. 
b. Consulting with citizens (through surveys, neighborhood meetings, or public hearings) about the 
activities/programs that would be executed, but the final decision has been greatly influenced by 
NGO(s). 
c. Involving community representatives on planning boards, but the final decision has been greatly 
influenced by NGO(s). 
d. Collaborating with citizens where the final decision has been made based on agreement from both 
parties. 
e. Empowering citizens by placing final decision-making in the hands of citizens. 
3. The demand for quick decisions and actions has been the main impediment for the implementation of 
community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
4. Issue complexity has been the main constraint for the implementation of community participation in 
post-tsunami redevelopment. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
5. BRR had no political will to stimulate and broaden the participatory process in post-tsunami 
redevelopment. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
6. BRR did not have enough skills to manage the participatory process in post-tsunami redevelopment.  
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
7. NGO(s) had no serious intention to stimulate and broaden the participatory process in post-tsunami 
redevelopment. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
8. NGO(s) did not have enough skills to manage the participatory process in post-tsunami 
redevelopment.  
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
9. Citizens were not enthusiastic about getting involved in the participatory process in post tsunami 
redevelopment. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
10. Citizens did not have the skills to get involved in the participatory process in post-tsunami 
redevelopment. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
11. Past military conflict in Aceh has led community members to have a lack of awareness and little 
capability of getting involved in the participatory process. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
12. Long experience under Soeharto’s authoritarian regime (1967-1998) has led to lack of awareness 
among community members of getting involved in the participatory process. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
13. Past military conflict in Aceh has led the governments to be less capable of dealing with the 
participatory process. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
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14. Long experience under Soeharto’s authoritarian regime has reduced the ability of the governments to 
deal with the participatory process. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
 
IV. Preferences for the Participatory Approach in Aceh Post-Tsunami Redevelopment  
1. To support community participation in the rebuilding process, the government, NGOs and other 
concerned parties need to provide education and training concerning participatory approaches for 
affected communities, related government agencies employees, NGO workers, and the general public.   
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
2. The government should set specific guidelines for community participation in the rebuilding process, 
in terms of minimum standards, forms, techniques, etc. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
3. The involvement of community members in decision making in the recovery process should be 
implemented in a representative way (community members are represented by bureaucrats, 
community leaders, interest groups, and other individuals or parties). 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree       
4. Community members should get involved in decision making in the recovery process at the 
village/neighborhood level through public hearings and public meetings. 
a. strongly agree     b. agree     c. neutral     d. disagree     e. strongly disagree     
5. Which of the following do you think the best way for the governments to involve communities in 
post-disaster redevelopment? (circle only one)  
a. Informing citizens about the activities/programs that would be executed without involving them 
in decision making. 
b. Consulting with citizens (through surveys, neighborhood meetings, or public hearings) about the 
activities/programs that would be executed, but the final decision should have been made by 
BRR. 
c. Involving community representatives on planning boards, but the final decision should have been 
made by BRR. 
d. Collaborating with citizens where the final decision should have been made based on agreement 
from both parties. 
e. Empowering citizens by placing final decision-making in the hands of citizens. 
6. Which of the following do you think the best way for NGO(s) to involve communities in post-disaster 
redevelopment? (circle only one) 
a. Informing citizens about the activities/programs that would be executed without involving them 
in decision making. 
b. Consulting with citizens (through surveys, neighborhood meetings, or public hearings) about the 
activities/programs that would be executed, but the final decision should have been greatly 
influenced by NGO(s). 
c. Involving community representatives on planning boards, but the final decision should have been 
greatly influenced by NGO(s). 
d. Collaborating with citizens where the final decision should have been made based on agreement 
from both parties. 
e. Empowering citizens by placing final decision-making in the hands of citizens. 
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APPENDIX E   
Respondents’ answers to the questions of the questionnaire 
 
Table 5.20.  Descriptive information about the respondents (questions 3 – 11 of section I of 
the questionnaire) 
No Item 
Lam 
Teungoh Lam Hasan Lambung Merduati Total 
3 Occupation                     
  Fisherman 11 5.50% 0 0.00% 4 2.00% 1 0.50% 16 8.00% 
  Farmer 3 1.50% 8 4.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 11 5.50% 
  Carpenter 0 0.00% 6 3.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 6 3.00% 
  Merchant 8 4.00% 6 3.00% 6 3.00% 16 8.00% 36 18.00% 
  Poultry breeder 3 1.50% 1 0.50% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 4 2.00% 
  Cattle breeder 2 1.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.50% 3 1.50% 
  Unorganized day laborer 2 1.00% 6 3.00% 1 0.50% 3 1.50% 12 6.00% 
  Government employee 0 0.00% 4 2.00% 9 4.50% 4 2.00% 17 8.50% 
  House wife 11 5.50% 4 2.00% 11 5.50% 3 1.50% 29 14.50% 
  Unemployed 5 2.50% 2 1.00% 4 2.00% 4 2.00% 15 7.50% 
  
Construction-related 
professional 3 1.50% 3 1.50% 6 3.00% 9 4.50% 21 10.50% 
  
State or private company 
worker 0 0.00% 6 3.00% 5 2.50% 9 4.50% 20 10.00% 
  
Student (senior high & 
undergraduate) 2 1.00% 4 2.00% 4 2.00% 0 0.00% 10 5.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
4 Age                     
  15 - 25 years old 10 5.00% 5 2.50% 9 4.50% 0 0.00% 24 12.00% 
  26 - 55 years old 37 18.50% 41 20.50% 38 19.00% 38 19.00% 154 77.00% 
  Over 55 years old 3 1.50% 4 2.00% 3 1.50% 12 6.00% 22 11.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
5 Sex                     
  Male 32 16.00% 33 16.50% 30 15.00% 36 18.00% 131 65.50% 
  Female 18 9.00% 17 8.50% 20 10.00% 14 7.00% 69 34.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
6 How long have you been 
living in your village?                     
  ≤ 5 years 6 3.00% 1 0.50% 3 1.50% 0 0.00% 10 5.00% 
  6 - 15 years 2 1.00% 10 5.00% 4 2.00% 1 0.50% 17 8.50% 
  16 - 25 years 8 4.00% 11 5.50% 10 5.00% 3 1.50% 32 16.00% 
  > 25 years 34 17.00% 28 14.00% 33 16.50% 46 23.00% 141 70.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
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7 Ethnic group                     
  Acehnese 48 24.00% 47 23.50% 47 23.50% 41 20.50% 183 91.50% 
  Javanese 2 1.00% 1 0.50% 2 1.00% 4 2.00% 9 4.50% 
  Sundanese 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  Bataknese 0 0.00% 1 0.50% 0 0.00% 1 0.50% 2 1.00% 
  Padangnese 0 0.00% 1 0.50% 1 0.50% 2 1.00% 4 2.00% 
  Other 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2 1.00% 2 1.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
8 Are you?                     
  Single 9 4.50% 8 4.00% 27 13.50% 5 2.50% 49 24.50% 
  Married 40 20.00% 42 21.00% 21 10.50% 35 17.50% 138 69.00% 
  Widow/widower 1 0.50% 0 0.00% 2 1.00% 10 5.00% 13 6.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
9 Level of education                     
  No education 5 2.50% 4 2.00% 2 1.00% 1 0.50% 12 6.00% 
  Elementary 2 1.00% 2 1.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 4 2.00% 
  Junior High 16 8.00% 15 7.50% 7 3.50% 10 5.00% 48 24.00% 
  Senior High 25 12.50% 23 11.50% 32 16.00% 32 16.00% 112 56.00% 
  University 2 1.00% 5 2.50% 9 4.50% 8 4.00% 24 12.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
10 Daily income                     
  None 10 5.00% 9 4.50% 16 8.00% 6 3.00% 41 20.50% 
  Less than 25,000 R 11 5.50% 3 1.50% 6 3.00% 0 0.00% 20 10.00% 
  
25,000 - less than 50,000 
R 24 12.00% 9 4.50% 9 4.50% 12 6.00% 54 27.00% 
  50,000 - 75,000 R 4 2.00% 26 13.00% 12 6.00% 23 11.50% 65 32.50% 
  More than 75,000 R 1 0.50% 3 1.50% 7 3.50% 9 4.50% 20 10.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
11 Level of effect of the 
tsunami on you                     
  Very severe 41 20.50% 39 19.50% 38 19.00% 11 5.50% 129 64.50% 
  Severe 5 2.50% 6 3.00% 9 4.50% 25 12.50% 45 22.50% 
  Moderate 1 0.50% 5 2.50% 2 1.00% 12 6.00% 20 10.00% 
  Minimal  1 0.50% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2 1.00% 3 1.50% 
  None 2 1.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.50% 0 0.00% 3 1.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
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Table 5.21.  Cross tabulation of responses to questions about participation 
in tsunami relief and general development activities (questions 1 – 10 of 
section II of the questionnaire) 
 
No Item Lam Teungoh Lam Hasan Lambung Merduati Total 
  Characteristic -coastal rural 
area                   
-40% have no 
education          
-lots of native 
inhabitants        
-major 
occupation: 
fishermen 
and farmers 
-very low 
income (Rp 
800,000 – 1 
million) 
-coastal rural 
area                   
-58% senior 
high, 7% 
undergradua-
te and higher 
-mix of native 
and new 
inhabitants        
-major 
occupation: 
private & 
state 
company  
workers and 
farmers 
-low income 
(Rp 1 – 1.2 
million) 
-semi urban 
area                   
-62% senior 
high, 21% 
undergradua-
te 
-lots of native 
inhabitants 
-major 
occupation: 
private 
company 
workers and 
civil servants
-middle 
income (Rp 
1.5 – 1.75 
million) 
-urban area       
-48% senior 
high, 20% 
undergradua-
te and higher 
-lots of new 
inhabitants 
-major 
occupation: 
private 
company 
workers, civil 
servants,  and 
traders 
-middle 
income (Rp 
2.5 million) 
  
1  Have you 
participated in any 
tsunami relief effort?                     
   Yes 44 22.00% 44 22.00% 47 23.50% 39 19.50% 174 87.00% 
   No 6 3.00% 6 3.00% 3 1.50% 11 5.50% 26 13.00% 
   Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
2  In what kind of relief 
effort?                     
   Evacuation of dead 
people/victims 3 1.72% 4 2.30% 0 0.00% 5 2.87% 12 6.90% 
   Barrack development 3 1.72% 1 0.57% 2 1.15% 0 0.00% 6 3.45% 
   Debris removal 10 5.75% 20 11.49% 7 4.02% 17 9.77% 54 31.03% 
   Village development 
planing  2 1.15% 0 0.00% 19 10.92% 8 4.60% 29 16.67% 
   House development 0 0.00% 1 0.57% 2 1.15% 1 0.57% 4 2.30% 
   Public facilities 
development 2 1.15% 0 0.00% 9 5.17% 1 0.57% 12 6.90% 
   Evacuation and 
barrack development 3 1.72% 1 0.57% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 4 2.30% 
   Evacuation and 
debris removal 3 1.72% 10 5.75% 1 0.57% 1 0.57% 15 8.62% 
   Debris removal and 
village development 
planning 2 1.15% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2 1.15% 
   Three kinds of 
activities 8 4.60% 2 1.15% 3 1.72% 2 1.15% 15 8.62% 
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   Four kind of 
activities 8 4.60% 1 0.57% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 9 5.17% 
   Other 0 0.00% 4 2.30% 4 2.30% 4 2.30% 12 6.90% 
   Total N 44 25.29% 44 25.29% 47 27.01% 39 22.41% 174 100.00% 
3  Why have you 
participated?                     
   To meet my needs 1 0.57% 2 1.15% 19 10.92% 9 5.17% 31 17.82% 
   To rebuild my 
village/neighborhood 17 9.77% 24 13.79% 7 4.02% 21 12.07% 69 39.66% 
   To gain experience 1 0.57% 0 0.00% 2 1.15% 3 1.72% 6 3.45% 
   To improve my skills 1 0.57% 1 0.57% 0 0.00% 5 2.87% 7 4.02% 
   To meet my needs & 
to rebuild my village 12 6.90% 5 2.87% 10 5.75% 0 0.00% 27 15.52% 
   To rebuild my village 
& to gain experience 3 1.72% 2 1.15% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 5 2.87% 
   To rebuild my village 
& to improve my 
skills 5 2.87% 8 4.60% 6 3.45% 1 0.57% 20 11.49% 
   To meet my needs, 
rebuild my village, & 
to gain experience 2 1.15% 1 0.57% 3 1.72% 0 0.00% 6 3.45% 
   To rebuild my 
village, to gain 
experience, & to 
improve skills 1 0.57% 1 0.57% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2 1.15% 
   Other 1 0.57% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.57% 
   Total N 44 25.29% 44 25.29% 47 27.01% 39 22.41% 174 100.00% 
4  How have you 
participated?                     
   By my own 
awareness and 
initiative 41 23.56% 43 24.71% 43 24.71% 27 15.52% 154 88.51% 
   Motivated by my 
family/relatives 1 0.57% 0 0.00% 2 1.15% 5 2.87% 8 4.60% 
   Motivated by my 
friends 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2 1.15% 2 1.15% 
   Motivated by village 
bureaucrat(s) 2 1.15% 1 0.57% 2 1.15% 5 2.87% 10 5.75% 
   Total N 44 25.29% 44 25.29% 47 27.01% 39 22.41% 174 100.00% 
5  How satisfied were 
you with your 
involvement?                     
   Very satisfied 17 9.77% 16 9.20% 24 13.79% 3 1.72% 60 34.48% 
   Satisfied 21 12.07% 23 13.22% 12 6.90% 33 18.97% 89 51.15% 
   Neutral 4 2.30% 5 2.87% 10 5.75% 1 0.57% 20 11.49% 
   Unsatisfied 2 1.15% 0 0.00% 1 0.57% 2 1.15% 5 2.87% 
   Very unsatisfied 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
   Total N 44 25.29% 44 25.29% 47 27.01% 39 22.41% 174 100.00% 
6  Why have you not 
participated?                     
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   No appropriate 
financial, social or 
other incentives 1 3.85% 2 7.69% 1 3.85% 3 11.54% 7 26.92% 
   Not related to my life 
and interests 3 11.54% 1 3.85% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 4 15.38% 
   Government's 
responsibility 2 7.69% 0 0.00% 1 3.85% 7 26.92% 10 38.46% 
   Other  0 0.00% 3 11.54% 1 3.85% 1 3.85% 5 19.23% 
   Total N 6 23.08% 6 23.08% 3 11.54% 11 42.31% 26 100.00% 
7  The governments 
promote participatory 
approaches in 
tsunami relief efforts                     
   Yes 39 19.50% 45 22.50% 47 23.50% 45 22.50% 176 88.00% 
   No 11 5.50% 5 2.50% 3 1.50% 5 2.50% 24 12.00% 
   Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
8  Have you 
participated in any 
dev. process before 
the tsunami?                     
   Yes 44 22.00% 49 24.50% 46 23.00% 46 23.00% 185 92.50% 
   No 6 3.00% 1 0.50% 4 2.00% 4 2.00% 15 7.50% 
   Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
9  If yes, what dev. 
activity(ies) have you 
participated in?                     
   Musrenbang at the 
village level 1 0.54% 4 2.16% 0 0.00% 5 2.70% 10 5.41% 
   Gotong royong 
kampung 34 18.38% 41 22.16% 26 14.05% 35 18.92% 136 73.51% 
   Other 9 4.86% 4 2.16% 20 10.81% 6 3.24% 39 21.08% 
   Total N 44 23.78% 49 26.49% 46 24.86% 46 24.86% 185 100.00% 
10  How satisfied were 
you with your 
involvement?(#10)                     
   Very satisfied 17 9.19% 13 7.03% 15 8.11% 6 3.24% 51 27.57% 
   Satisfied 21 11.35% 33 17.84% 22 11.89% 37 20.00% 113 61.08% 
   Neutral 5 2.70% 3 1.62% 9 4.86% 2 1.08% 19 10.27% 
   Unsatisfied 1 0.54% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.54% 2 1.08% 
   Very unsatisfied 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
   Total N 44 23.78% 49 26.49% 46 24.86% 46 24.86% 185 100.00% 
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Table 5.22.  Cross tabulation of responses to questions about the importance of 
participation in tsunami relief (questions 1-4 of section III-A of the questionnaire) 
No Item 
Lam 
Teungoh Lam Hasan Lambung Merduati Total 
1 Community 
participation in post-
tsunami 
redevelopment was 
vital to meeting the 
need of communities                     
  Strongly agree 26 13.00% 14 7.00% 32 16.00% 12 6.00% 84 42.00% 
  Agree 21 10.50% 34 17.00% 15 7.50% 29 14.50% 99 49.50% 
  Neutral 3 1.50% 2 1.00% 3 1.50% 4 2.00% 12 6.00% 
  Disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 5 2.50% 5 2.50% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
2 Community 
participation in post-
tsunami 
redevelopment was 
vital to improving 
capacity building of 
communities                     
  Strongly agree 22 11.00% 11 5.50% 21 10.50% 14 7.00% 68 34.00% 
  Agree 27 13.50% 37 18.50% 25 12.50% 26 13.00% 115 57.50% 
  Neutral 1 0.50% 2 1.00% 4 2.00% 4 2.00% 11 5.50% 
  Disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 6 3.00% 6 3.00% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
3 Community 
participation in needs 
assessment in post-
tsunami 
redevelopment has 
reduced 
communities' 
traumatic feelings                     
  Strongly agree 14 7.00% 7 3.50% 20 10.00% 14 7.00% 55 27.50% 
  Agree 31 15.50% 32 16.00% 22 11.00% 29 14.50% 114 57.00% 
  Neutral 3 1.50% 5 2.50% 7 3.50% 4 2.00% 19 9.50% 
  Disagree 2 1.00% 6 3.00% 1 0.50% 3 1.50% 12 6.00% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
4 Community 
participation in needs 
assessment in post-
tsunami 
redevelopment has 
given hope for a 
better future for 
communities                     
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  Strongly agree 13 6.50% 5 2.50% 17 8.50% 15 7.50% 50 25.00% 
  Agree 31 15.50% 29 14.50% 24 12.00% 25 12.50% 109 54.50% 
  Neutral 5 2.50% 9 4.50% 8 4.00% 6 3.00% 28 14.00% 
  Disagree 1 0.50% 7 3.50% 1 0.50% 4 2.00% 13 6.50% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
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Table 5.23.  Cross tabulation of responses to questions about the extent and 
constraints of participation in post-tsunami redevelopment (questions 1-14 of section 
III-B of the questionnaire) 
No Item 
Lam 
Teungoh Lam Hasan Lambung Merduati Total 
1 What BRR has done 
to involve 
communities in post-
tsunami 
redevelopment?                     
  Informing 12 6.00% 13 6.50% 15 7.50% 24 12.00% 64 32.00% 
  Consulting 15 7.50% 24 12.00% 19 9.50% 16 8.00% 74 37.00% 
  Placation 12 6.00% 12 6.00% 11 5.50% 9 4.50% 44 22.00% 
  Partnership 
(collaborating) 11 5.50% 1 0.50% 5 2.50% 1 0.50% 18 9.00% 
  Delegated power 
(empowering) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
2 What NGO(s) has 
(have) done to 
involve communities 
in post-tsunami 
redevelopment?                     
  Informing 2 1.00% 0 0.00% 3 1.50% 2 1.00% 7 3.50% 
  Consulting 11 5.50% 3 1.50% 14 7.00% 8 4.00% 36 18.00% 
  Placation 1 0.50% 11 5.50% 3 1.50% 10 5.00% 25 12.50% 
  Partnership 
(collaborating) 34 17.00% 34 17.00% 22 11.00% 26 13.00% 116 58.00% 
  Delegated power 
(empowering) 2 1.00% 2 1.00% 8 4.00% 4 2.00% 16 8.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
3 The demand for 
quick decisions and 
actions has been the 
main impediment for 
participation                     
  Strongly agree 6 3.00% 2 1.00% 15 7.50% 7 3.50% 30 15.00% 
  Agree 17 8.50% 27 13.50% 16 8.00% 24 12.00% 84 42.00% 
  Neutral 9 4.50% 6 3.00% 5 2.50% 1 0.50% 21 10.50% 
  Disagree 15 7.50% 12 6.00% 13 6.50% 16 8.00% 56 28.00% 
  Strongly disagree 3 1.50% 3 1.50% 1 0.50% 2 1.00% 9 4.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
4 Issue complexity has 
been the main 
constraint for 
participation                     
  Strongly agree 3 1.50% 3 1.50% 11 5.50% 10 5.00% 27 13.50% 
  Agree 19 9.50% 26 13.00% 18 9.00% 21 10.50% 84 42.00% 
  Neutral 8 4.00% 4 2.00% 3 1.50% 2 1.00% 17 8.50% 
  Disagree 18 9.00% 14 7.00% 15 7.50% 13 6.50% 60 30.00% 
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  Strongly disagree 2 1.00% 3 1.50% 3 1.50% 4 2.00% 12 6.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
5 BRR had no political 
will to stimulate and 
broaden the 
participatory process                     
  Strongly agree 6 3.00% 4 2.00% 8 4.00% 11 5.50% 29 14.50% 
  Agree 20 10.00% 30 15.00% 22 11.00% 34 17.00% 106 53.00% 
  Neutral 19 9.50% 8 4.00% 16 8.00% 3 1.50% 46 23.00% 
  Disagree 5 2.50% 8 4.00% 3 1.50% 2 1.00% 18 9.00% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.50% 0 0.00% 1 0.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
6 BRR did not have 
enough skills to 
manage the 
participatory process                     
  Strongly agree 6 3.00% 5 2.50% 3 1.50% 7 3.50% 21 10.50% 
  Agree 15 7.50% 17 8.50% 18 9.00% 33 16.50% 83 41.50% 
  Neutral 18 9.00% 10 5.00% 19 9.50% 6 3.00% 53 26.50% 
  Disagree 11 5.50% 17 8.50% 9 4.50% 4 2.00% 41 20.50% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 1 0.50% 1 0.50% 0 0.00% 2 1.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
7 NGO(s) had no 
serious intention to 
stimulate and 
broaden the 
participatory process                     
  Strongly agree 3 1.50% 2 1.00% 1 0.50% 0 0.00% 6 3.00% 
  Agree 8 4.00% 5 2.50% 8 4.00% 11 5.50% 32 16.00% 
  Neutral 7 3.50% 9 4.50% 5 2.50% 4 2.00% 25 12.50% 
  Disagree 24 12.00% 32 16.00% 32 16.00% 30 15.00% 118 59.00% 
  Strongly disagree 8 4.00% 2 1.00% 4 2.00% 5 2.50% 19 9.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
8 NGO(s) did not have 
enough skills to 
manage the 
participatory process                     
  Strongly agree 2 1.00% 2 1.00% 8 4.00% 5 2.50% 17 8.50% 
  Agree 6 3.00% 4 2.00% 25 12.50% 36 18.00% 71 35.50% 
  Neutral 8 4.00% 13 6.50% 8 4.00% 2 1.00% 31 15.50% 
  Disagree 30 15.00% 29 14.50% 9 4.50% 7 3.50% 75 37.50% 
  Strongly disagree 4 2.00% 2 1.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 6 3.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
9 Citizens were not 
enthusiastic about 
getting involved in 
the participatory 
process                     
  Strongly agree 1 0.50% 1 0.50% 4 2.00% 2 1.00% 8 4.00% 
  Agree 3 1.50% 1 0.50% 1 0.50% 13 6.50% 18 9.00% 
  Neutral 8 4.00% 8 4.00% 2 1.00% 5 2.50% 23 11.50% 
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  Disagree 25 12.50% 33 16.50% 31 15.50% 25 12.50% 114 57.00% 
  Strongly disagree 13 6.50% 7 3.50% 12 6.00% 5 2.50% 37 18.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
10 Citizens did not have 
the skills to get 
involved in the 
participatory process                     
  Strongly agree 3 1.50% 3 1.50% 3 1.50% 1 0.50% 10 5.00% 
  Agree 9 4.50% 7 3.50% 2 1.00% 16 8.00% 34 17.00% 
  Neutral 9 4.50% 9 4.50% 5 2.50% 3 1.50% 26 13.00% 
  Disagree 26 13.00% 25 12.50% 31 15.50% 24 12.00% 106 53.00% 
  Strongly disagree 3 1.50% 6 3.00% 9 4.50% 6 3.00% 24 12.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
11 Past military conflict 
in Aceh has led 
residents to have a 
lack of awareness 
and little capability 
of getting involved in 
the participatory 
process                     
  Strongly agree 3 1.50% 6 3.00% 11 5.50% 6 3.00% 26 13.00% 
  Agree 5 2.50% 27 13.50% 17 8.50% 24 12.00% 73 36.50% 
  Neutral 17 8.50% 10 5.00% 4 2.00% 5 2.50% 36 18.00% 
  Disagree 23 11.50% 7 3.50% 11 5.50% 11 5.50% 52 26.00% 
  Strongly disagree 2 1.00% 0 0.00% 7 3.50% 4 2.00% 13 6.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
12 Soeharto's 
authoritarian regime 
has led to lack of 
awareness among 
residents of getting 
involved in the 
participatory process                     
  Strongly agree 2 1.00% 10 5.00% 11 5.50% 11 5.50% 34 17.00% 
  Agree 8 4.00% 19 9.50% 18 9.00% 18 9.00% 63 31.50% 
  Neutral 19 9.50% 7 3.50% 6 3.00% 6 3.00% 38 19.00% 
  Disagree 18 9.00% 12 6.00% 12 6.00% 13 6.50% 55 27.50% 
  Strongly disagree 3 1.50% 2 1.00% 3 1.50% 2 1.00% 10 5.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
13 Past military conflict 
in Aceh has led the 
governments to be 
less capable of 
dealing with the 
participatory process                     
  Strongly agree 3 1.50% 4 2.00% 2 1.00% 0 0.00% 9 4.50% 
  Agree 9 4.50% 12 6.00% 10 5.00% 12 6.00% 43 21.50% 
  Neutral 17 8.50% 16 8.00% 12 6.00% 11 5.50% 56 28.00% 
  Disagree 20 10.00% 17 8.50% 24 12.00% 22 11.00% 83 41.50% 
  Strongly disagree 1 0.50% 1 0.50% 2 1.00% 5 2.50% 9 4.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
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14 Soeharto's 
authoritarian regime 
has reduced the 
ability of the 
governments to deal 
with the participatory 
process                     
  Strongly agree 3 1.50% 3 1.50% 2 1.00% 1 0.50% 9 4.50% 
  Agree 9 4.50% 10 5.00% 8 4.00% 7 3.50% 34 17.00% 
  Neutral 17 8.50% 20 10.00% 12 6.00% 14 7.00% 63 31.50% 
  Disagree 20 10.00% 14 7.00% 27 13.50% 24 12.00% 85 42.50% 
  Strongly disagree 1 0.50% 3 1.50% 1 0.50% 4 2.00% 9 4.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
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Table 5.24.  Cross tabulation of responses to questions about the participatory approach 
in post-tsunami redevelopment (questions 1-6 of section IV of the questionnaire) 
No Item 
Lam 
Teungoh Lam Hasan Lambung Merduati Total 
1 The government, NGOs 
and other concerned 
parties need to provide 
education and training 
concerning participatory 
approaches                     
  Strongly agree 15 7.50% 11 5.50% 26 13.00% 6 3.00% 58 29.00% 
  Agree 26 13.00% 35 17.50% 23 11.50% 43 21.50% 127 63.50% 
  Neutral 7 3.50% 3 1.50% 1 0.50% 1 0.50% 12 6.00% 
  Disagree 2 1.00% 1 0.50% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 3 1.50% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
2 The government should set 
specific guidelines for 
community participation in 
the rebuilding process                     
  Strongly agree 11 5.50% 5 2.50% 13 6.50% 7 3.50% 36 18.00% 
  Agree 29 14.50% 40 20.00% 28 14.00% 43 21.50% 140 70.00% 
  Neutral 9 4.50% 5 2.50% 6 3.00% 0 0.00% 20 10.00% 
  Disagree 1 0.50% 0 0.00% 3 1.50% 0 0.00% 4 2.00% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
3 The involvement of 
community members in 
decision making should be 
implemented in a 
representative way                     
  Strongly agree 8 4.00% 9 4.50% 20 10.00% 7 3.50% 44 22.00% 
  Agree 30 15.00% 32 16.00% 21 10.50% 43 21.50% 126 63.00% 
  Neutral 7 3.50% 9 4.50% 7 3.50% 0 0.00% 23 11.50% 
  Disagree 5 2.50% 0 0.00% 2 1.00% 0 0.00% 7 3.50% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
4 The involvement of 
community members in 
decision making in the 
recovery process should be 
implemented through 
public hearings and public 
meetings                     
  Strongly agree 11 5.50% 16 8.00% 19 9.50% 15 7.50% 61 30.50% 
  Agree 30 15.00% 31 15.50% 23 11.50% 29 14.50% 113 56.50% 
  Neutral 5 2.50% 3 1.50% 4 2.00% 3 1.50% 15 7.50% 
  Disagree 4 2.00% 0 0.00% 4 2.00% 3 1.50% 11 5.50% 
  Strongly disagree 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
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  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
5 The best way for the 
governments to involve 
communities in post-
disaster redevelopment                     
  Informing 8 4.00% 0 0.00% 2 1.00% 4 2.00% 14 7.00% 
  Consulting 7 3.50% 4 2.00% 4 2.00% 13 6.50% 28 14.00% 
  Placation 4 2.00% 16 8.00% 9 4.50% 4 2.00% 33 16.50% 
  Partnership (collaborating) 26 13.00% 28 14.00% 34 17.00% 22 11.00% 110 55.00% 
  Delegated power 
(empowering) 5 2.50% 2 1.00% 1 0.50% 7 3.50% 15 7.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
6 The best way for NGO(s) 
to involve communities in 
post-disaster 
redevelopment                     
  Informing 4 2.00% 0 0.00% 2 1.00% 3 1.50% 9 4.50% 
  Consulting 7 3.50% 3 1.50% 5 2.50% 6 3.00% 21 10.50% 
  Placation 2 1.00% 11 5.50% 10 5.00% 5 2.50% 28 14.00% 
  Partnership (collaborating) 29 14.50% 35 17.50% 31 15.50% 27 13.50% 122 61.00% 
  Delegated power 
(empowering) 8 4.00% 1 0.50% 2 1.00% 8 4.00% 19 9.50% 
  Total N 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 50 25.00% 200 100.00% 
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APPENDIX F 
The profiles of respondents who “tend to agree” and “tend to disagree” with the 
importance of community participation in post-tsunami relief for each of the case study 
villages (cluster analysis) 
 
Lam Teungoh 
Table 5.25. Distribution of sex by the two clusters 
Sex Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male 28 4 32 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
Female 17 1 18 
  (94%) (6%) (100%) 
Total 45 5 50 
  (90%) (10%) (100%) 
Table 5.26. Distribution of age by the two clusters 
Age Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
15 – 25 9 1 10 
  (90%) (10%) (100%) 
26-55 33 4 37 
  (89%) (11%) (100%) 
>55 3 0 3 
  (100%) (0%) (100%) 
Total 45 5 50 
  (90%) (10%) (100%) 
 
Table 5.27. Distribution of level of education by the two clusters 
Education Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
No education 4 1 5 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
Elementary 2 0 2 
  (100%) (20%) (100%) 
Junior High 14 2 16 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
Senior High 23 2 25 
  (92%) (8%) (100%) 
University 2 0 2 
(100%) (0%) (100%) 
Total 45 5 50 
  (90%) (10%) (100%) 
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Table 5.28. Distribution of income by the two clusters 
Income Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
None 9 1 10 
  (90%) (10%) (100%) 
<25,000 10 1 11 
  (91%) (9%) (100%) 
25,000 - 
<50,000 21 3 24 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
50,000-75,000 4 0 4 
  (100%) (0%) (100%) 
>75,000 1 0 1 
  (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Total 45 5 50 
  (90%) (10%) (100%) 
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Lam Hasan 
 
Table 5.29. Distribution of sex by the two clusters 
Sex Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male 28 5 33 
  (85%) (15%) (100%) 
Female 15 2 17 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
Total 43 7 50 
  (86%) (14%) (100%) 
 
Table 5.30. Distribution of age by the two clusters 
Age Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
15 – 25 4 1 5 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
26-55 36 5 41 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
>55 3 1 4 
  (75%) (25%) (100%) 
Total 43 7 50 
  (86%) (14%) (100%) 
 
Table 5.31. Distribution of level of education by the two clusters 
Education Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
No education 4 1 5 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
Elementary 1 1 2 
  (50%) (50%) (100%) 
Junior High 12 3 15 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
Senior High 21 2 23 
  (91%) (9%) (100%) 
University 5 0 5 
(100%) (0%) (100%) 
Total 43 7 50 
  (86%) (14%) (100%) 
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Tabel 5.32. Distribution of income by the two clusters 
Income Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
None 6 3 9 
  (67%) (33%) (100%) 
<25,000 2 1 3 
  (67%) (33%) (100%) 
25,000 - 
<50,000 8 1 9 
  (89%) (11%) (100%) 
50,000-75,000 24 2 26 
  (92%) (8%) (100%) 
>75,000 3 0 3 
  (100%) (0%) (100%) 
Total 43 7 50 
  (86%) (14%) (100%) 
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Lambung 
 
Table 5.33. Distribution of sex by the two clusters 
Sex Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male 26 4 30 
  (87%) (13%) (100%) 
Female 18 2 20 
  (90%) (10%) (100%) 
Total 44 6 50 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
 
Table 5.34. Distribution of age by the two clusters 
Age Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
15 – 25 9 0 9 
  (100%) (0%) (100%) 
26-55 32 6 38 
  (84%) (16%) (100%) 
>55 3 0 3 
  100 (0%) (100%) 
Total 44 6 50 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
 
 
Table 5.35. Distribution of level of education by the two clusters 
Education Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
No education 2 0 2 
   (100%) (0%)  (100%) 
Elementary 0 0 0 
  (0%) (0%) (0%) 
Junior High 7 0 7 
  (100%) (0%) (100%) 
Senior High 28 4 32 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
University 7 2 9 
(78%) (22%) (100%) 
Total 44 6 50 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
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Table 5.36. Distribution of income by the two clusters 
Income Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
None 14 2 16 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
<25,000 6 0 6 
  (100%) (0%) (100%) 
25,000 - 
<50,000 7 2 9 
  (78%) (22%) (100%) 
50,000-75,000 12 0 12 
  (100%) (0%) (100%) 
>75,000 5 2 7 
  (71%) (29%) (100%) 
Total 44 6 50 
  (88%) (12%) (100%) 
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Merduati 
 
Table 5.37. Distribution of sex by the two clusters 
Sex Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male 28 8 36 
  (78%) (22%) (100%) 
Female 12 2 14 
  (86%) (14%) (100%) 
Total 40 10 50 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
 
Table 5.38. Distribution of age by the two clusters 
Age Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
15 – 25 0 0 0 
      (0%) 
26-55 31 7 38 
  (82%) (18%) (100%) 
>55 9 3 12 
  (75%) (15%) (100%) 
Total 40 10 50 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
 
Table 5.39. Distribution of level of education by the two clusters 
Education Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
No education 0 0 0 
   (0%)  (0%) (0%) 
Elementary 0 0 0 
   (0%) (0%)  (0%) 
Junior High 8 2 10 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
Senior High 26 6 32 
  (81%) (19%) (100%) 
University 6 2 8 
(75%) (25%) (100%) 
Total 40 10 50 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
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Table 5.40. Distribution of income by the two clusters 
Income Cluster Total 
1 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
None 5 1 6 
  (83%) (17%) (100%) 
<25,000 0 0 0 
   (0%)  (0%) (0%) 
25,000 - 
<50,000 9 3 12 
  (75%) (25%) (100%) 
50,000-75,000 19 4 23 
  (83%) (17%) (100%) 
>75,000 7 2 9 
  (78%) (22%) (100%) 
Total 40 10 50 
  (80%) (20%) (100%) 
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APPENDIX G 
The constraints of community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment for each of the 
case study villages (factor analysis) 
 
Lam Teungoh 
Table 5.41. KMO and Bartlett Test 
KMO 
Bartlett	Test	of	Spherity	
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.563 190.975 66 0.000 
         
Table 5.42. Total Variance Explained 
 
Component 
Initial 
Eigenvalues
% of Variance Cumulative % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 3.461 28.839 28.839 
2 1.872 15.603 44.442 
3 1.483 12.357 56.799 
4 1.161 9.677 66.476 
5 1.035 8.628 75.105 
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Table 5.43. Rotated Component Matrix 
No. Variable 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Quick_decision .169 -.036 .398 .694 .343 
2. Issue_complexity .102 .007 .010 .846 .082 
3. BRR_politic.will .033 -.047 .022 .073 .907 
4. BRR_skills -.066 .418 .102 .173 .701 
5. NGO_intention .868 .211 .026 -.037 .137 
6. NGO_skills .889 -.138 .052 .071 -.087 
7. Citizen_enthusiasm .702 .185 .137 .315 -.041 
8. Citizen_skills .056 .616 -.241 .574 -.098 
9. Aceh_conflict_citizen .100 .293 .702 .140 .107 
10. Soeharto_citizen .057 .133 .908 -.009 -.006 
11. Aceh_conflict_gov .079 .748 .347 -.084 .233 
12. Soeharto_gov .120 .758 .273 .023 .039 
  
The constraints on community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment from the 
biggest to the smallest according to respondents from Lam Teungoh are as follows: 
 NGOs’ intention and skills to implement and manage the participatory process, and citizens’ 
enthusiasm to get involved in the participatory process (28.839% of variance explained).  
 Citizens’ skills to get involved in the participatory process, and the impact of Aceh’s military 
conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on government’s capability of dealing with the 
participatory process (15.603% of variance explained). 
 The impact of Aceh’s military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on citizens’ 
awareness and capability of getting involved in the participatory process (12.357% of 
variance explained). 
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 The demand for quick decisions and actions, and issue complexity caused by the tsunami 
(9.677% of variance explained). 
 BRR’s political will and skills to implement and manage the participatory process (8.628% 
of variance explained). 
(These constraints explain 75.105% of the contraints on community participation in post-tsunami 
redevelopment).    
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Lam Hasan 
Table 5.44. KMO and Bartlett Test 
KMO 
Bartlett	Test	of	Spherity	
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.503 175.603 66 0.000 
         
Table 5.45. Total Variance Explained 
 
Component 
Initial 
Eigenvalues
% of Variance Cumulative % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 2.451 22.281 22.281 
2 1.956 17.779 40.060 
3 1.699 15.447 55.506 
4 1.433 13.026 68.532 
5 1.241 11.284 79.816 
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Table 5.46. Rotated Component Matrix 
No. Variable 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Quick_decision .035 -.053 .906 .140 -.033 
2. Issue_complexity .122 .104 .903 .001 .038 
3. BRR_politic.will -.075 -.048 -.035 -.024 .881 
4. BRR_skills .134 .169 .044 -.085 .841 
5. NGO_intention .923 .046 .128 .051 .056 
6. NGO_skills .920 .033 .035 .051 .009 
7. Citizen_enthusiasm .373 .086 .124 .718 -.093 
8. Citizen_skills .054 -.198 -.006 .826 -.109 
9. Aceh_conflict_citizen -.302 .327 .103 .671 .092 
10. Aceh_conflict_gov .055 .909 .107 .046 .109 
11. Soeharto_gov .036 .930 -.057 -.008 .003 
       
 
The constraints on community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment from the 
biggest to the smallest according to respondents from Lam Hasan are as follows: 
 NGOs’ intention and skills to implement and manage the participatory process (22.281% of 
variance explained).  
 The impact of Aceh’s military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on government’s 
capability of dealing with the participatory process (17.779% of variance explained). 
 The demand for quick decisions and actions, and issue complexity caused by the tsunami 
(15.447% of variance explained). 
 Citizens’ enthusiasm and skills to get involved in the participatory process, and the impact of 
Aceh’s military conflict on citizens’ awareness and capability of getting involved in the 
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participatory process (13.026% of variance explained). 
 BRR’s political will and skills to implement and manage the participatory process (11.284% 
of variance explained). 
(These constraints explain 79.816% of the contraints on community participation in post-tsunami 
redevelopment). 
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Lambung 
Table 5.47. KMO and Bartlett Test 
KMO 
Bartlett	Test	of	Spherity	
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
Df Sig. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.679 347.147 66 0.000 
 
          
Table 5.48. Total Variance Explained 
 
Component 
Initial 
Eigenvalues
% of Variance Cumulative % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 4.158 34.651 34.651 
2 2.153 17.942 52.593 
3 1.475 12.291 64.884 
4 1.339 11.154 76.038 
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Tabel 5.49. Rotated Component Matrix  
No. Variabel 
Komponen 
1 2 3 4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Quick_decision .832 .134 .083 -.163 
2. Issue_complexity .850 .140 .115 -.027 
3. BRR_politic.will .687 -.191 .167 .064 
4. BRR_skills .277 -.393 -.488 -.045 
5. NGO_intention -.260 -.164 .205 .801 
6. NGO_skills .091 .177 -.138 .866 
7. Citizen_enthusiasm .125 .943 .165 .048 
8. Citizen_skills .156 .929 .087 -.021 
9. Aceh_conflict_citizen .896 .108 -.011 -.016 
10. Soeharto_citizen .820 .130 .116 -.075 
11. Aceh_conflict_gov .282 .122 .824 .105 
12. Soeharto_gov .224 .063 .909 -.087 
 
The constraints on community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment from the 
biggest to the smallest according to respondents from Lambung are as follows: 
 The demand for quick decisions and actions, issue complexity caused by the tsunami, BRR’s 
political will to implement and manage the participatory process,  and the impact of Aceh’s 
military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on citizens’ awareness and capability of 
getting involved in the participatory process  (34.651% of variance explained). 
 Citizens’ enthusiasm and skills to get involved in the participatory process (17.942% of 
variance explained). 
 BRR’s skills to implement and manage the participatory process, and the impact of Aceh’s 
military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on government’s capability of dealing 
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with the participatory process (12.291% of variance explained).  
 NGOs’ intention and skills to implement and manage the participatory process (11.154% of 
variance explained). 
(These constraints explain 76.038% of the contraints on community participation in post-tsunami 
redevelopment). 
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Merduati 
Table 5.50. KMO and Bartlett Test 
KMO 
Bartlett	Test	of	Spherity	
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.572 288.528 66 0.000 
        
  
Table 5.51. Total Variance Explained 
 
Component 
Initial 
Eigenvalues
% of Variance Cumulative % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 3.629 30.243 30.243 
2 1.891 15.761 46.004 
3 1.655 13.790 59.793 
4 1.304 10.863 70.657 
5 1.076 8.969 79.626 
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Tabel 5.52. Rotated Component Matrix 
No. Variable 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Quick_decision .219 .876 .074 -.149 .159 
2. Issue_complexity .298 .831 .194 -.112 .133 
3. BRR_politic.will -.203 .134 .005 .866 .046 
4. BRR_skills .205 -.220 -.017 .864 -.098 
5. NGO_intention .021 .258 -.126 .111 .619 
6. NGO_skills -.360 .667 .025 .241 -.021 
7. Citizen_enthusiasm .669 .101 .185 .160 .483 
8. Citizen_skills .071 -.049 .192 -.204 .826 
9. Aceh_conflict_citizen .185 .125 .939 -.014 -.009 
10. Soeharto_citizen .217 .091 .936 .005 .098 
11. Aceh_conflict_gov .876 .149 .158 -.042 .120 
12. Soeharto_gov .888 .020 .211 -.052 -.113 
 
The constraints on community participation in post-tsunami redevelopment from the 
biggest to the smallest according to respondents from Merduati are as follows: 
 Citizens’ enthusiasm to get involved in the participatory process, and and the impact of 
Aceh’s military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on government’s capability of 
dealing with the participatory process (30.243% of variance explained). 
 The demand for quick decisions and actions, issue complexity caused by the tsunami, and 
NGOs’ skills to implement and manage the participatory process (15.761% of variance 
explained). 
 The impact of Aceh’s military conflict and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime on citizens’ 
awareness and capability of getting involved in the participatory process (13.790% of 
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variance explained).  
 BRR’s political will and skills to implement and manage the participatory process (10.863% 
of variance explained). 
 NGOs’ intention to implement and manage the participatory process, and citizens’ skills to 
get involved in the participatory process (8.969% of variance explained). 
(These constraints explain 79.626% of the contraints on community participation in post-tsunami 
redevelopment). 
 
